

Modern Binary Exploitation

CSCI 4968 - Spring 2015

Markus Gaasedelen

```
push ODh
call sub_31411B

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD
; sub_312FD8+49

call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

loc_31307D:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD

and eax, OFFFF or eax, 80070

 $[abp+arg_0]$

DEFCON Quals

- May 15/16/17
 - Starts 8pm Friday, May 15th
 - Sage 3101 Friday, Sage 4101 Saturday/Sunday
- Extra Credit
 - Letter grade raise on a Lab
 - OR +10% on the final project
- To get the extra credit
 - Solve one challenge (that's not a sanity check)
 - OR Play 10 hours on Saturday and/or Sunday

```
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D


Sunday +arg_0]
mov esi, 1D0h
mov esi, 1D0h
```


```
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

Lecture Overview

- Security
 - Security Today
 - Security Tomorrow
- Exploitation
 - Exploitation Today
 - Exploitation Tomorrow

CVE Statistics – May 2015





http://www.cvedetails.com/browse-by-date.php


Security Trends


```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

 As you know, security and mitigation technologies are no doubt getting better

```
- Why the spike in 2014?
```

CVE Statistics – May 2015





jmp short loc_313080

http://www.cvedetails.com/browse-by-date.php

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD
call sub_3140F3
and eax, OFFFFh

June 2013

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```



REF: SUD 312FD 2FD8+59

KREF: sub_312FD

loc 31307D:

; CODE XREF: sub 312FD

and eax, 0ffffh
or eax, 80070000h

7 DE XREF: sub

Security Trends

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

- As you know, security and mitigation technologies are no doubt getting better
 - Why the spike in 2014?

```
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg 0], esi
```

- Possibly a result of the Snowden revelations
 - The fallout raised global awareness and interest in security/privacy. 'Cyber' in the news ever since size and interest in

```
test eax, eax

jg short loc_31307D

call sub_3140F3

jmp short loc_31308C


;

loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

call sub_3140F3

and eax, OFFFFFh
```

- Exploits are getting more and more complex
 - More bugs
 - More time
 - More money



```
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

- Exploits are getting more and more complex
 - More bugs
 - More time
 - More money

```
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
push esi
lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]
push eax
mov esi, 1D0h
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F
```

loc_313066

; CODE XREF: sub 312FD8 ; sub_312FD8+59


• At what point do hobbyists have to draw the line? Companies? Contractors? Nation States?

```
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

loc_31307D:

; CODE XREF: sub_312F

call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h



The Security Mindset

 Systems and applications will never perfectly secure. Period.

```
[lip+arg 0], eax
```


The Security Mindset

 Systems and applications will never perfectly secure. Period.

 They just have to be hard enough to break that nobody can afford it anymore

```
sub 3140F3
```

The Weakest Link - Humans



MBE - 05/12/2015

Future of Security & Exploitation


; CODE XREF: sub_

Lecture Overview

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 - Security Tomorrow
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 - Exploitation Today
 - Exploitation Tomorrow

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

- The entry bar for binary exploitation is rising faster and faster
 - It's starting to outpace individuals and hobbyists interest, ability, and dedication to enter the field



```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

 Memory corruption based exploits will no longer be feasible to produce for the average

desktop or server

 Memory corruption based exploits will no longer be feasible to produce for the average

```
desktop or server
```

- In the immediate 10-20 years (?)
 - Embedded devices are further behind

```
sub 3140F3
```

- push edi
 call sub_314623
 test eax, eax
 jz short loc_31306D
 cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
 jnz short loc_313066
 mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
 cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
 jb short loc_313066
 sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
 push esi
 push esi
- Implementation & logic flaws will probably always exist
 - You can't really fix stupid

- push edi
 call sub_314623
 test eax, eax
 jz short loc_31306D
 cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
 jnz short loc_313066
 mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
 cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
 jb short loc_313066
 sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
 push esi
 push esi
- Implementation & logic flaws will probably always exist
 - You can't really fix stupid
- What we will see and discover more of:
 - Sponsored backdoors, 'cheating'
 - Hardware backdoors, flaws, supply chain trust sub_312FD8+49
 - Crypto backdoors, subtle design flaws

```
CODE XREF: sub_312FD

Bub_3140F3 tsub_312FD8+49

eax, eax

short loc_31307D

sub_3140F3

short loc_31308C
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FI
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0ffffh
or eax, 80070000h
```

Lecture Overview

- Security
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This Course

You spent hours looking for bugs

You spent hours reversing in IDA

You spent hours debugging with GDB

You spent hours writing python

```
call sub_31411B

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D

call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_31
call sub_3140F3
and cax, OFFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

This Course

You spent hours looking for bugs

You spent hours reversing in IDA

You spent hours debugging with GDB

You spent hours writing python

