Basic data concerning the conflict

     1. Mountainous (Nagorno) Karabakh [Autonomous Region]1

Location: Southwest part of Azerbaijan (had no common border with Armenia)

 

Territory: 4, 400 square km (1700 sq miles)

 

Population

• At present: estimated to be around 100,000-160,000
• Before the conflict: 185,000 (1989)

National composition

• At present: 100% Armenian
• Before the conflict: 75% Armenian, 25% Azeri (1989)

 

2.    Impacts of the conflict

Refugees

 

-Azerbaijan: 200,000

-Armenia: 229,000 (by other reports 300,000-400,000)[2]

 

 

Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s)

 

-Azerbaijan (“mainland”): 650,000+

-Armenia: almost none

-Armenians in Mountainous Karabakh: approximately 15,000

-Nakhichevan AR of Azerbaijan: almost none

 

Losses from both sides during the conflict

 

-Killed: 25,000-30,000

Other impacts:

--ethnic cleansing committed against Azeris in Armenia and in the occupied 20 % of Azerbaijan;

--partial ethnic cleansing against the Armenian population in the rest of Azerbaijan;

--billions of dollars of economic damage resulting from war destruction, embargo policies,

--environmental pollution etc. to both countries.

 

Part II: Questions-Answers.

 

1) What is the character of the conflict?

The Karabakh conflict is essentially an ethnic and territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia based on land claims of both parties. Both Azerbaijanians and Armenians accuse each other of territorial and ethnic expansion and aggression.

 

The present Karabakh conflict is the most protracted armed conflict in the post-Soviet area continuing from the late 1980s when the dissolution of the Soviet Union began. In February 1988, Armenians suddenly held well-organized demonstrations in both Yerevan and Stepanakert (Khankendi) demanding the incorporation of Azerbaijan’s Mountainous Karabakh Autonomous Region's (hereinafter MKAR) into Armenia.

 

The essence of the conflict has not changed significantly since then.

 

Armenians in Armenia and in Karabakh demand secession of Mountainous Karabakh and either incorporation of it into Armenia or establishing an independent Armenian "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" (so-called NKR).

 

Azeris, in their turn, argue that Karabakh is critical to the territorial integrity of their country. They contend that Karabakh is a historical and integral part of Azerbaijan and one of the cradles of the Azeri culture. They dismiss the Armenian demands for independence and/or unification and proclaim their readiness to grant wider autonomy to Mountainous Karabakh within the Azerbaijan Republic.

 

2) What is the legal problem in the Karabakh conflict?

 

The Karabakh conflict is an international conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This legal framework was, in part, set by the OSCE (Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe), which recognized Armenia and Azerbaijan as direct parties to the conflict and “elected and other representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh...as interested parties”. This framework constituted the OSCE Mandate for the Minsk Group, where the OSCE has focused its efforts to resolve the conflict[3].

 

Azerbaijanian party insists on the preservation of the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty, while the Armenian party argues the right to self-determination for the Karabakh Armenian community. However, the question of self-determination is not central to this conflict, as Armenian party claims it to be, because the Armenian people has already exercised its right to self-determination by establishing the Armenian Republic and ethnic Armenian minority of Azerbaijan living in Mountainous Karabakh is not a distinct people to be eligible to external self-determination. Legal term of the Armenian action is called irredentism, which means advocating of the “acquisition of some region included in another country by reason of cultural, historic, ethnic, racial and other ties”.

 

The Armenians in Mountainous Karabakh are not “people” but “national minority”. Hence, when claiming independence (which, as the history of the conflict shows, is in fact, a smart strategy towards the subsequent merger with Armenia), or when directly demanding unification and fighting to achieve these ends they claim forceful secession from the sovereign state, which is broadly recognized as illegitimate action in modern international law and international relations and is explicitly contrary to such fundamental principle as that of territorial integrity.

 

Moreover, it is indisputable and could be found in any serious source concerning the matter that Armenia was/is directly involved in this conflict by assisting militarily and financially the ethnic Armenians in Mountainous Karabakh. The facts of involvement of Armenian Army's regular troops in the military operations and the fact that the Republic of Armenia finances from 60 to up to 90%[4] of self-proclaimed Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) budget prove that. Thus, as a matter of law, Armenian army troop involvement in Azerbaijan makes Armenia a party to the conflict- aggressor and promotes the conflict in Karabakh to the international level[5].

