The Politics of Order-Building in
Dr. Dimitris K. Xenakis*
Defence Analysis Institute
Defence Analysis Institute
September 2003
1.1 About the Study: Why and How
1.2 Uses of Comparison and Analogical Reasoning
The Helsinki Process and the Transformation of Europe
2.1 Europe and the Cold War System
2.2 Détente
and the Genesis of the CSCE
2.4 From Détente
to Annus Mirabilis: 1975-1989
2.6 Transformation Within: From Regime to Organisation:
1990-1995
2.7 Functions, Structures and Mechanisms
2.8 Understanding the Helsinki Paradigm
The Barcelona Process and the Transformation of the
Mediterranean
3.1 Euro-Mediterranean Systemic Properties
3.2 (Mis)perceptions, Islamophobia and the Arab Journey to
Modernity
3.3 Towards a Comprehensive Security Agenda
3.4 The
Mediterranean Between and Within Europe and the US
3.5 The Barcelona Declaration and the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership
3.6 The Evolution of the Barcelona Process
3.7 September 11th and the Mediterranean
Dimension of ESDP
3.8 Overall Evaluation of the Barcelona Project
3.9 Conceptualising the Euro-Mediterranean Regime
Comparative Investigation and Lessons Learned
4.1 Comparing ‘Apples with Oranges’
4.2 Multilateral Arrangements and Conditionality
4.3 The Politics of Order-Building
This
study explores
two distinct international political phenomena from a comparative perspective:
the Conference (and then Organisation) on Security and Co-operation in
The study explores various areas of international relations
in both pre- and post-1989
Institutionalists of all kinds seem to agree that
goal-attainment is affected by the organisational and institutional context
within which international actors operate. ‘Institutions contain some sort of
governmental DNA and tend to transmit that genetic code to the individuals who
take up roles within them’.[2]
Although it is true that opinions differ on the extent to which institutions
reformulate preferences and interests,[3]
what the proposed comparison needs is a research design to ‘force analysts to
distil out of this diversity a set of common elements that prove to have great
explanatory power’.[4] The
organisation of this investigation revolves around the following aims: to
examine the systemic complexity of the emerging Euro-Mediterranean order in
relation to pre- and post-Cold War European international politics; to
conceptualise the EMP in the light of the Helsinki experience; and to explore
the benefits of a macroscopic comparative analysis in transformative orders.
The study has been organised along the following lines. The
first Chapter is dedicated in the justification of the comparative
investigation both in terms of methodology (general level) and in terms of the comparability
of the two international processes under scrutiny. Chapter 2 offers a
historical overview of the genesis of the CSCE, its process-driven nature, and
its distinctive contribution to détente
during the Cold War. In this context, the analysis of the European order in
relation to the systemic complexity of the Cold War era aims at gaining
analytic purchase on the role of the CSCE in meeting the challenges of a
fragmented international order. It offers both a broad and precise analysis of
what constituted a milestone in East-West politics at the time, namely the
Helsinki Final Act and its assorted baskets. The Act also contained a very
significant follow-up procedure designed to address problems of continuity in
inter-block communication, whilst bestowing to the whole exercise a ‘sense of
process’, particularly evident in the way in which analysts have used the term
‘Helsinki Process’ interchangeably with the entire CSCE. The analysis of its
evolution from 1975 to the 1989 annus
mirabilis aims to explain not only the ‘long peace in Europe’, but also to
tackle issues of order and change: how we moved from the bipolar system of the
Cold War to a new international system characterised by increased
interdependence, higher levels of co-operation, far more sophisticated networks
of interaction (involving both state and non-state actors), but also more
complicated and uncertain security politics of the post September 11th
era..
But the passing from one era to the other did not represent
the oft-quoted thesis of the ‘end of history’ and with it the end of security
anxiety in
To gain any valuable insights in contemporary
Euro-Mediterranean politics, one has first to understand the complexity of this
volatile regional order. Chapter 3 aims at no less. Such a demanding task
provides a comprehensive mapping of the Mediterranean, which is taken as a
regional space, where geography, history, and politics intermesh with culture
and religion with enormous complexity, resulting in a composite system of
partial regimes, each reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging.
This chapter also examines the patterns of Euro-Mediterranean relations since
the signing of the Barcelona Declaration. The nature and the level of regional
interdependence and the role that previous Mediterranean approaches of the EU
have come to play in the area provide the analytical framework for placing the
current state of play in context. The study claims that the EMP represents a
‘breaking with the past’, makes the case for a focused analysis of its
basket-based arrangements, and offers an overall account of the project. By
employing the uses of ‘process-phased analysis’ in the light of the Helsinki
Process, a first evaluation of the project-dynamics is attempted, arguing that
it is yet to deliver the expected order-building outcomes. This is due to a
variety of reasons, and most notably due to the lack of institutional support,
making arduous and erratic the transition of the regional partnership from an
‘association of states’ to a full-blown ‘international regime’.
The final chapter focuses on the comparative insights, by
addressing the differences and similarities in the patterns of systemic
complexity and order-building of the two international processes. It concludes
with the lessons that the
‘Like in
Analogical reasoning permits the transfer of
such assumptions and postulates from a well-known phenomenon to a less familiar
one and provides the necessary cognitive resources for developing a working conception
of new issues and questions.[5]
This assumption allows us extend similarity so that information from the
familiar domain (
According to Novick, analogical reasoning proceeds in four
steps: representation (preliminary characterisation), retrieval (useful
analogies), mapping (matching features), and adaptation (model modification).[6]
Successful reasoning by analogy rests on the premise that the two knowledge
domains are significantly similar and can be treated as results of the same
causal process.[7] It takes no specialist in
international relations to reach the conclusion that the CSCE project and the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) share some common characteristics. The
structural affinity between the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the model
developed by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (HFA) is based on the incorporation of
three distinct yet related dimensions (or baskets) of international
cooperation. But this prima facie
structural resemblance needs a methodological justification so as to utilise
the analytical insights offered by analogical reasoning. The procedural
modalities embedded in both international processes aim at breaking down
systemic complexity. The latter has added to the already burdened past of the
CSCE - i.e., inter-block antagonism and discontinuous communication - and, in
the case of the
Today,
scholars perceive a world of complexity and dynamism that was largely masked
during the apparent stability of the Cold War. In some interpretations,
‘complexity’ is merely used to describe things that are complicated and not
well understood.[9] But a
comparative investigation along the lines suggested here is also a means of
transcending questions of complexity that are easily discernible at both the
systemic level and the units of analysis themselves. This line of inquiry may
well lead to an approximation of reality - or indeed a ‘hierarchy of realities’[10]
- within pre-existing images of internatioonal organisation and, in the case of
the newly-born Mediterranean project, institutionalised governance. Analogical
reasoning helps the analyst to familiarise with and simplify an otherwise
nebulous image of large-scale regime-formation, thus yielding a deeper
understanding of the ontological nature of the nascent Euro-Mediterranean
regime and its attempts to manage uneasy interdependencies.
International analysis has shown how analogical reasoning
helps leaders and diplomats understand the particular situations they face at
any time; evaluate the material and moral impact of possible actions. In
practical terms, policy-makers themselves will ultimately decide whether or not
the
Already in 1975, the HFA contained a special section
dedicated to ‘Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the
Attempting to draw insights from the
With regards to the different contexts of each case study,
attention is paid to the motives underlying these processes, the actors
involved, the implications stemming from the implementation of agreed
principles, and the emergence of norms of behaviour. But to appreciate
the nature and dynamics of the
It
is widely acknowledged in the acquis
académique that any comparative analysis is dependent on the
selection of the case-studies, which, in turn, rely on the justificatory logic
of the research design itself. Out of several methods and possibilities of
selection, mainly two research designs maximise the uses of comparison. These
are the ‘most different’ and the ‘most similar’ systems designs. International
experience shows that the majority of comparativists have opted for the ‘most
similar’ systems designs when selecting on the ‘dependent variable’ - i.e.,
what it is to be explained, or indeed what lessons are to be drawn and learned
from the comparative exercise. What is equally crucial for the ‘quality’ of the
envisaged research product is that the choice of designs, and for that matter
of the cases themselves, should not be based on the principle of convenience
and/or familiarity with specific case studies, but rather should be the outcome
of a well-thought-out process of selection in
relation to the nature of the type of comparative results to be sought.[18]
But let us add that inherent to the comparative method is a ‘trade off’ between
similarity and differentiation. Whatever the case may be, one can legitimately
claim that comparative analysis may be significantly strengthened by the
interaction of the aforementioned research styles: as in different approaches
to social scientific research, so in the case of comparative analysis, the ‘best
possible outcome’ depends on the striking of a delicate balance between equally
important variables.