```
sub 3140F3
```

Bug Hunting

Looking for bugs with or without source is the most time consuming part of the process

Bug Hunting

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
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mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

 Looking for bugs with or without source is the most time consuming part of the process

How can we find these bugs faster?

Bug Hunting

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

 Looking for bugs with or without source is the most time consuming part of the process

- How can we find these bugs faster?
 - Automation

Static Code Analyzers

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

- Source code analyzers can help find bugs statically, but they can also miss a lot
 - Very hard to detect many real UAF's statically

```
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308F

loc_313066: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD
; sub_312FD8+55

push ODh
call sub_31411B

loc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD
; sub_312FD8+49

call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C
;

loc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD
```

Static Code Analyzers

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

- Source code analyzers can help find bugs statically, but they can also miss a lot
 - Very hard to detect many real UAF's statically

```
the kids nowadays
```

- Coverity is popular with the kids nowadays
 - integrates straight with GitHub

```
push ODh
call sub_31411B

cc_31306D: ; cODE XREF: sub_312FD8

cc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

; sub_312FD8+49

call sub_3140F3


test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3

jmp short loc_31308C

cc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8

cc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

Coverity



or eax, 80070000h

Static Code Analyzers

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

- Source code analyzers can help find bugs statically, but they can also miss a lot
 - Very hard to detect many real UAF's statically

```
push [ebp+arg_4]
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax.eax
```

- Coverity is popular with the kids nowadays
 - integrates straight with GitHub

- Tons of good options for C/C++ Code
 - http://spinroot.com/static/

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FE
call sub_3140F3
and eax, Offffh
```

Fuzzing

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

• Fuzzing – The act of mangling data and subject throwing it at a target application to see if it mishandles it in some fashion

• Fuzzing has probably been the source of over 95% of the bugs from the past 10 years

The fuzzing era is starting to wind down

```
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD
call sub_3140F3
```

Fuzzing

- Remember these labs?
 - -7C
 - -7A
 - **-9C**
 - -9A
 - _ ...

• Since the scope of the labs is so small, it would have been easy to fuzz them

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, 0FFFFh
or eax, 80070000h
```

Instant Bugs

```
        push
        edi

        call
        sub_314623

        test
        eax, eax

        jz
        short loc_31306D

        cmp
        [ebp+arg_0], ebx

        jnz
        short loc_313066

        mov
        eax, [ebp+var_70]

        cmp
        eax, [ebp+var_84]

        jb
        short loc_313066

        sub
        eax, [ebp+var_84]

        push
        esi
```

```
_ D X
128.213.48.61 - PuTTY
                                                                   16 [|||||||
                                  11 [||||||
                                                                   Tasks: 58, 6 thr; 9 running
                                                                   Load average: 19.43 9.00 3.60
                                                                   Uptime: 1 day, 03:03:33
 4261 rpisec
                                   3316 S 0.0 0.1
5990 rpisec
                                                                      sshd: rpisec@pts/2
15985 rpisec
                                                                      L -bash
                                   3376 S 0.0 0.1 0:00.26
14522 rpisec
                     0 253M 11156 6384 S 52.4 0.1 0:44.50
                                                                            python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14549 rpisec
                     0 253M 11156 6384 R 25.2 0.1 0:21.58
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14548 rpisec
                     0 253M 11156 6384 S 13.9 0.1 0:11.60
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14547 rpisec
                     0 253M 11156 6384 S 0.0 0.1 0:00.25
14546 rpisec
                     0 39644 8248
                                   3476 R 29.2 0.1 0:28.31
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14545 rpisec
                                    3476 S 29.8 0.1
                     0 39660
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14544 rpisec
                     0 39872
                                    3476 S 29.8 0.1
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14543 rpisec
                     0 39872
                                    3476 R 29.2 0.1
                                                     0:28.56
14542 rpisec
                     0 39640
                                    3476 S 29.2 0.1
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
                                    3476 S 29.2 0.1
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14540 rpisec
                                    3476 S 28.5 0.1
14539 rpisec
                     0 39872
                                    3476 S 29.8 0.1
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14538 rpisec
                    0 39860
                                   3476 S 27.9 0.1 0:27.51
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
                    0 43532 13136
                                    3476 S 30.5 0.2 0:29.94
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
                                    3476 S 28.5 0.1
14536 rpisec
                     0 39864
                                                     0:28.26
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14535 rpisec
                                    3476 S 29.2 0.1 0:28.33
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
                                    3476 R 30.5 0.1 0:27.10
14534 rpisec
                     0 39864
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14533 rpisec
                     0 39868
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14532 rpisec
                     0 39860
                                   3476 S 27.9 0.1 0:27.73
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14531 rpisec
                                    3476 S 30.5 0.1 0:28.33
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14530 rpisec
                     0 39856
                                    3476 S 29.8 0.1 0:28.78
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
                                    3476 S 29.8 0.1 0:27.75
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14529 rpisec
                                    3476 S 28.5 0.1 0:27.12
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14528 rpisec
14527 rpisec
                     0 39856
                                    3476 S 29.2 0.1
                                                     0:29.35
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14526 rpisec
                                    3476 S 29.2 0.1
                                                     0:28.51
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14525 rpisec
                     0 39856
14524 rpisec
                                    3476 R 30.5 0.1
                     0 39852
14523 rpisec
                     0 39856
                                   3468 R 29.2 0.1 0:28.76
                                                                               python grindr.py ./testcases/lab7A
14521 rpisec
                                   5228 T 0.0 0.1 0:00.13
                                   1860 S 0.0 0.0 0:00.00
                    0 15824 2108 1944 S 0.0 0.0 0:00.00

    /sbin/getty -8 38400 tty3

1255 root
F1Help F2Setup F3SearchF4FilterF5Tree F6SortByF7Nice -F8Nice +F9Kill F10Quit
                                                                                                                       sub 3140F3
```