 

In summary, this conflict is a conflict with Armenia, acting aggressively against Azerbaijan; ethnic Armenians in Karabakh, as separatists attempting to merge with Armenia by trying to screen off under the ideal of self-determination and Azerbaijan, trying to preserve its territorial integrity, its national and cultural [id]entity so much associated with Karabakh.

 

3) What are the main obstacles in negotiation process?

-Inequality

The fact that Azerbaijan has virtually lost the war by having almost 20% of her territory occupied by the Armenian forces and having 1 million refugees, put her to a comparatively disadvantageous position, when Armenian party uses the occupied territories outside Karabakh as “trading chips” for acquiring more concessions from Azerbaijanian party.

 

At first the negotiations were stressed on the package resolution when the return of the occupied territories and refugees and the future status of Mountainous Karabakh would be negotiated and agreed upon in one agreement. But later Armenian party rejected the package resolution and insisted on step-by-step resolution when the conditions of return of the refugees and occupied territories and the future status of Karabakh would be negotiated separately. Armenian party obviously benefited from such kind of negotiations because now she could use the occupied territories as a “bargaining chip” for acquiring independence to Karabakh. For example, in return for submitting the occupied Azeri territories adjacent to Karabakh back to Azerbaijan, the Armenian party demands Azerbaijan to go to concession “on her turn" and grant independence to Karabakh Armenians. Thus, it looks like the Armenian party negotiates to “buy” an Azeri land (Mountainous Karabakh) by suggesting yet another Azeri land (occupied territories adjacent to Mountainous Karabakh), whereas neither of them belong to her.

-Independent parties

Another serious obstacle in negotiation is that there is still significant disagreement on who can be considered an independent party to the conflict and who cannot. The Armenian party insists on recognition of the Karabakh Armenian authorities as a competent and equal party to the negotiations. Azerbaijanian party prefers to negotiate with one Armenian party in a time and argues that the puppet Armenian authorities of Karabakh cannot be considered as an independent party as they are the absolute dependents of Armenia and therefore, rejected direct bilateral negotiations solely with self-proclaimed NKR authorities. Azerbaijan also fears that bilateral negotiations could allow Armenia to withdraw from negotiations and thus, to escape from the responsibility while still backing up the self-proclaimed NKR Armenian authorities. Azerbaijan also insisted that, if the Karabakh Armenians' representatives participate as equal full-right party in negotiations, then by the same logic, the representatives of the Karabakh Azeris should have the right to participate in the negotiation process on equal rights with Armenian community of Karabakh too.

-Shusha and Lachin

Yet another substantial disagreement is the status of the Shusha raion of former MKAR and Lachin raion adjacent to it, which borders and connects Mountainous Karabakh with Armenia.

 

The Azeris consider the town of Shusha the historical capital of Karabakh, the cradle of Azeri music and culture. Many famous Azeri composers and writers were from Shusha. Shusha raion (=county or province) was the only one among the five others inside of MKAR with Azeri majority before its occupation and expulsion of Azeri population in 1992.

 

Lachin raion, obviously, was not a part of MKAR and never was (although historically and geographically it constitutes a mountainous part of Karabakh region); neither has it had any Armenian population. The only claim the Armenian party makes in an attempt to annex these territories is that Shusha is an inseparable part of Karabakh (which is true) and Lachin has the strategic corridor linking Mountainous Karabakh with Armenia and with the rest of the world. As the Armenian party states, without having a direct link to Armenia, which implies annexation of the Shusha-Lachin corridor, the Karabakh Armenians will feel always insecure and vulnerable.

-Attitudes in the Society

The radical moods, which have roots in both societies also, have been an obstacle for achieving settlement. For example in 1997 the president L. Ter-Petrosyan was forced to resign by strong radical opposition after he was ready to support the Minsk group call to return six out of eight occupied provinces adjacent to the Mountainous Karabakh (the other two provinces were Lachin and Kelbajar). R. Kocharyan, who generally was considered the leader of the "war party" became the president (it is notable, that before the presidential elections in Armenia, Kocharyan was the president of self-proclaimed Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and by the time of elections he had not even possessed the necessary Armenian citizenship and still formally possesses the Azeri citizenship being a Karabakh Armenian, the facts which didn't hamper him to be the president of Armenia..).