When conducting comparative research we are advised to find
cases that are as similar as possible, and then find a crucial difference to
set the limits of comparison. To borrow from Harris, those who study
comparative politics ‘should endeavour as far as possible to compare similar
units and entities ... We should not compare apples with oranges just because
are both fruits, but apples of one sort with apples of another sort’.[19]
The question that follows concerns the comparability of the applied research
areas as represented in the selected international processes or, in Teune’s
terms, the ‘equivalence across systems’ for the purposes of construct validity
and measurement.[20] The
components and properties of the systems compared should ideally be the same or
at least indicate some equivalence to avoid the danger of engaging in allegedly
creative comparisons that nevertheless are meaningless due to their initial lack
of equivalence. Sartori defines a related methodological issue as the
‘travelling problem’,[21]
arising arises in cross-national/cross-systemic comparisons, when concepts
‘travel a very long distance’.[22]
This points to the different uses and diverse traditions of language,
conceptual history, and concept-building, and the various ways of interpreting
concepts that are central to the research but account for different ‘structures
of meaning’ resting on different normative qualities, modes of conceptualisation,
and means of determining our perceptions of reality.
In comparative research, once it is established that
comparisons are valid, the researcher has to decide whether to avoid pitfalls
and proceed cautiously to formulate ‘laws’, ‘tendencies’, or ‘predictions’. But
first, one has to ask how is it possible to measure the degree and validity of
comparability, especially when the research at hand claims to represent an
comparative exercise in the politics of regional complexity and order-building?
Should the comparative exposition of these phenomena involve a time-series
analysis, a phased-process one, or one based on clearly designated
institutional parameters? To provide an answer, it is important to note that a
number of reasons point both to the significance and feasibility of the
proposed comparative investigation. An appropriate point of departure is the
question of time and, in particular, (a)synchronic analogical reasoning. One
way to apply this type of reasoning is to address the question of ‘time’ in a
creative manner and draw upon past experiences that can be taken, ceteris paribus, as functional analogies
of more contemporary developments. This is especially true for studying
international processes as these evolve through different phases that are not
dissimilar to those that other processes have previously undergone. We explain:
the OSCE is a firmly enough established regional organisation that has evolved
through a series of phases. It started as an international conference that
approximated the image of an international diplomacy forum, it then turned into
an international regime through the development of specific normative
commitments and institutional mechanisms, and since 1992 it became a regional
organisation ‘proper’ under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter possessing some
operational capabilities of its own. On the other hand, it is only recently
that a certain degree of systematisation of Euro-Mediterranean relations became
manifest. Such a qualitative change in what used to be a series of uncoordinated
bilateral arrangements (and then of a largely ad hoc nature) was brought about with the Barcelona Declaration.
The latter provided the long awaited platform for the emergence of a
multilateral policy framework, with weak but promising institutional features.
Theoretically speaking, the EMP can be conceived of as being more than a mere
‘association of states’ as conventionally understood.[23]
The principal reason for this progressive assertion is that certain
international regime aspects are evident in its structures like the development
of norms of good governance and the institutionalisation of mechanisms for
collective action. All the above provide for the mapping of the expectations
raised in
The degree of comparability of the two projects is even
higher in the post-Cold War era: it was then that the CSCE transformed itself
into an international organisation, while the EMP and the premium it places on
comprehensive security could not have been realised under the bipolar
configuration of the international system. In addition, in both processes,
their structural resemblance - i.e., their basket-based architectural design,
process-driven nature, and low levels of institutionalisation during their
early stages - is linked to the principle of conditionality. In the case of the
CSCE, conditionality formally entered into play by linking the importance of
human rights to acceptance of the post-Yalta territorial status quo. In the case of the EMP, conditionality takes the form
of a ‘trade off’ between financial/technical assistance (as opposed to the less
rewarding strategy of development aid) and an ethics of liberalisation based on
socio-economic restructuring and, where possible, reconstruction.
Here, an important qualification is in order: the human
dimension of the HP was seen by the Western coalition as a useful diplomatic
weapon for the gradual erosion of the Soviet-dominating communist regimes, by
introducing a system of international controls over human rights issues; on the
other hand, the aim of the BP is to establish concrete avenues of communication
among distinct historically constituted, culturally defined, socially
constructed, and politically organised states and societies based on mutually
rewarding outcomes. Put differently, it is not based on a crude Westernisation
project along the lines of a neo-colonialist policy aiming at the erosion, if
not collapse, of existing
As with most political science research, international
comparative politics is also driven by ‘real-world events’. These events spark our imagination and help
relate present-day reality to past experience. Likewise, rethinking the past in
light of the present is a productive way of searching for important and
intriguing questions. Most comparativists tend to treat theories, approaches,
and methods as tools to frame and explain empirical puzzles. This spirit is
best captured by Przeworski’s characterisation of his scholarly style as
‘opportunist’, and in Katzenstein’s suggestion that his research is mainly
stimulated by the ‘dependent variable’.[25]
Indeed, what remains universal in the study of comparative politics, as it does
for all good social science research, is a conscious attempt to explain the
‘dependent variable’, which in our case is the dynamics of Euro-Mediterranean
relations, and ‘prove’ the connection between the case studies involved, which
in the context of this study is to pursue the previous task in the light of the
Helsinki experience. Such an endeavour is further justified when taking into
account an explicit recognition by the architects of the
A
good point of departure for the analysis of the CSCE is
At a glance, the CSCE was a unique ensemble of interlinked
regimes, whose aim was to focus on universal respect for human rights, economic
co-operation, environmental concerns, and the free flow of people and
information within a multilaterally controlled and transparent international
setting. It served as a forum of equal partners, offering the opportunity to
articulate their concerns and increase their awareness about the (substantive)
interests of their partners. Above all, it served as a means of facilitating
inter-block communication in a period of exceeding tension. In fact, it was
assigned the task of making dialogue possible between the two confronting
alignments when East-West relations seemed to have reached a dead end. The
The entire CSCE project was part and a parcel of détente,[26]
as it was initiated at the peak of superpower politics to overcome the systemic
complexity of a highly fragmented European international system, composed of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation (WTO). But in times of mounting tension, the new international
forum emerged as the first significant step towards the realisation of a higher
task: the search for stability and co-operation in a Continent that had become
the ideological battleground of two major power coalitions. The CSCE acted as a
learning process; its ultimate goal being
Both détente
and the creation of the CSCE rested upon different normative orders for the two
opposing blocks. Post-war
Contrary to what its title suggests, Mastny writes, the CSCE
‘has proved to be more about politics rather than a collective security
arrangement’.[30]
Distinct from the assorted arms-control negotiations that were at the top of
the international agenda, the CSCE primarily concerned itself with the ‘soft’
aspects of security, bearing on the interactions as opposed to the capabilities
of the potential combatants. The introduction of a ‘human dimension’ to the HP
gave the latter ‘a civic dynamism of its own’,[31]
but it was the linkages among its respective ‘baskets’ that made it a unique
international setting. Also, a primitive version of conditionality applied:
agreement in one basket-area depended upon agreement in others. No one during
those days could have foreseen that such an ambitious exercise in multilateral
diplomacy would survive the Cold War, especially when it came to the
implementation of
The
European Cold War Order is the story of half a century of Soviet-American
conflict. Its causes have been a subject of controversy between the
adversaries, and so has the underlying nature of their relations. Some, like
Churchill, saw it as a familiar contest in geopolitics. On that model, the
East-West camps constituted the superpowers’ ‘spheres of influence’. To others,
in the
The
Cold War was also a struggle between conflicting universal values. In the West,
the concepts of market economy and multi-party democracy were cherished as
necessities. In the East, single party statism and a command economy were highly
valued. The obvious conflict of ideas and obstinate nature of their adherents
were the driving force behind the Cold War. Orwell often wrote about
governments oppressing their people through psychology.[35]
The one concept that kept his imaginary citizens dedicated to their government
was nationalism, in that it allows people to unite behind a common cause and
identify an enemy. But unification breeds security and a desire to take risks.
The formation of an enemy gives that group of people something to act against.
