FUJIMORI'S  COUP  DE  FORCE

Thursday, April 24, 1997

Fujimori victorious, surveys the Japanese Ambassador's residence and looks the body of  his enemy, the Tupac Amaru leader, Nestor Cerpa, who died on the stairway of the mansion, was shot in the face and body many times. He also had an execution-style bullets wound in his forehead.

      Talking soccer language, we would say: " Alberto Fujimori, 1. Tupac Amaru, 0.  That's how the tough Peruvian President wanted the four - month hostage crisis at the Japanese Embassy in Lima to end, and it looks as though his demands, rather than those of the leftist Tupac Amaru guerrillas, have been met.

      That's as it should be. The victory of President of Peru, the Peruvian military, and its counterterrorist advisers is shared by all those who favour a hard line against a terrorist threat.  Indeed, the victory vindicates the no - concessions position of goverments around the globe, among them the British, who into this very week continue to face the violent harassment of the Irish Republican Army, the Israelis, and increasingly the South Koreans, who have reacted firmly in the past year against deadly North Korean infiltration.

      It's the Japanese who come out looking less well. Granted, the hostage crisis took place in their embassy, and 24 of the 72 men who remained captive by the end of the siege were Japanese citizens.  But presure from Japanese leaders for Peru to reach some sort of negotiated settlement with the Tupac Amaru rebels in order to ensure the hostages' safe release demonstrated irresponsibility.  Indeed, once the dust settles, it might be worth speculating why the rebels chose a Japanese target in the first place.  Is it because they suspected that Japan, more than another adversary would be willing to cut a deal ?

      Certainly Eng. Fujimori was not prepared to do so.  During negotiations in March, his goverment refused in to the rebels' basic demand that their comrades be freed from Peruvian jails. Moreover, he shuffled his staff over the past weekend, possibly bolstering the goverment's resolve not to give in after such a long and arduous wait.

      Obviously, no one wanted the hostages dead, and the risk on tuesday's operation could have gone wrong was tremendous.  The Peruvian military is not especially well trained in this sort of crisis operation.  Moreover, the tragic recent experience of Waco, Tex., shows how difficult it is to seize a fortified structure in which people are armed.  There was a certain amount of luck involved in the Peruvian military's performance.

      That said, the Tupac Amaru hostage crisis adds to the growing body of global experience that offers lessons to those who would make a settlement with terrorists.

      A hostage crisis pits the short-term need to preserve lives rather sharply against the longer-term goal of discouraging would-be terrorists from using violence as a means of pursuing policy. It demands a high-risk calculation whose short-term return - in the form of released, live hostages - is never a given.  The long-term return - the discouragement of subsequent hostage seizures - is far less tangible to those making the decisions.

      But after the fact, that return is clear.  It took resolve. honour, and courage not to cave in to the Tupac Amaru terrorists .  The President of Peru has set an example to others leaders. He has also sent a clear, discouraging message to prospective violent groups who watched the whole event on their television sets.

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