 

Yet another example from recent times, the direct talks between the Azerbaijanian President H. Aliyev and R. Kocharian, which was expected to yield important results, were effectively disrupted by the terrorist attack on Armenian Parliament in October 1999, in which a number of high Armenian officials were killed, including Speaker and the Prime-Minister. It was a painful shock that the Armenian society had to live through. There were considerable arguments that one of the objectives of this terrorist attack was to disrupt the peace process. In the meantime, the opposition from the Azerbaijanian society, that was kept unaware (as well as the Armenian society) of the negotiation details, has also played a significant role in preventing the alleged “treacherous negotiations”.

 

There were much rumors that during direct talks the two Presidents discussed the issue of a territorial swap between Armenia and Azerbaijan, when, ostensibly, Karabakh would be transferred to Armenia, whereas Azerbaijan would get some small part of Zangezur, thus reestablishing the link between Nakhichevan exclave and the “mainland”. It should be noted, however, that besides widespread popular sentiment against territorial swap in both countries, some political factions in both Armenia and Azerbaijan also opposed this swap based on strategic considerations as well. In a case the territory swap would come true, Armenia would be deprived from her direct access to her strategic partner Iran. As to Azerbaijan, she would get a small and underdeveloped territory relatively to Karabakh with its rich land and more or less developed infrastructure.

-Geopolitical interests

And at last but not at least, the important strategic situation of Caucasus as a gateway between Europe and the Middle East and Central Asia regions, rich in natural resources, intertwining and oftentimes contradicting and conflicting interests of Russia, USA, Iran, Turkey and the rest of Europe also heavily influences the conflict resolution process.

 

4) What are the positions and policies of regional and interested powers with regard to the Karabakh problem?

 

 -The United States: ethnic lobby v. economic-strategic interests

 

The US views Azerbaijan as a strategic political and economic partner in the region, gateway between Europe and the Middle Eastern and Central Asian resources and markets. Azerbaijan’s role as one of the major suppliers of oil and oil products in the Europe in XXI c. can also be a reliable factor to determine a degree of the US interest in the region.

 

However, the US policy in the region has been significantly restrained by the impact of domestic politics: that is the influence of the powerful Armenian lobby in the Congress. Whereas the White House condemns occupation of Azeri lands, displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, human rights abuses, Congress denies humanitarian aid to million of Azeri refugees by its amendment to the Freedom Support Act, notoriously known as Section 907 (imposed in 1992) and allocates extremely disproportional foreign aid to Armenia the amount of which even exceeded the entire Armenian budget, including defense[6] and listed Armenia as the second after Israel largest recipient of foreign aid from US calculated on a per capita basis in 1996[7]. On the other hand, today Azerbaijan is the only post-Soviet country not to get US Government aid.

 

Despite the efforts of White House to lift this unfair restriction imposed on Azeri people the Congress still continues its pro-Armenian policy driven solely by domestic interests caring only on how to please the Armenian community of America to get their support during the elections.

 

Obviously, such inconsistent policy harms US interests in this strategic region and also complicates the peace process.

-Russia: nostalgia for the imperial past

Russia's reputation as the impartial and just mediator interested in solving the problem has been seriously damaged during the conflict. Both parties blamed Russia for discriminatory policies, in using the conflict to keep both countries in her "sphere of influence" and even accused her of military involvement of the conflict.

 

There are substantial grounds for such allegations.

 

For example, on January 19-20 1990 the Soviet troops without consent of even Azeri Soviet authorities and without notice to population invaded Baku where there were huge strikes and demonstrations demanding independence for Azerbaijan and justice in Karabakh (as the state of emergency was imposed on Karabakh and some adjacent areas by Moscow, the Armenian Parliament was discussing the MKAR budget, like it was already a part of Armenia, the flow of refugees was increasing etc). The communist and KGB leaders of Russia tried to justify the invasion, with the need to stop "Armenian pogroms" in Baku, even though it is a fact that there were no "pogroms" at that time in Baku (“Hungarian scenario”). The result of this brutal invasion was hundreds of peaceful people killed and injured. This date entered the history of Azeri people as the "Black January" tragedy.