But an ever-present enemy gives citizens a scapegoat to blame for the ills of
the nation, caused by the nation itself. McCarthyism is a good case in point.[36]
Insecurities can be blamed on ‘Communist subversion’ without any evidence,
because mob mentality allows for injustices.[37]
From this perspective, it is surprising that the Cold War did not lead to an
overly aggressive action, as the possibility of an unprovoked first strike was
always present. But what prevented such a strike was the certainty of a
counter-attack. Mutually Assured Destruction (appropriately know as MAD) was
the philosophy that both East and West had the power to destroy each other
completely. The invention of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles was the
beginning of MAD theory, based on three ideas: both have enough weapons do
destroy the other, both can detect a first strike before it arrives, and both
are able to respond adequately before they are hit first.[38]
The Cold War gave new meaning to ‘war’. It defined a
state of hostility between two alliances, with mutually exclusive objectives,
which did not manifest itself either wholly, or principally, through direct
military ‘combats’. Instead, the conflict was fought across the broadest
spectrum of human endeavour. Yet, competition was no less lethal because of its
reduced military character. Individuals, nations, and lifestyles perished as a
result of the struggle. The Cold War had proven to be a real, but different,
expression of total war. In previous wars, the economic, material, and
political strengths of a nation had been injected into the military industrial
complex and transformed into conventional military power in the form of navies,
armies, and later air forces. Military operations and strategies were
predominant to the conduct of war. Conflicts were less than total in their
range and intensity. In comparison to the course of the interwar years, the
period after 1945 was one of considerable stability in
The Cold War was complex, multifaceted, and had no
equivalent: the international system had become polarised; a playing field in a
struggle that brought people together like never before, thus strengthening
their identity. As Agnew and Corbige explain, the Cold War ‘became a system of
power relations and ideological representations in which each “side” defined
itself relative to the other’.[40]
The bipolar system exhibited four defining characteristics: the hegemonic role
of the two superpowers in the European international system; the two opposing
alliances, each based on different socio-economic structures: NATO and the EC,
under the ‘benign hegemony’[41]
of the US, and the Warsaw Pact, under the more constricting domination of the
Soviet Union; the emergence of a small but distinct group of NNA states that
played a significant role in the HP; and the threat of a nuclear holocaust.
With the dawning of the nuclear age, traditional calculations concerning the
rationality of using military force to achieve desired political ends became
redundant and, in the words of Hyde-Price, ‘ironically brought an element of
stability to the east-west conflict in Europe’.[42]
DePorte has argued that, however undesirable morally
and politically, the Cold War system met the functional needs of the European
state system itself.[43]
An object rather than a participant in the Cold War,
Although
Helsinki is considered to be the birthplace of the CSCE, its origins go back to
1954, when Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov proposed a draft for a General
European Treaty on collective security, excluding the US and Canada.[46]
Later again in 1965 Brezhnev proposed a plan for a pan-European Security
Conference with US and
In the age of bipolarity, détente
and the creation of the CSCE meant different things to different governments.
For the WTO countries, détente
was a temporary state of affairs conducive to a relaxation of tensions, despite
the persisting arms race and the gradual but irreversible shift in the global
correlation of forces in favour of the
On their part, the NNA countries had their own goals and
strategies in the CSCE: to participate in the détente process, which was otherwise understood as an
East-West development, and to maintain their role in pan-European issues as an
intermediary. Under these circumstances, in May 1969,
After a protracted communiqué
dialogue between NATO and the WTO, the Conference was finally launched in
1972 with the first of a series of preparatory meetings known as the ‘Helsinki
Consultations’. The participating countries were not concerned so much with
resolving differences of substance as with identifying differences and ensuring
that these would be properly discussed at the Founding Conference in
As regards the rules of procedure, it was agreed that
decisions would be taken by consensus, defined as ‘the absence of any objection expressed by a Representative and
submitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in
question’ (Recommendation No. 69). The ‘consensus rule’ is more
flexible than the ‘unanimity rule’ and could guarantee that decisions taken by
such method would be respected by all signatories. A single veto may prove an
insuperable obstacle, although no country could claim that it did not support
one or another of the declared principles. According to Lehne, the adoption of
consensus rule was a somehow predicted development since it best corresponded
to the principle of sovereign equality of all the participants (principle I),
while it further enhanced the political weight of the Conference’s results.[55]
Consensus was also reached on the dates and organisation of the FUM after the
successful termination of the multilateral talks. As for the structure of the
Conference itself, the participants agreed to the creation of numerous working
bodies with the ‘Co-ordinating Committee’ as the central organ. Additional
committees were provided that could set up their own working groups. It was
also agreed that the Chair would rotate on a daily basis between all
delegations. Consequently, the political benefits that a selective chairmanship
might offer were deliberately diminished and its function was thus reduced to
merely technical responsibilities. Although the CSCE was based on the
principles of sovereignty and equality, EC states had indicated early in the
negotiations that they would act as a group and be bound collectively by the
agreed commitments.[56]
Not all of the CSCE’s innovations could be seen immediately
as constructive or productive. But the idea put forward by the Swiss delegation
to group together three different but complementary pillars or ‘baskets’
deserves special attention, for they made the CSCE a unique model. A ‘Follow
Up’ mechanism was proposed to guarantee the continuity of the CSCE and a
thorough implementation and review of agreed upon principles and commitments.
Doubtless, this mechanism represented in practical terms the process-driven
character of the CSCE: a dynamic element designed to deal with and, if
possible, overcome the systemic complexities of the Cold War. The first
preparatory stage of the CSCE was terminated when the member Foreign Ministers
declared the contents of the Blue Book
in
Later in
Arguably, as in all other major international fora, the
emergence of a promising inter-superpower trade-off remained the crucial factor
for the successful conclusion of the negotiations. The necessity for such
political bargaining mainly centred on Baskets I and III. The West and the NNA
countries had gained a fairly creditable proportion of what they wanted in
terms of texts and phrases on human rights issues, as the strict interpretation
of the first two preparatory meetings had vast significance during the Cold
War. Soviets had made it clear that, unless the West adopted the notion of a
preamble for Basket I, no progress would be achieved in the human dimension.
The rationale behind this view was to safeguard the presence of principles like
non-intervention in internal affairs along with respect for others’ rights to
determine their laws and regulations in Basket I (especially in the Decalogue).
The final agreement took the form of a ‘Neutral Package Deal’ that accommodated
both Eastern and Western aspirations. Following Maresca’s argument, just as the
balance between the inviolability of frontier and peaceful change constituted
the central CSCE territorial compromise, so the complex arrangements on
non-intervention and human rights reflected the central political one.[57]
Although in both cases the balance was a fine one, in the latter case, the CSCE
‘introduced the dynamic concept that respect for individual rights is a
legitimate aspect of interstate relations ... and that discussion of human
rights related issues does not constitute a form of intervention in internal
affairs’.[58]
Ten
Presidents, seventeen Prime Ministers, four Communist Party Secretaries, and
two Foreign Ministers gathered in
The HFA codified a political basis for normalising relations
in
The Act went beyond the traditional military aspects of
security (high politics) by incorporating issues of economic development,
concerns for the environment, as well as cultural affairs (low politics) into a
comprehensive concept of security. It introduced a structural basket-based
arrangement, each basket being equally binding. This way the West managed to
enact a ‘soft law’ that put the issue of
trade with the
The
first basket consisted of two main sections. The first established the basic
principles for guiding interstate behaviour in conformity with the UN Charter -
i.e., the ‘Helsinki Decalogue’. The WTO countries regarded the Decalogue as the
most important part of the HFA. Their justification was that the Decalogue
represented a prelude to the creation of a Security Conference. In addition,
they claimed for this code of contact a quasi-juridical status under
international law. The West, however, did not recognise any special standing vis-à-vis the other baskets.
Another obvious difference between the two blocks was on the interpretation of
the principles that were included. WTO states stressed the importance of those
principles that were seen as legalising the post-war borders and the communist
regimes in
The second section of Basket I included a document on CBMs
and certain aspects of security and disarmament. The aim was to build trust
through increased transparency and predictability of military activities,[61]
and in particular to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of
misunderstanding or miscalculation of such activities. For the NATO countries, the inclusion of the CBMs represented a
significant contribution to the lessening of politico-military tensions in
Basket
II formed an area of major interest for the WTO countries, characterised by
Edwards as demandeurs,[64]
since one of their main purposes was to achieve economic progress. But from
NATO’s perspective, Basket II, calling for increased economic, scientific,
technological and environmental co-operation, represented a practical
application of its members’ pursuit of reduced tensions with the communist
states, as co-operation in these fields could well lead to the regularisation
of relations and eventually to the breakdown of ideological barriers. The
commitment to exchange statistics on trade and economic activity could
certainly contribute to bringing WTO members into closer contact with the West
and provide the basis for co-operation in a wide range of enterprises. Behind
the creation of habits of information exchanges, by establishing regularised
economic and scientific relations, there was a clear prospect of a spillover
into the political and humanitarian fields. It was extremely important that
irrespective of the diversity of their economic and social systems, CSCE states
expressed their conviction that co-operation in these fields contributed to
European security-building.