American Fuzzy Lop (AFL)

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84
push esi
```

- A 'security-oriented' fuzzer that inserts and utilizes instrumentation that it inserts at compile time
 - Requires source code to be super effective

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American Fuzzy Lop (AFL)

american fuzzy lop 1.74b (readelf)

```
process timing
                                                        overall results
      run time : 0 days, 0 hrs, 8 min, 24 sec
                                                        cycles done : 0
 last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 1 min, 59 sec
                                                        total paths: 812
                                                       uniq crashes : 8
last uniq crash : 0 days, 0 hrs, 3 min, 17 sec
last uniq hang : 0 days, 0 hrs, 3 min, 23 sec
                                                         uniq hangs : 10
cycle progress
                                       map coverage
now processing: 0 (0.00%)
                                         map density: 3158 (4.82%)
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)
                                      count coverage : 2.56 bits/tuple
                                       findings in depth -
stage progress
now trying : arith 8/8
                                      favored paths: 1 (0.12%)
stage execs : 295k/326k (90.31%)
                                       new edges on: 318 (39.16%)
                                      total crashes : 63 (8 unique)
total execs: 552k
                                        total hangs: 191 (10 unique)
exec speed : 1114/sec
fuzzing strategy yields
                                                       path geometry
 bit flips: 447/75.5k, 59/75.5k, 59/75.5k
                                                        levels : 2
byte flips: 7/9436, 0/5858, 6/5950
                                                        pending: 812
arithmetics : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                       pend fav : 1
known ints: 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                      own finds : 811
dictionary: 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
                                                       imported : n/a
     havoc : 0/0, 0/0
                                                       variable: 0
      trim: 0.00%/1166, 38.39%
                                                                  [cpu: 15%]
```

American Fuzzy Lop (AFL)

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313666
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

- A 'security-oriented' fuzzer that inserts and utilizes instrumentation that it inserts at compile time
 - Requires target source code to be supper effective

```
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], esi
jz short loc_31308B
```

- Great for file format fuzzing!....313066.
 - Generally not that useful for CTF fuzzing .: / "

```
http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/
```

```
; sub_312FD8+49

call sub_3140F3

test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D

call sub_3140F3

jmp short loc_31308C
```

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
and eax, Offffh
or eax 80070000b
```

Fundamentals of Modern Bu

push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
loc_313066
var_70]
by var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push

As the bugs get more refined and complex,
 fuzzing will only take us so far

Fundamentals of Modern Bu

 As the bugs get more refined and complex, fuzzing will only take us so far

Many modern bugs have to be 'forced' by requiring very specific conditions

like some sort of crazy edge cases

```
sub 3140F3
```

MBE - 05/12/2015




```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
```

- A 'timeless debugger' By GeoHot
 - Observe a binary at any point of its execution state for a given input
 - You can move forwards and backwards in time



```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306
cmp [ebp+arg_0], eb
jnz short loc_31306
eax, [ebp+var_7
cmp eax, [ebp+var_8
jb short loc_31306
sub eax, [ebp+var_8
```





```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push eax
```