 

In 1991 during the so-called "Operation Ring" the joint Azeri-Soviet (Russian) force have held a "passport control" in Shaumian (presently Geranboy) raion (=county or province) of Azerbaijan neighboring MKAR and populated by a large Armenian community. During this joint Azeri-Russian operation many villages where Armenians lived were emptied of them and the Armenian population (several thousand) were deported to MKAR.

 

Another yet outrageous example was the participation of 366th regiment of Russian Interior Ministry forces in an assault on the Azeri town of Khojaly in central MKAR in the night of February 25-26. The victims of that inhuman assault were 400-2000 Azeris, mainly civilians, hundreds of others captured. The destiny of many of them is still unknown. Immediately after the Khojaly massacre the 366th regiment, which played a decisive role in capturing the town, was called back to Russia and dissolved in an attempt to bury the scandal. Most of the arms of the regiment were left at the disposal of the Karabakh Armenian authorities.

 

At present the biggest problem with Russia is that she doesn't wish to abandon her imperial policies. Russia has proclaimed the Caucasus an area of vital interest and desperately backs up her allies in the region. As former US Ambassador to the OSCE and US special negotiator for Karabakh, John Maresca, stated:

 

"Russia wished to reestablish its dominance in the region and to exclude outsiders, namely the US and Turkey Russia wants to dominate Armenia  and Azerbaijan for a number of reasons. Most obviously, Moscow would like to reestablish control of the former soviet frontier with Turkey and Iran  and to share in Azerbaijan's oil riches. To accomplish these aims, Russia has  been pressuring Azerbaijan to accept the reentry of Russian troops as a separation  force and as border guards, as to give Russia a share of the oil concessions being developed by Western countries. For leverage the Russians have used an  implicit but dramatic threat: If Azerbaijan does not comply, Russia will step up its backing for Armenia, with disastrous military results for the Azeris."[8]

 

This is exactly what happens now. Armenia, who was quick to realize the benefits of alliance with Russia for her, is the closest ally of Russia in the Caucasus. Russia has stationed troops in Armenia guarding her borders with Turkey and Iran. Russia also arms Armenia, She has illegally transferred enormous arms supplies to Armenia during the years 1994-96 with overall cost of, at least, 1 billion dollars causing an international scandal and still continues to supply Armenia.

 

Armenia welcomes Russian troops, because in doing so, she relieves herself from guarding her borders with Turkey, whom she considers a potential threat. At the same time, it allows her to concentrate her military force in Armenian-Azerbaijanian conflict line.

With an outpost in Caucasus, Russia oftentimes exercises harsh policies against two other South Caucasian republics: Azerbaijan and Georgia, which pursue more pro-Western policies in an attempt to get rid of the Russian dominance. Russia uses the conflict in these countries to bring them to her sphere of influence again.

-Turkey: an outpost of the West in the East

Turkey has close ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties with Azerbaijan and repeatedly supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and interests. Turkey also views Azerbaijan as a strategic link between herself and Turkic republics of Central Asia. She is also displeased with Armenia being under the thumb of Russia and resists Russian attempts to dominate in the region, seeking to strengthen Western influence in the Caucasus policies.

 

During the height of the conflict in 1993 Turkey imposed an embargo on Armenia under the pretext of Armenian troops non-compliance with the Security Council Resolution #822 (1993), demanding immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces from the occupied Kelbajar raion of Azerbaijan.

 

In 1992 when Armenia launched its first massive military offensive against Nakhichevan exclave of Azerbaijan, Turkey's military intrusion was seriously discussed in Ankara. However, Russia hurried to warn firmly that such an action could unleash the third world war and Turkey had not much to choose other than to comply with the situation.

 

The historical enmity that many Armenians feel against the Turks also has played an important role. Armenia considers Turkey a historical enemy and accuses her in the alleged "genocide of Armenians" during the World War I years and also questions Turkey's impartiality as a mediator due to the wide public and elite sympathy to Azerbaijan in Turkey.

 

Armenia fears Turkey so close to her geographically and so close to Azerbaijan in her position and has repeatedly rejected Turkish calls for mediation.

-Iran: balance of powers policy

Iran is the homeland of millions of Azeris, comprising the second largest ethnic group in Iran after Persians and living in its northwest part bordering Azerbaijan. This factor makes a substantial, but not synonymous influence to the Iran's attitude.