As Basket II called for increased co-operation in science,
technology, and the environment, the West was looking for improved opportunities
for businessmen - including the availability of accommodation, business
premises, and communication facilities - and increased availability of
commercial and economic information. WTO states could also significantly
benefit from this basket, and particularly from gaining access to Western
technology and scientific knowledge, as well as to commercial credit and
commercial exchanges on advantageous terms. A basic underlying co-operation in
this area was that economic co-operation is useful above and beyond the
differences in socio-economic systems since it promotes security. Yet, East
European expectations to obtain better access to Western markets, finance, and
technology were not in fact fulfilled. By comparison with questions of security
policy and human rights, the economic area remained very much in the shadows
within the CSCE framework. Given the background of the Cold War and the
economic backwardness of the Eastern bloc at the time, the West was not really
prepared to extend economic co-operation. Were the Western countries to remove
quotas and trade restrictions, then the state-running WTO economies would be
left with an unfair advantage because of the range of other controls at their
disposal. A crucial development here was the endorsement of the need for a
freer flow of commercial information. In all other terms, although the economic
dimension of the HFA was filled with specific practical proposals, it never
turned out to be of greater importance to the more normative aspects of the
remaining baskets.
For
any researcher studying the CSCE process, its most striking feature appears to
be in the field of human rights, for specific humanitarian and information
provisions by far exceeded what had originally expected to be produced by the CSCE.
The third basket expressed the conviction that increased cultural and
educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between
people, and the resolution of all humanitarian problems would contribute to the
strengthening of peace and understanding among different peoples, as well as to
the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion. To
that end, twenty-five specific principles were set out, focusing on a wide
range of subject areas including co-operation and exchanges in cultural issues,
freedom of travel, advancement of conditions for tourism, improvement of the
circulation of, access to, and exchange of information, and measures for civil
society-formation.
The human dimension proved to be the most controversial area
for reaching consensus. The debate was mainly over how to reconcile the demands
for a freer and more open flow of information between the two poles with
non-bargainable national interests, especially those touching upon the
sensitive issue of state sovereignty. At the most basic level, the West felt
that it would be too vulnerable in domestic criticism if it were to give moral
endorsement to the Soviet domination in Central and
The HFA did not establish any new human rights standards. It
mainly reaffirmed provisions laid down in UN Conventions. But the Act
represented a landmark, for it made human rights a fundamental and legitimate
subject of East-West relations as well as an element of security itself. This
aspect is claimed to be the greatest innovation not only of the HFA, but of the
whole of the HP: linking human rights with diverse dimensions of (in)security
that often impel governments to repress their citizens.[66]
Most important, the inclusion of human rights in the evolving pattern of
interstate behaviour provided a universal optimism for opening up relations
among peoples themselves.[67]
The
last section of the HFA may have been the shortest but proved the most
important in the CSCE’s evolutionary journey. In order to implement the
provisions of the Act, the participants decided to introduce a ‘sense of
process’ through the FUM. Many ideas were put forward, ranging from preferences
for a weak institutional structure to the establishment of a new international
organisation. In the end, political pragmatism seems to have had its way for
the follow-up mechanism shaped a rather weak structure: CSCE meetings would
begin with the Foreign Affairs Ministers discussing the appropriate modalities
for the holding of future meetings. All in all, the FUM transformed the HFA
into a dynamic political forum, by guaranteeing its continuation and laying the
foundations for a thorough implementation and review of its provisions.
The
HP functioned as an open-ended forum for political dialogue until the 1990s
surpassingly lacking any concrete institutional structure. But being a
stratagem of détente, the
evolution of the HP was not linear but had dramatic ups and downs linked to
developments in East-West relations. As a result of the latter’s deterioration,
the first two FUM fell short of producing any tangible results. But as an
order-transforming project with a concrete finalitè
politique - a Pan-European ‘security community’[68]
- it was not immune to changes in the inteernational scene. Although the
challenge of détente in the
1970s was to sustain the nascent CSCE regimes in high politics, trade, and
human rights, the initial hopes raised in the process were dashed by the
competitive nature of bipolarity. Thus, when the West exposed the Soviet
hypocrisy in
Human rights issues dominated the CSCE agenda in a series of
meetings throughout the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, the CSCE had reached a
point where it had to pass judgement on its own performance. The talks in
As in
From November 1980 to September 1983, the Madrid FUM was held
under a hostile international climate due to the Soviet invasion to
NATO decided to reactivate the
The Stockholm Conference held from January 1984 to September
1986. The conference formed itself into working groups at the end of 1985,
which facilitated serious work, and received political impetus from the Geneva
Summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev.[77]
Westernproposals were for practical measures designed to reduce the likelihood
of an outbreak of hostilities in
The final product of
The persisting obstacles of East-West relations re-emerged at
the Vienna FUM which opened under the shadow of the abortive Reykjavik Summit.
This meeting provided the possibility for translating the new policies of Glasnost and Perestroika into concrete progress over the full spectrum of the
HP. Thus, in many of the issues of traditional friction in East-West relations,
the
In a less ideologically dichotomised setting, the Vienna
meeting managed to produce a historic document that scholars often refer to as
the ‘Constitution of Europe’ for human rights. But it was not only the end
results of these meetings that were important. The final document of the Vienna
Conference was of great importance since it secured the monitoring of human
rights and a more open exchange of information on related issues. It also
established the HDM,[83]
as well as a Conference on the human dimension itself. The decision to
incorporate into the Concluding Document not only the mandate, but also the
organisational and procedural modalities for a number of expert meetings made
the
As the rapid wind of change swept through the Eastern block,
new initiatives were tabled to counter the negative impact of accelerating
disintegration in the former WTO area.[86]
Their aim was linked to the hope of mitigating the material misery in
It was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall that progress
was achieved on the ‘economic dimension’. In less than four weeks, in the 1990
Bonn Conference, previously opposing participants had agreed on the
relationship between political pluralism and market economies. Among other
issues, the Conference reached agreement on freedom of enterprise, the
protection of private property, the free flow of trade, capital, investment,
and the repatriation of profits. For the first time, all CSCE states recognised
the symbiotic relationship between democratic institutions, fundamental rights,
civil liberties, and economic and social progress. Agreement on practical
measures illustrated a readiness to strengthen economic information channels
and networks, to standardise statistical data and account systems, to promote
management and expert training, to develop industrial co-operation and to
create a competitive business environment. [90]
Finally, the 1991 Moscow Conference was held in the wake of the Russian coup.
The fact that CSCE states refused to accept the results of the coup played a
significant part in aborting it. Not only did the
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,
The politics of nationalism, separatism and secession
challenged the new international order, while the new European order was
already in the process of forming its own rules, norms and patterns of
engagement.[93] The
redefinition of the European order is still incomplete. As Mayall and Miall
have pointed, ‘the phase of deconstruction has probably not yet ended’.[94]
More than twenty years ago, Hassner tried to assess the
possibilities for
The first phase of the 1990s were a period of idealism in
which the newly independent states appealed to the UN and OSCE with every minor
complaint, much as they had turned to the Central Committee of the Communist
Party in earlier days. The second stage was a period of ‘romantic maximalism’
in which leaders of the post-Soviet states believed that international
organisations had unlimited economic and military resources which would be used
to address all major challenges of daily life. The third stage was one of
cynicism toward international organisations, most sharply felt in Russia. The
view that international organisations lack either the interest or the capacity
to become involved in Eurasia led to the conclusion that membership in these
organisations has little value.[101]
Herein lies the institutional paradox of the first post-Cold War decade: on the
one hand, there exist overlapping security institutions with competing
responsibilities, while on the other, the nature of the post-1989 systemic
reality has been instrumental in sustaining and/or increasing actors’ faith in co-operative
frameworks and in advancing rule-governing state behaviour and interaction.[102]
But as the recent events in Kosovo show, no single organisation is in a
position to effectively handle the new challenges.
