Does God Have a Greater Good?
~ AN ATHEISTIC RESPONSE ~

Many theists reply to the logical problem of evil by saying that God has greater good in mind when He allows all of the evil in the universe. In other words, the presence of first order evils is necessary for the existence of second order goods. Thus, an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly benevolent God would create a world in which pain and despair would emerge to make possible virtues such as love, hope, and self-sacrifice. Unfortunately, the implications of such a response to the logical problem of evil are devastating for Theism. 

First, by saying that God allows evil for the purpose of a greater good, one put limitations on God power. It seems that "if God has to introduce evil as a means to good, he must be subject to at least some causal laws" (Mackie 52). If God must permit evil to effect certain goods, then the law of cause and effect would in some way limit Him. However, according to theism, God cannot be limited in any way by the laws of causality because (1) He is omnipotent, and, therefore, has unlimited power and (2) He created causal laws. Consequently, by requiring evil for specific goods, God is confined to causality and is, thus, is neither omnipotent nor the maker of causal laws. 

Second, first order evils do not always result in second order goods. The theistic explanation completely leaves out the possibility of second order evils which "would include malevolence, cruelty, callousness [and] cowardice" (Mackie 54). Second order evil such as these often results from evils of the first order. For example, misery often shapes insane individuals who rape and molest children. It seems that if God intended greater goods, such as mercy and love, to balance the scales of justice, He did not take into account the human tendency to pervert good to its utter extreme.

Third, even if one grants that God really does accomplish a greater good by permitting the existence of evil, theism is still at odds with humanitarianism (Camus). Albert Camus, in his famous novel called The Plague, actually held that Theism is inconsistent with the 'greater good' solution proposed by theists! His argument goes as follows: 

Just think about the implications of the Camus' argument. If God uses evil to accomplish greater goods, then human beings ought not to fight against injustice because such would interfere with God's plans. However, one fact that everyone grants is that it is right to help stop suffering - this is what it truly means to be a humanitarian. Thus, God does not use evil to accomplish a greater good; this certainly casts great doubt on the traditional theistic response to the problem of evil. Further, humanitarianism creates a disproof of God's existence: if God uses suffering to produce a greater good, then such evil is justified, and so it is wrong to work against it. But because we know, on humanitarian grounds, that it is right to help stop suffering, it follows that suffering is not justifiable. Thus, since theists hold that God has a justification for all evil, it follows that ultimately unjustifiable suffering disproves the existence of the Christian God (Geisler, Religion 381).

In sum, there are there are three key reasons why theists are wrong in claiming that God has a greater good in mind when He allows all of the evil in the universe. Primarily, such an explanation reduces God to a being that is not omnipotent. Furthermore, this solution ignores the fact that first order evils sometimes, and even frequently, produce second order evils that are much worse. Lastly, the 'greater good' response to the problem of evil is flawed because it contradicts humanitarianism and even backfires into a disproof of God's existence.

Works Cited

Camus, Albert. The Plague. Trans. Stuart Gilbert. New York: Albert 

Geisler, Norman. Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids: Baker Book  Geisler, Norman. Philosophy of Religion. Grand Rapids: Zondervan 
Mackie, J.L. "Evil and Omnipotence." Mind Vol.16, No. 254 (1955)
McCloskey, H.J. "God and Evil." The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. X, 
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