- A 'timeless debugger' By GeoHot
 - Observe a binary at any point of its execution state for a given input
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```
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306
cmp [ebp+arg_0], es
jz short loc_31308
```

- Super basic taint sort of functionality
 - Helps visualize r/w of specific memory addresses
- http://qira.me/

```
; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8;
sub_312FD8+49

call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
call sub_3140F3
```



```
push edi
call sub_314623
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jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

• An 'open-source Platform for Architecture-Neutral Dynamic Analysis' — By MITLE SUB_31486A CAX, CAX

PANDA






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jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
```

- An 'open-source Platform for Architecture-Neutral Dynamic Analysis' — By MITL Sub_31486A eax, eax short loc_31306D esi
- Built on top of QEMU, allows instrumentation, analysis, and replay of an entire system



```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
push edi
mov [ebp+arg_0], eax
call sub_31486A
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
```

PANDA Model



PANDA

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_313061
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84
jb short loc_313666
sub eax, [ebp+var_84
push esi
```

- An 'open-source Platform for Architecture-Neutral Dynamic Analysis' — By MITL Sub_31486A eax, eax short loc_31306
- Built on top of QEMU, allows instrumentation, analysis, and replay of an entire system
- Awesome plugin infrastructure



- Utilizes LLVM Intermediate Representation to make one size fits all (CPU's) analysis plugins
- https://github.com/moyix/panda

 call
 sub_3140F3

 and
 eax, 0FFFFh

 or
 eax, 80070000h

Advanced Concepts Today

- Taint Analysis
 - Tracing the impact of user input throughout the binary, and how it influences execution
 - PANDA, QIRA
- Symbolic Execution + SAT/SMT Solving short 10
 - Proving that specific conditions can exist in execution to manifest difficult bugs
 - Z3, SMT-LIB
- Machine Learning

```
oc_31306D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

call sub_3140F3
test eax, eax
jg short loc_31307D
call sub_3140F3
jmp short loc_31308C

oc_31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
```

Lecture Overview

- Security
 - Security Today
 - Security Tomorrow
- Exploitation
 - Exploitation Today
 - Exploitation Tomorrow

```
50
```

DARPA's Cyber Grand Challenge



, [ebp+arg_0]
, 1D0h

p+arg_4]
_314623
, eax
rt loc_31306D
p+arg_0], esi
rt loc_31308F

; CODE XREF: sub 312FD8
; sub_312FD8+55

_31411B

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD8
; sub_312FD8+49

_3140F3
, eax
rt loc_31307D
_3140F3
rt loc_31308C

loc 31307D:

; CODE XREF: sub_312FD

and eax, Offffh or eax, 8007000

DARPA's Cyber Grand Challenge

jb short loc_313066 sub eax, [ebp+var_84 push esi

o 💝 🗆 []

"DARPA's Cyber Grand Challenge"

call sub_3140F3 jmp short loc_31308

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OVV_k73z3E0

and eax, OFFFFh
or eax, 80070000

About CGC

- A challenge set forth by DARPA
- Can we develop a completely autonomous system that is capable of...
 - finding vulnerabilities (whitebox and blackbox)
 - patching said vulnerabilities
 - writing exploits for said vulnerabilities push sub_31411
- http://www.darpa.mil/cybergrandchallenge/

; CODE XREF: sub_312FE
call sub_3140F3
and eax, Offffn
or eax, 80070000h

Some CGC Competitors

ssh ean

sub_314623
est eax, eax

short loc_31306D

pp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
short loc_313066
eax, [ebp+var_70
pp eax, [ebp+var_84
short loc_313066
eax, [ebp+var_84
short loc_313066
eax, [ebp+var_84
esi
ssh esi

TRAILS

mov [ebp+arg_0], eax

| lea eax, [ebp+arg_0]









: 31307D: ; CODE XREF: sub 312F

and eax, Offffh or eax, 80070000h

Exploitation of Tomorrow

```
push edi
call sub_314623
test eax, eax
jz short loc_31306D
cmp [ebp+arg_0], ebx
jnz short loc_313066
mov eax, [ebp+var_70]
cmp eax, [ebp+var_84]
jb short loc_313066
sub eax, [ebp+var_84]
push esi
push esi
```

• The 'Cyber Reasoning Systems' being by a developed by CGC competitors are quickly pushing the envelope of bug discovery and exploitation

Exploitation of Tomorrow

 The 'Cyber Reasoning Systems' being developed by CGC competitors are quickly pushing the envelope of bug discovery and exploitation

 The technology behind them is likely to be some smart fuzzers guided by taint analysis, constraint solvers, and more

sub 3140F3