The end of the Cold War found Western Europe highly
institutionalised. As Keohane and Nye put it: ‘state behaviour was to a
considerable extent governed by rules. This system therefore only distantly
resembled the textbook portrayal of sovereign states pursuing self-help
policies under conditions of anarchy’.[103]
Yet, if such relations seem to be an example of peacefulness at the
international level, this is not due to the absence of conflicts, but rather
derives from the existence of various forms of non-violent and even integrative
conflict-management.[104]
Western Europe is well accustomed to the politics of reciprocal co-operation
and good neighbourliness, thut is why a state of political co-determination has
emerged among West European polities, based on a system of mutual governance. Growing economic integration, for which the EU is
the driving force, has reinforced interdependence and solidarity among
Europeans. EU initiatives towards Central and Eastern Europe are part of a
wider evolution towards pan-European integration. As the EU has become the centre of gravity for its
periphery, it is legitimate to expect that its leadership potential will face
up to its growing international responsibilities.[105] In Zaldivar’s words: ‘The countries of the Union have a particular
responsibility to ensure that they choose the right path, because of the
influence they can exercise’.[106]
Likewise, painful structural adjustments lie ahead for the Europe to compete in
a globalised economy, while urgent reforms must precede the accession of the
Central and East European states to the EU.[107]
Today, there is no lack of European security institutions. The current debate within Europe is over
‘who decides’ on European security arrangements. Out of a massive literature,
three issues figured prominently in the debate on the new European architecture
in 1996: the transformation and eastward enlargement of NATO and the EU; the
transatlantic partnership and the role of the US in European security; and the
future shape and role of the OSCE.[108]
The Atlantic Alliance remains at the centre of European security debates
because it has succeeded in building political consensus, managing threats,
defending its members, organising multinational military operations, and
keeping the US involved in Europe. The
other European security organisations alongside NATO work to ensure that
comprehensive security has a firm foundation through the strengthening of
democratic institutions in the new member states. The dilemma is that, while
former communist Europe is drawn into the European security framework, security
can never really be achieved without a change in the political cultures of the
newly admitted states. In Klebes’ words: ‘the problem is to ensure that Western
Europe reunites with Eastern Europe in terms of its democratic values and other
institutions that promote a pervasive and formidable foundation for continental
and transatlantic security’.[109] The
defining properties of security-community is co-operation and confidence, and
the Central and East European states cannot be part of such a community unless
they establish co-operative practices of conflict-resolution. This does not
imply that all such conflicts must be resolved before the Central and East
Europeans are fully integrated into the European security-community, as the
Franco-German experience has shown.[110]
Shortly
after the 1989 Vienna FUM the radical changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union reached a point where it became impossible to sustain the bipolar order.
The collapse of the Eastern alliance resulted in the disappearance of the
bloc-to-bloc basis of the CSCE negotiations. At the request of WTO members, but
with an agenda prepared by the West, the Paris Summit convened to formally mark
the end of the Cold War and to deal with the new challenges confronting
European security. East European governments favoured the enhancement of the
CSCE for several reasons: the institution offered them the same rights and
privileges as western countries and guaranteed that they had some influence on
international developments; participation in the CSCE clearly identified
countries as members of the European commonwealth; the CSCE remained the only
security institution, besides the more tenuous links provided by the UN,
linking East European governments with the US; finally, having benefited from
the CSCE before the 1989 revolutions, East European states expected the
institution to provide additional advantages after the disappearance of the
communist regimes that had thwarted the attainment of CSCE norms.[111]
The task ahead for the CSCE was to be re-tooled so as to consolidate democracy,
integrate the former communist states into an ever globalising economic and
financial system, and to incorporate them in the evolving pan-European
architecture. The difficulty lay in transforming abstract commitments into
actual processes and in developing new patterns and norms of interstate
behaviour.
The Charter of Paris reflected agreement among CSCE states
that the emerging polities should be directed towards sustainable economic
growth. Economic liberty, social justice, and a sense of responsibility for the
environment were also acknowledged as indispensable to prosperity and
stability, while ‘for the first time, it became clear that the participating states
could develop a common strategy to reach these goals’.[112]
As Peters argues, the Paris Charter represented the beginning of both
institutional deepening and broadening. Deepening refers to the formalisation
of a closely-webbed network of fora for consultations with new instruments and
mechanisms providing the CSCE with operational capability. Broadening refers to
the expansion of CSCE competencies to deal with post-1989 issues of
democratisation, protection of minorities, conflict-management, etc.[113]
The first section of the Charter listed a number of lofty
principles, which form the basis of the CSCE community. As Bloed notes,
however, the principles therein ‘reconfirmed that which had already been
established at the Bonn conference on economic co-operation and the Copenhagen
human dimension conference’.[114]
The Charter also assigned the content of the three Helsinki baskets to seven
different sectors (the human dimension, security, economic co-operation, the
environment, culture, migration and the Mediterranean), including co-operation
with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). By establishing a new timetable of
regular political consultations, and by giving the CSCE a modest degree of
institutional underpinning, the participating states placed the HP on a more
permanent footing. The aim was to promote a ‘new quality of political dialogue
and co-operation’ through ‘the intensification of our consultations at all
levels ...’.[115]
Moreover, regular consultations were established at three
levels: Heads of State or Government, Foreign Ministers and Senior Officials.
Two political bodies were also set up: the CSCE Ministerial Council that was to
meet at least once a year, and the Committee of Senior Officials (Senior
Council) that was to meet several times a year. In addition, three standing
institutions were created: a Secretariat in Prague, the Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw and the Conflict Prevention
Centre (CPC) in Vienna. In institutional terms, a deepening of the HP took place,
in that a closely-webbed network of consultative fora was formalised and, for
the first time, new instruments and mechanisms provided the CSCE with
operational capabilities. In parallel, a broadening of the CSCE’s institutional
scope has occurred, by adding a competence to deal with democratisation
processes and the protection of minorities. The Charter also called for greater
parliamentary involvement in the CSCE through the creation of a CSCE
Parliamentary Assembly. Such a call received a positive response from the
Spanish delegation, which proposed to convene a conference of parliamentarians
in Madrid. The conference met in April 1991 and laid the foundations for the
creation of the Parliamentary Assembly (PA) of the CSCE. [116]
Important new steps were taken in Berlin and Prague meetings.
At the Berlin Ministerial Council the emergency mechanism was adopted, allowing
for convening consultations even without consensus.[117]
The Prague Ministerial Council adopted in January 1992 the ‘Prague Document on
Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Procedures’, which intended to
serve as guidelines for negotiators at the next FUM in Helsinki. It is worth
mentioning that the Prague Council was held at a time when NATO was already
preparing meetings for a new strategy in the ‘near abroad’, and when the CSCE
was to hold the first meeting of its Council of Ministers.[118]
The Prague meeting also prepared the way for the dissolution of the WTO’s
military structure, and then the termination of its activities. In accordance
with the Paris Charter, the objective of the Prague meeting was to issue
recommendations to the Ministerial Council on possible ways to develop the
institutional structure of the CSCE and how to improve its conflict-prevention
and conflict-resolution capabilities, or what Anstis called ‘security
management’.[119]
Russia was promptly accepted by the Senior Officials, but the accession of the
eleven other former Soviet Republics (or successor states) and those new
Republics that had declared their independence from the Yugoslav Federation was
more problematic.[120]
The enthusiasm that marked the Paris Summit dissipated over
the failure of the CSCE to manage the Yugoslav crisis, although even the best
efforts of both the EC and the UN experienced grave difficulties. Some West
European states were sceptical in attributing security-management functions to
the CSCE, thus reflecting a tendency to view the emerging European security
architecture in an exclusive way: either NATO or the EC (through the WEU)
should be the cornerstone of the new order. Other officials remarked that this
attitude was at odds with NATO policy as adopted by the Rome Summit. Western
leaders indicated that the CSCE should be transformed into a more operational
entity, insisting that interlocking and interacting institutions should
underpin European security. The rationale here was that ‘real’ national and
international security is achieved through dialogue, consultation, and
co-operation, covering the whole range of interstate relations. But when Central
and East European countries were faced with economic recession and political
unrest, the HP needed a conflict-prevention mechanism comprising of systematic
political consultations, stronger institutional arrangements, and substantive
operational capabilities. In the Prague Document, CSCE states adopted a menu of
optional instruments for crisis-management, including a procedure for
initiating CSCE security-management. But while these arrangements represented a
good starting point, a complete mechanism was still to be elaborated.[121]
The Prague meeting also considered the fact that any
institutional structures would prove inadequate if faced with the threat of
economic destabilisation, collapse of the energy distribution system or mass
migratory waves. It was made clear that the new European security regime could
be sustained only if economic collapse in Central and Eastern Europe could be
prevented, and satisfactory conditions for democratic transition established.
What was at stake was the possibility for ‘CSCE peace-keeping’ or a ‘CSCE role
in peace-keeping’. In Anstis word’s, the dilemma faced by the CSCE was clear:
‘either the CSCE should be able in its own right to call upon resources such as
a peace-keeping force for security management, or it should remit this role to
others with the necessary assets’.[122]
The answer to that question was partially offered at the next FUM in Helsinki
scheduled to take place in March 1992. It is to this meeting that we now turn.
After the Charter of Paris, CSCE efforts proved disappointing
when faced with the Yugoslav crisis and the resurgence of the problem of
national minorities.[123]
Collective action problems were intensified because of the CSCE’s growing
composition (from 35 to 53): effective operative functions were believed to
decrease as membership increases. As early as the negotiations leading to the
Charter of Paris, some states had already pleaded for a resolute turn towards
its institutionalisation. At a time of hope, but also of instability and
insecurity, the Paris Summit insisted ‘on the efforts to forestall aggression
by addressing the root causes of problems and to prevent, manage and settle
conflicts peacefully by appropriate means’.[124]
The urgent need for developing a CSCE potential for
conflict-prevention and crisis- management was the driving force in the
progress towards it becoming an organization. It had become clear that the
management of order-change in Europe was a qualitatively new challenge that
could not be met with old structures and unchanged institutions. Although the
institutions that were created at the Paris Charter proved weak, they allowed
enough space for further institutional development. Additional
institutionalisation was achieved at the Helsinki Summit in July 1992. This FUM
took place against the background of increasing conflicts and crises in Europe,
serious violations of human rights, internal tensions, and social and economic
setbacks. These have darkened the vision of a safe, free, and prosperous CSCE
area. Hence, the CSCE had to be reshaped so as to meet the needs of a
transformative order.