 

First of all, Iran fears that a strong Azerbaijan Republic can be an incentive for the Azeris living in Iran to demand more rights and even to secede and unify with Azerbaijan. Thus, Iran is not interested and fears an establishment of strong Azerbaijan.

 

On the other hand, Iran cannot explicitly go against Azerbaijan and support Armenia risking to antagonize the Azeris living in Iran and also other Iranians sympathizing Azerbaijan on the grounds of religious proximity.

 

Iran is dissatisfied with the role of Turkey and the West to strengthen their role in the Caucasus and neither she is satisfied with the Azerbaijan's pro-Western policies. So, she intends to use the enmity between Turkey and Armenia to take an opportunity to oppose Turkish and US policies in the region.

 

In this situation Iran had to exercise balance of powers policy pursuing her national interests and also trying to prevent "spillover" of the conflict to her territory. This policy implies neither strong pro-Western and Turkic Azerbaijan, nor powerful Christian Armenia. Iran officially recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and makes some humanitarian aid to the refugees, but in the meantime widely cooperates with Armenia and even Karabakh Armenian authorities. In some cases Armenian party simply used Iranian mediation to prepare for the new attacks, as it was in May 1992, when during the high level negotiations in Tehran, Armenian party used Azerbaijan's distraction to seize Shusha and Lachin. This fact also did little to ensure Azerbaijan that Iran was an appropriate mediator for the conflict resolution.

 

But it should be noted that Iran once dared to intervene militarily when she was worried about possible significant disruption of balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia during the second massive Armenian offensive to Nakhichevan in 1993. At that time Iranian troops passed across the border (without Azerbaijani permission) to defend "jointly constructed dams" and also established some camps for the refugees. Iran, who pursued her “balance of powers” policy didn't want refugee flow to her territory and occupation of Nakhichevan by Armenia and feared "spillover" of the conflict to her territory. Despite she withdrew soon after being warned by Russia, this Iranian move restricted Armenian freedom of action and helped Nakhichevan to escape massive Armenian offensive.

-Europe: first shaky efforts

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan desire more integration to the European structures. In the same time Western Europe considering the natural resources and strategic importance of the region is willing to develop relations with both countries. At present the conflict and the possibility of resuming hostilities are the major obstacles in the way to the further European integration, as Europe does not want more instability within its boundaries.

 

Nowadays the European efforts are mainly concentrated in the assisting Minsk Group, which is led presently by France, Russia and US representatives as co-chairmen and which functions under the auspices of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe),in its mediation for peaceful settlement and its efforts to strengthen the cease-fire, which has been generally followed by the parties since May 1994, while preparing proposals for the settlement to the conflicting parties.

 

Nevertheless, there has been substantial discontent from both sides regarding the activity of the Minsk Group and OSCE dealing with the Karabakh problem. Both conflicting parties and some independent observers repeatedly accused the Minsk Group of being driven by national interests of its leading countries. OSCE was criticized in not being actively, and most importantly, effectively involved in the conflict resolution by pushing the conflicting sides to the compromise.

 

5) Why Azerbaijan doesn’t open its borders with Armenia and keeps Armenia in blockade?

 

In 1989 Azerbaijan’s border with Armenia and Armenian-controlled regions of Mountainous Karabakh was sporadically closed as a result of escalating conflict. By 1991, with the beginning of active military operations the Azerbaijanian Government officially decided to close borders and cease all trade relations with Armenia. As result of broad propaganda of the Armenian interest groups abroad, this Azeri action has been widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. For example, the US Congress, which, as we saw, was the captive of the Armenian lobby, denied all governmental aid to Azerbaijan unless “it respected international human rights standards, abandoned its blockade of Armenia, ceased its use of force against Karabakh and Armenia and sought a peaceful solution to the conflict”.

 

However, let’s see the opposite arguments to figure out how fair and well grounded are all these allegations.

