Mind and Matter

      
It is sometimes argued that:
(1) 'matter is all that exists'.
This is then used to justify the arguments that:
   (2) There is no free will
   (3) The mind is identical to the brain.
   (4) Human consciouness can be artificially reproduced.

(2) On the basis that matter obeys deterministic laws,
(3) on the basis of reductionism, and (4) on the basis
of functionalism.

However, in saying that 'matter is all that exists' you are
not actually proving determinism, functionalism or
reductionism. What is going on is that the word 'matter'
is being used in two senses: one, as a mere synonym for 'existence',
the other as reflecting particular concepts of how the physical
universe works (which may  or may not be true).

Rather than discussing the question of mind in terms of matter,
it would perhaps be better to procede in terms of reductionism, functionalism,
and determinism.

Another argument that is used to favour materialism is that the only
alternative is Cartesian dualism. In fact there are many other options --
property dualism, emergence, supervenience, panexperientialism, etc.

So the questions are:

Is there an 'explanatory gap' between physical and mental phenomena
that makes a reductionsitic/materialistic scheme unfeasible ?

If so, how can it be bridged without abandoning a version of materialism
strong enough to justify science ?

Peter D. Jones 3/8/01