The 1992 Helsinki II document ‘The Challenges of Change’ was
innovative enough in advancing the institutional structures of the CSCE, ‘by
rendering its security capabilities operational’,[125]
and by developing the framework of activities relating to the human dimension.
In addition, Basket II was reactivated and measures to further co-operation in
the fields of economics, science, technology, and the environment were adopted.
The Helsinki II document declared the CSCE as a regional arrangement in the
sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, calling for an ambitious role for the
CSCE in the fields of early warning, conflict-prevention, and
crisis-management. In December 1992, the CSCE Ministerial Council established a
new post of the Secretary General, and in 1993 strengthened the Secretariat in
Vienna. In December 1993, a new body, the Permanent Committee, was established
in Vienna, significantly extending the possibilities for political
consultation, dialogue, and decision-making on a weekly basis.
The inclusion of peacekeeping operations in the means
available to the HP is of great significance for it transformed the CSCE into
an institution with operational functions.[126]
The Helsinki II document declared that civil or military operations can be
conducted by the CSCE; while they may not entail the use of force, they must be
conducted impartially and a consensus by the Ministerial Council or the
Committee of Senior Officials should be considered as necessary. It was decided
that CSCE peacekeeping operations could only be undertaken in the context of
intrastate conflicts. The CSCE could call for help from NATO, the EU, the WEU,
or even the CIS. Traditionally, peacekeeping operations are a ‘hard’ option, in
that armed forces may be used as an instrument, although the Helsinki II
document stated that such operations might not be used for coercion.
Enforcement action was altogether excluded from the new instruments, but as
history proves, the HP has better worked with softer options.[127]
The process of institutionalisation which begun earlier in
Paris was continued in Helsinki II with the establishment of a
Chairman-in-Office (CiO) and a Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),
strengthening the CSCE’s role in preventive diplomacy. The newly created High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) was tasked with responding, at the
earliest possible stage, to regional nationalistic and ethnic tensions. The
latter measure demonstrated the CSCE’s desire to identify the underlying causes
of crises and to correct them before they become uncontrollable. In addition,
‘it enabled the HP to tackle the question of national minorities from a
security point of view, something that significantly differs from the exclusive
- and up to that time inconclusive - viewppoint of human rights’.[128]
Yet, the human dimension had to be adjusted so that states are able to verify
the implementation of agreed commitments, by a biennial review meeting and by
holding seminars on issues of particular relevance.[129]
Moreover, Helsinki II ended the dichotomy that had limited
the HP to the mere negotiation of CSBMs, while placing beyond its scope issues
of disarmament which, throughout the 1970s, remained in the responsibility of
the MBFR and, after the Stockholm Conference, of the CFE. This dichotomy was
eliminated by the provision to set up the FSC in Vienna. The harmonisation of
the MBFR and CFE arrangements aimed at preserving and further enhancing the
dynamic process instituted by these major agreements.[130]
Yet, the FSC was tasked to negotiate conventional disarmament measures and
provisions to harmonise obligations arising from various international
instruments, CSBMs, and other stabilising measures. Helsinki II also decided
that the FSC will serve as a general permanent framework for consultation,
co-operation, and dialogue on force generation capabilities, non-proliferation,
and the formulation of politico-military code of conduct.[131]
Chapter V of the Helsinki II document assigned to the FSC the negotiation of concrete
and militarily significant measures to reduce the conventional armed forces of
CSCE states, to link maintenance of armed forces to legitimate security
requirements, and to operationalise the ‘Programme for Immediate Action’.[132]
Of particular significance and sophistication is the Forum’s role for a
co-operative dialogue which, as Ghebali notes, is ‘a role linked to the idea
that security must no longer be dealt with as a purely national matter, but as
a collective responsibility, committing all the participating countries
regardless of their size or geographic location’.[133]
But soon after the Helsinki Summit, the effectiveness of the
CSCE was put to the test. The growing tensions in Kosovo, Sandjak, and
Vojvodina, the danger of a spillover to FYROM, the deep crisis in Moldova, the
continuing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the urgent preventive diplomacy
efforts in the Baltics, all called for immediate CSCE action. The failure of
the Budapest Summit (5-6 December 1994) did not entail any negative repercussions
for the Budapest Review Conference (7-8 December 1995) which produced a
document entitled ‘Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’. As already
noted, this document provided for the metamorphosis of the CSCE,
containing numerous decisions relating to military, economic, and human rights
issues, as well as matters of a Mediterranean interest. Although the structures
and institutions of the CSCE were consolidated, without dramatically
rationalising the system,[134]
it was the change of name that reflected this deep transformation. Höynck
concurs: ‘This was an expression of its determination to give a new political
impetus to its process, thus enabling it to play a central role in the
promotion of a new common security space’.[135]
Above all, Budapest confirmed the future role of the OSCE as a primary
instrument for early warning, conflict-prevention, and crisis-management. But
as the Netherlands Helsinki Committee observed shortly before the Budapest
Review Conference, ‘their rhetoric notwithstanding, states do not seem too sure
about the particular role of the CSCE in Europe or, if they are, how far they
want to take that role’.[136]
Although the Russian President Yeltsin spoke of the danger of a ‘cold peace’
pointing to the on-going war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘there was a general
feeling that in this increasingly critical situation the capabilities of the
CSCE in conflict prevention and crisis management should be further developed’.[137]
As Europe cannot afford additional open conflicts that are in danger of becoming
unmanageable, the questions of whether, when and how the OSCE should get
involved is an extremely sensitive issue associated with its own possibilities
and limitations. As succinctly put: ‘asking too much of the CSCE is in its own
way as bad as asking too little’.[138]
Thus, the results of the Budapest Review Conference were both future-oriented
and directed towards immediate concerns.
The role of the CiO was strengthened so that individuals can
now bring serious cases of alleged non-compliance to the attention of the
Permanent Committee, as it was agreed that human dimension issues would be
regularly dealt with by the latter. The position of the ODIHR was also enhanced
to increase its involvement in the workings of the Permanent Committee and in
mission activities, entitling the ODIHR’s Director to propose further action in
close consultation with the CiO. This was managed by ‘putting regularly human
dimension issues on the agenda of the Permanent Committee (including serious
cases of non-implementation), participation of the ODIHR in Senior Council and
Permanent Committee discussions, and involvement of the ODIHR in the
preparation, conduct and follow-up of field missions’.[139] The Concluding Document mandated the
CiO to convene a meeting of the Permanent Committee to discuss the means of
integrating economic and environmental co-operation, science and technology,
and regional and trans-frontier co-operation.
The Budapest Conference also endorsed the outcome of the
negotiations that were conducted since 1992 in the framework of the FSC. This
included an updated version of the CSBMs regime - the so called ‘Vienna
Document’ - and seven other politically binding texts. These texts accounted
for three different arrangements. The first offered the traditional-type of
CSBMs: a programme for military contacts and co-operation,[140]
a set of provisions on ‘Defence Planning’ to enhance transparency, and a regime
for the global exchange of military information. The second contributed to
conflict management techniques through a catalogue of ‘Stabilising Measures for
Localised Crisis Situations’. Finally, the third consisted of principles
governing arms transfers and non-proliferation, and a ‘Code of Conduct on
politico-military aspects of security’. The latter is generally seen as the
most precious political item of the Budapest exercise,[141]
introducing new security elements by affirming that participating states ‘are
determined to act in solidarity if CSCE norms and commitments are violated and
to facilitate concerted responses to security challenges that they may face as
a result’.[142]
OSCE states will consult promptly on questions of self-defence and they will
also consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required
in defence of their common values.
What is also worth noting is that the Budapest Summit
achieved a breakthrough on Mediterranean issues.[143]
In attempting to intensify the dialogue with the five non-participating
Mediterranean states, OSCE states decided to establish an informal contact
group to meet periodically within the framework of the Permanent Committee in
order to conduct high-level consultations through the Troika and the Secretary
General and, also, to hold a seminar on the OSCE’s experience.[144]
Since then, the OSCE has held two such seminars in the Mediterranean: in Cairo
(September 1995), which gave Mediterranean partners a picture of the OSCE
experience; and in Tel Aviv (June 1996), which developed the experiences of
other forums in conducting dialogue. These developments bear particular weight
on the rationale of this study, as it adds credit to a comparative
investigation of the Helsinki and Barcelona processes.