 

As the Azerbaijanian party points, from the very beginning of the conflict Armenia acted as an aggressor against Azerbaijan. She declared the unification of Armenia and Mountainous Karabakh in 1989, an act, which had absolutely no legal grounds neither based on Soviet Constitution of that time nor on present international legal norms and ironically, Armenia hasn't rescinded that Parliament decision since then, even after the formal self-proclamation of independence of Armenian NKR. Armenia began first the massive expulsion of Azeri population from Armenia beginning from the February of 1988 when the massive anti-Azerbaijan demonstrations were held and persecution of Azeris began, which ultimately counted more than 200.000 (more than total population of Mountainous Karabakh including both Armenians and Azeris!) and whose actions grew to the active military aggression against Azerbaijan afterwards with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

 

Azerbaijan asserts that in this entire situation she couldn't act otherwise. She couldn't keep her borders open with Armenia like nothing happened while the number of refugees reached 1 million, while there has been committed ethnic cleansing against the Azeri population in Armenia and later in approximately 20% of Azerbaijan Republic, while there have been continuous attacks on Azeri towns and villages.

 

Furthermore, Azerbaijan points that she is not Armenia’s only border country. Besides Azerbaijan there are Georgia and Iran who Armenia borders with and whom she has normal relations and therefore, crying about blockade of Armenia is absurdity.

Azerbaijan has simply placed an embargo and ceased all trade relations with a nation with which she considers herself in a state of armed conflict and is under no obligation to trade with Armenia.

 

Moreover, Azerbaijan also stresses that Armenia has no moral right to accuse Azerbaijan, as she by herself keeps Azerbaijan's exclave of Nakhichevan in blockade and isolated from “mainland” since the beginning of the conflict.

 

6) Why Azerbaijan rejected the last proposal of the OSCE Minsk group regarding an establishment of a “common state” with Karabakh Armenian authorities?

 

The so-called "common state" proposal called for the establishment of horizontal relationship between the Azerbaijanian Government and Karabakh Armenian leadership, meaning their equal powers; the existence of independent Karabakh Armenian army, their own currency and other attributes of a sovereign State.

 

This proposal was the outcome of the Armenian refusal to accept conditions set forth in Lisbon Summit of OSCE in 1996 when, despite the support of all members, Armenia vetoed the document with an article stipulating the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. In an attempt to make Armenian party more compliant, the OSCE, pushed by Russia, prepared a new draft for conflict resolution with new articles that were unacceptable to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan proclaimed that it is impossible to establish a state on virtually confederative principles between Azeri people of 8 million and less than 150 thousand ethnic Armenians living in Karabakh (Armenians comprised less that 2 % of country’s population, there are more Russians in Azerbaijan than Armenians). It would mean an establishment of a state inside of a state or in other words a sovereign state whose affiliation with Azerbaijan would be nominal. Moreover, according to the provisions of the so-called “common state” proposal, Azerbaijan should not sign any treaty or join any political bloc without prior consent of the self-proclaimed NKR authorities. Thus, let alone the loss of part of the territory, 8 million strong Azerbaijanian people was even demanded to submit its independence and virtually, fall under control of the Karabakh Armenian authorities, which, at best, can represent the political will of not more than 150.000 Armenian community living in Karabakh.

 

It is important to note, that all the said above does not imply that Armenian party would comply with such a solution to the conflict. Armenia is still confident that her military advantage allows her to demand more.

 

At the same time, Azerbaijan expressed her readiness to guarantee all the rights and freedoms to ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan and repeatedly confirmed her position. The Azerbaijanian party is also ready to grant Mountainous Karabakh region a high status of autonomy within the Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan was always in favor of an international presence and observation in the conflict area to guarantee peace and stability in the region as long as it would be necessary. Azerbaijan also guarantees ethnic Armenians in Mountainous Karabakh secure passage from the so-called Lachin corridor which Armenian party has occupied and intends to annex.

 

7) Why Armenia does not recognize "Nagorno Karabakh Republic"?

 

Armenia hasn't recognized the self-proclaimed NKR and at present, is unlikely to do so. Armenia pathetically tried to prove that she is actually not a party to the conflict that she has not participated in the military operations in Karabakh, and that she has suffered for nothing. Thus, Armenia is unlikely to recognize Karabakh, at least, at present situation, in order not to antagonize the international community, by diminishing her area for maneuvering and risking to be sanctioned and internationally recognized as an explicit aggressor. Besides, one should not forget that Armenia has her own ambitions (even though she tries to hide them in vain from international community now) with regard to the Mountainous Karabakh. Hence, recognition would lead not only to disadvantage in international political stage restricting her freedom of action, but also would significantly hamper both internationally and domestically her attempts to incorporate Karabakh into her own territory.