Since its transformation into an international organisation,
the OSCE has performed the following valuable functions. First, it provides a
platform for pan-European multilateral diplomacy across a comprehensive range
of issues within the broadly defined area of security and co-operation. Second,
it constitutes a normative framework upon which a co-operative security system
can be based, in terms of promoting and codifying shared norms, values and
standards of behaviour among its members, particularly in the sphere of human
rights and the non-use of force. As Hanson put it, ‘contemporary international
relations in Europe are characterised by an element that was largely absent
from this arena until relatively recently. While norms constraining state
behaviour have always been present to some degree in inter-state relations,
never before have they been codified so clearly to represent the obligations
and expectations of states, both in inter-state relations and in the way they
treat their domestic populations’.[145]
Third, it offers a series of mechanisms for the
continuous monitoring of human rights for both individuals and national
minorities.[146]
Fourth, it acts as an institutionalised forum for promoting military
transparency, arms controls, and CSBMs, including the CFE agreement and the
Open Skies treaties.[147]
Fifth, it acts as guarantor of the Paris-instituted Pact for Stability as well
as a means of strengthening regional security through localised arms agreements
in the context of the Dayton Accords.[148]
Finally, it develops instruments for early warning, preventive diplomacy, and
crisis management.[149]
One of the key lessons of Bosnia, Neville-Jones asserts, is that ‘crisis
prevention and management must be taken more seriously… This means willingness
to spend small sums of money in order to avoid greater costs later.[150] The OSCE has only recently begun to develop
such activities, but has already achieved some significant successes.
While the OSCE has succeeded in carving out for itself a
crucial role based on the aforementioned functions, it still faces a number of
significant challenges. Hyde-Price points out that the OSCE has a relatively
small permanent staff and constant financial problems,[151]
while it has become a veritable ‘alphabet soup’ of institutions and offices,
suffering from the malaise of institutional rivalry, bureaucratic infighting,
and lack of cohesion.[152]
Moreover, its relationship with other regional/international organisations
needs further clarification. Although its aim, post-1989, has been to forge a
European co-operative security system based on ‘interlocking’ institutions,
such enmenshment of functions and tasks has often resulted in these
institutions becoming ‘interblocking’. Today, the OSCE occupies a unique
position in the European security architecture. The concept of comprehensive
security to which the OSCE adheres differentiates it from any other
Trans-Atlantic security organisations that focus entirely on the
politico-military aspects of security.[153]
Instead, the OSCE presumes a direct relationship between peace, stability and
wealth on the one hand, and the development of democratic institutions, the
rule of law, respect for human and minority rights on the other. In its efforts
to institutionalise a comprehensive security regime, the OSCE sets in motion a
‘learning process’ that requires governments and military establishments to
transcend deterrence and replace it with mutualism, reassurance, and
trust-building measures. As Adler suggests, this redefinition of security has
been necessary for the development of mutual trust and a growing sense of
mutual identification among OSCE members.[154]
Although the growing OSCE aspirations to effective
conflict-management represent an ambitious enough target, no path-breaking
achievements can be expected in enforcing the renunciation-of-force principle
in cases of committed aggressors. For, its activities are often measures of
‘quiet’ diplomacy and instruments of low intensity whose efficacy can be easily
questioned. Rather, its major achievement so far has been in the area of
discerning disputes and potential conflicts that are less publicly visible.[155]
Doubtless, OSCE ‘soft’ measures seem appropriate when conflicting parties
exhibit some degree of goodwill, and when the actual conflict itself seems
still some way off. The fact-finding missions, visits and recommendations of
the HCNM, and the contacts and technical expertise offered by the OSCE have
greatly contributed to defusing tensions in Estonia and FYROM, where the
parties are relatively amenable and open to compromise. Likewise, OSCE
operations have helped to de-escalate potential tensions in the Baltic region,
while its intervention in the Balkans (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, and Albania)
has demonstrated its expanding role in regional conflict-management and other
security-related issues that currently figure prominently in the transatlantic agenda.[156]
Comprehensive security, along the lines pursued by the OSCE,
presupposes that a variety of aspects are taken into account by the relevant
decision-making bodies of the organisation. But economic/ecological issues are
absent from the organisation’s agenda: the emphasis is still on democratisation
and the transition to free-market economies, whereas economic and ecological
issues are not yet perceived as (near-future) security threats. Instead, they
are safely tucked away in the deliberations of the Senior Council when it meets
as the Economic Forum. Zaagman offers three reasons for change: ‘Firstly,
because [such an approach] ... leads to the neglect of issues which could cause
(violent) conflict in the short term. Moreover, since economic and ecological
issues are not integrated in the supposedly comprehensive security discussions
of the political OSCE bodies, important aspects may be overlooked when the OSCE
is debating how to address a conflict-prone situation. Lastly, this state of
affairs also leads to a neglect of core security concerns of certain OSCE
states, which are of an economic and ecological nature’.[157]
Today, the OSCE has several political bodies and
institutions. It has been rightly pointed out that, institutionally, there is
already much in place, although many OSCE mechanisms leave room for
improvement.[158] In
Höynck’s words: ‘the instruments of OSCE provide a possibility to build
trust, increase transparency and clarify concerns between neighbours, while it
is always an expression of a co-operative endeavour’.[159]
Central to its contribution to international security-building is the
accommodationist role of its Permanent Council. Additionally, the
Chairman-in-Office, assisted by the Troika, has been a forceful instrument for
promoting OSCE ideals and for taking the necessary actions. Since 1992,
long-term missions in conflict zones have proved effective in reducing tensions
and creating the necessary climate of confidence for seeking political
solutions. The HCNM is effectively involved in defusing minority problems
through a politics of discreet diplomacy, being conducted since 1993. On its
part, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights contributes to
the development of civil societies in the OSCE area.
The
CSCE established the structure and the process that came to symbolise détente in Europe. In an
international climate plagued by mounting ideological tensions, it was hoped
that the new forum could provide fresh political direction, fostering the flow
of ideas, people, and information, whilst keeping distrust on a manageable
level. Rather than becoming a ‘passive affair’, the CSCE evolved into a dynamic
process, whose ultimate goal was ‘to reconcile Europe’s traditions of freedom
with its present realities’.[160]
Refusing to see the final product of such reconciliation built on power alone,
it sought to establish a new political order based on the principles of
international law, democratic values, and a human rights approach to
security-building. According to Birnbaum, the HP represents ‘a unique
international effort in the collective management of both conflict and
cooperation’.[161]
Through the employment of collective diplomacy, the process developed effective
methods of work for monitoring the Cold War power balance and replacing the
risk of confrontation with institutionalised co-operation. Despite the fact
that the HP was frequently exposed to dangers either external or inherent to
its framework, ‘it showed a remarkable ability to both reflect and change with
the times’.[162]
Dealing with the necessity for an honest and productive dialogue between the
two major coalitions, it exploited all possibilities for ‘expanding a genuine
community of interest and general mutual understanding’.[163]
Such tasks, however, which arguably extend beyond a mere enlargement of trust
among nations, made the HP an integral element of détente, conceived not only as a condition (systemic
property) but also as an evolutionary process to be maintained, if not
enhanced.
The HP has contributed to European security by providing a
co-operative security regime for the resolution of collective action problems.
It turned out that such a regime had been implemented fairly successfully,
contributing to the dynamics of order-building in the wider European security
process. This contribution was more evident in the following areas: surprise
attack, arms race, ineffective verification, and ethnic and religion conflict.[164]
Moreover, through its human dimension, the CSCE sought to rededicate the
European state system to the cause of human rights ‘that were for the first
time recognised as a vital part of the international agenda’.[165]
But above all, as Mastny put it, ‘the CSCE linked state security with
individual security’.[166]
This novel approach paved the way towards the creation of new channels of
inter-systemic communication that could challenge communist repression ab intra.
Summarising its pre-1989 contribution to the politics of
order-building, one has to acknowledge that the CSCE multilateralized East-West
diplomacy in Europe’s international system. In doing so, the new multilateral
framework of co-operation challenged what Ghebali calls la logic des blocs,[167]
allowing the neutral actors of the Cold War to develop their role as full
participants and as independent mediators. In other words, the CSCE tried to
establish equality among unequal partners, transcend bipolar complexity, and
extend the pan-European dialogue from the sphere of ‘hard’ security to
ecological, economic, and humanitarian issues. To borrow from Mastny again:
‘Connecting the seemingly disconnected had always been a Helsinki tradition’.[168]
Finally, the CSCE transformed this intermittent dialogue into a continuous but
loosely institutionalised process based on political pragmatism that took the
form of a series of conferences organised at indeterminate intervals without
support by a permanent secretariat.