 

8) What is the role of Armenia in the conflict?

 

Despite all the claims and complaints by Armenia that she is not the party to the conflict, that she has not participated in a military operations and has suffered for nothing, there is substantial evidence and proof to assert the opposite.

 

I.                 Armenia has participated in military operations in Karabakh.

The evidence established by various international NGO's and observer groups; the testimonies of the refugees from the occupied lands; the soldiers, arms, war maps and other supplies from regular units of Armenian Army, captured during the fighting in Karabakh; artillery bombardment of various places of Azerbaijan from Armenia (e.g. Kazakh raion in the north-west bordering Georgia, Kelbajar occupied in 1993, Nakhichevan AR); armed assaults to Azeri territories outside Mountainous Karabakh[9] (e.g. the same Kazakh, Kelbajar raions and the Nakhichevan exclave of Azerbaijan); the hundreds of Azeri civilians and POWs captured in Karabakh and held in the jails in, Yerevan, Spitak, Goris and many other parts of Armenia and many more facts allow to consider Armenia's military involvement in the conflict as obvious.

 

II.               Armenia financially sponsors NKR Armenian authorities.

Armenia actually doesn't deny this fact arguing that without financial support, food and fuel (most of which was supplied to Armenia as humanitarian aid for civil population) the Karabakh Armenians would suffer heavily from Azeri assaults, the Azeri siege might cause serious shortages of food and fuel (as well as military), that the fuel shortage might seriously worsen the conditions of the Karabakh Armenians particularly during the severe winters etc. At the same time, there are substantial evidences that the same fuel was used more for military purposes when, for example, launching massive attacks in the winter and spring of 1992 and 1993, rather than for civilian needs.

 

III. Armenia has demonstrated her aggressive intentions in domestic and international political and legal activities by refusing to recognize and respect the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, vetoing international documents stipulating the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, hampering the negotiation process relying on her military advantage, hindering the international community to set up a strong legal basis for solution to the problem etc.

 

There are lots of examples for the allegations above, like the above mentioned Armenian parliament act (decision) adopted in 1989 and ruling the incorporation of MKAR to Armenia. As it was pointed above, this decision hasn't been rescinded since then.

 

In 1992 the Armenian Parliament decreed that it would not sign any international document stipulating that Karabakh remained a part of Azerbaijan. In 1996 Lisbon Summit of OSCE despite the unanimous support by other members, Armenia vetoed the article of the final declaration which stipulated the inviolability of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

 

Whatever the arguments the Republic of Armenia might propose, it is obvious that her acts throughout the conflict makes her an aggressor and invader of the Azerbaijan territory. (see. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX). Definition of Aggression, particular attention to Art 3. and Art 5(1).).

 

9) Is there some legal basis to lay down the foundation for peaceful settlement?

 

Despite all the complications and disagreements both regional (e.g. OSCE) and global organizations (e.g. UNO) have significantly contributed to the peace process and laid some grounds for the conflict settlement.

 

In 1996 in OSCE Lisbon Summit all the participating States supported three principles proposed by OSCE Minsk Group which should form the peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict. These principles were:

 

1) territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and Azerbaijan Republic;

2) high status of Mountainous Karabakh within the Azerbaijan Republic;

3) guaranteed security to all population of Mountainous Karabakh (including both Armenian and Azeri population).

 

Unfortunately, as was already said, this document had not passed due to the veto imposed by Armenia and was included to the final declaration as an advisory annex in form of the statement of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE.

 

UN Security Council has adopted four Resolutions in 1993 concerning the Karabakh conflict: Resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884. In these Resolutions the UN Security Council demands “immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all occupying forces from…occupied areas of the Azerbaijan Republic.”

 

Armenia and Azerbaijan should mutually recognize each other’s territorial integrity and establish normal relations as the members of UN, CIS, OSCE and other international institutions and international community.

 

The Armenian population of Mountainous Karabakh should be guaranteed all the rights and freedoms according to the provisions of international law with regard to the national minorities and appropriate form of self-government should be granted with respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic.

 

The banished Azeri population of Karabakh should be allowed to return to their homes and granted all the rights and security guarantees equally with the Armenian population.

 

For all these purposes both Armenian and Azeri people desperately need the help of and more attention from the international community to restore long, stable and just peace.