But the institutionalisation did not progress on the
basis of a ‘grand design’. Rather, its transformation was a response to the new
systemic reality through manageable forms of creative development.[169]
Until 1990, the so-called ‘old’ CSCE[170]
functioned as a series of FUM and ad hoc conferences,
setting norms and periodically reviewing their implementation. It has since
played a vital role in stimulating democratic reform and developing monitoring
mechanisms to ensure compliance. After the Cold War, the ‘new’ CSCE has
established a plethora of political organs and administrative bodies with
operational capabilities. This marks a point of departure from a
quasi-institutionalised exercise in international regime-formation and
regime-maintenance to a process of substantive institutionalisation in a
transformative order: from conference to regime and then to organisation.[171]
The CSCE was mainly an instrument of conference diplomacy: a framework for
negotiation and linkage of interests to reach consensual decisions and
ascertain implementation. Today, the OSCE contains elements of both the pre-
and post-1989 phases of the HP. This is reflected in the preservation of its
process-driven nature, the encompassment of permanent monitoring mechanisms,
and institutions with operational capabilities.
In post-Cold War security considerations, the term ‘conflict’
has not been exclusively confined in military terms. Preventing conflicts in
the 1990s requires that the net be thrown widely to include questions of
political order (or disorder), economic factors, and issues of human rights,
minority rights, etc. In recent years, the OSCE has been paying more attention
to the economic and civil dimensions of security.[172]
Pluricausal crises require imaginative, comprehensive, and flexible responses
that may transform the OSCE into a pan-European security community based on a
normative consensus. Höynck notes: ‘[The OSCE] is the one and only
organisation with the possibility of building a common political ethos of European values: values that
are necessary as a common foundation for permanent peace and security’.[173]
Today, the OSCE marks its impact by establishing a crucial
link between domestic and international security: its comprehensive concept of
security reflects the globalising trends in world politics and the reality that
a state cannot achieve security at the expense of others. In its long journey,
human rights issues have come to be accepted as areas of legitimate involvement
for international organisations, urging a different interpretation of the
classical principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Lehne defines the CSCE as an extremely loose community
because of the limits to cohesiveness and unity.[174]
This finding is still applicable and will presumably be valid in the new
millennium too. Heraclides makes the point well: ‘the community of values
achieved ... is in several instances only skindeep ... Although no
participating state would openly dispute the principles of pluralistic
democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the
rights of persons belonging to national minorities, it is clear that not all
states truly subscribe to them ...’.[175]
Subscribing to political and moral standards on the one hand, and committing
oneself to their implementation on the other, are obviously two different
things. In this sense, the OSCE can be also seen as a forum of symbolic
politics: a ‘quasi-legal community’, rather than a ‘community of values’, based
on a commitment to peaceful change.[176]
According to Acimovic, the OSCE departs from the CSCE in
terms of its place and role in European politics, its character, constitutive
structure, and methods of work.[177]
Its essential function is no longer the promotion of détente but to steer and manage democratisation in the
former socialist polities and to provide regional stability. This is in line
with Ghebali’s view that the entire project was as much a result of changing
(systemic) realities, as it was an agent of change in its own right.[178]
As far as the latter equation is concerned, the post-Cold War aims of the OSCE
consist of new normative commitments to democracy, the rule of law, human
rights, economic freedoms, and social justice. In short, in its long and
arduous journey from Helsinki I to its present form, the HP has taken on a
remarkable set of tasks, competencies, and commitments, breaking away from its
past image as a loose sequence of interstate negotiations and political
consultations. OSCE competencies encompass the setting of specific regimes and
compliance mechanisms. Although this is a continuous process requiring a
macro-perspective to become effective, so far, dependable expectations of peaceful
change are not prevalent in the entire OSCE region. Adler explains why: ‘First,
because many new states that were invited to join after the end of the Cold War
have yet to internalise the norms and practices. Secondly, because of ethnic
conflicts, civil wars, and gross human rights violations that take place in the
region, and that will be so far the foreseeable future, regional peace will
depend, in part, on collective security activities of NATO, the WEU, and/or
individual European powers’.[179]
Building
a new European architecture has taken the OSCE from its norm-setting role to a
more operational one. With its innovative approach to pan-European
security-building, the OSCE has been instrumental in the incorporation of the
former communist countries to a continent-wide security community. The
continuation of a positive role for the OSCE depends on its political and
instrumental flexibility to allow for collective problem-solving to be adapted
to the necessity of rebuilding legitimate polities.[180]
In this sense, Peters notes, its credo
is ‘co-operation on behalf of democracy and welfare in order to enhance
security of the people within the states and among states’.[181]
The above exploration of the Helsinki order-building model, in its various
evolutionary stages - i.e., conference, regime, organisation - provides the
analytical platform from which a deeper understanding of the Barcelona Process
can be reached. Since the primary aim of this study is to address questions of
Euro-Mediterranean governance in the light of the Helsinki experience, rather
than to provide an exhaustive account of the latter, the bulk of analysis is
placed on the emerging Euro-Mediterranean order, to which we now turn.
The 1989 annus mirabilis has been configured as a
major turning point in international relations, when the East-West ideological
dichotomy evaporated and the focus shifted towards the North-South divide. Now
that the once fearsome Soviet threat has actually vanished, post-Cold War
Europe is confronted by instability deriving from socio-political and economic
disparities, together with the risk of smaller-scale intrastate conflicts.
During the Cold War, the Euro-Mediterranean system encompassed many possible
seats of tension as well as a series of protracted conflicts with a strong
historical background (for example the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus and
the Arab-Israeli conflict). The fact that the region served as a security
chessboard to the strategic policies of both the US and the Soviet Union[182]
has introduced an idiosyncratic fragility at the systemic level, after the
removal of the ‘bipolar overlay’. Notwithstanding the successive Yugoslav
crises and the Gulf Wars, the renaissance
of a wider interest in Mediterranean affairs is based on the growing importance
the region enjoys in the strategic calculus of the new European order. While
EU members along the northern rim are increasingly prosperous as they find
themselves locked in a dual, albeit not linear, process of economic and
political integration, most countries located at the southern rim seem to be
moving in the opposite direction. It is evident that the widening gap between
the North and South Mediterranean rims causes dramatic structural instability
to Europe’s international system, while projecting images of instability to the
rest of the world. But to gain any valuable insights from the study of
Euro-Mediterranean politics, one has first to understand the complexity and
reality of this volatile regional order.
Geographically,
the Euro-Mediterranean space encompasses at least two mega-regions: the
geographical space which borders its north-west sector (EU) and the
south-eastern one, namely the Middle East, and three sub-regional groupings:
Southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb.[183]
Although there exist many variations in such geographical divisions, it is
still useful to think of the Mediterranean as a single security system. Arguably,
no other part of the globe exemplifies better the post-bipolar symptoms of
instability towards the fragmentation and revival of ‘ancient feuds’ than the
Mediterranean, with security questions becoming increasingly indivisible, often
regardless of its diverse sub-regional features.
Many
issues that are currently involved in regional fragmentation date back to the
early stages of colonialism.[184]
Colonialisation was first practised by the South to the North and, later, vice versa. The Egyptian, Phoenician, Greek,
and Persian civilisations, and later the Roman Empire, have all found their way
to the Mediterranean and sought to use it as a means of extending their
power-base. The split between the Byzantine empire in the East and the
Catholic/Germanic kingdoms in the West, the rise of Islamic and Arabic rule in
the Middle East, North Africa and Spain, the impact of extra-territorial forces
such as the Normans and Crusaders, and the rise of regional powers like Moorish
Spain, Venice and Genoa, have all contributed to the fragmentation of the
region. Their combined impact has often turned the latter into a potentially
explosive area, wherein the divisions and controversies among its peoples
intermixed with their historical ties and related destiny. As a result, the
Mediterranean has always run the risk of becoming a site of endemic and often
protracted conflicts.
Contemporary analysts point to both real and potential
conflicts that originate in or impact on the region. Revisiting their
respective causes, Balta has distinguished between conflicts that originate in
the distant past and conflicts that emerged during the second half of this
century.[185]
Potential conflicts are divided into three categories: those inherited from
colonialism (mainly territorial), those stemming from deeply divided societies
(e.g., Lebanon), and those originating in minority issues (e.g., Basques,
Corsicans, Kurds, etc). Conflicts inherited from the past are closely
associated with the three monotheistic denominations affecting Mediterranean societies.
Taken together, these inheritances exemplify the denominational fractures among
Christianity, Judaism and Islam, and the schisms between the Catholic and
Eastern Orthodox camps, as well as between the Sunnis and Shiites. Such
conflicts are the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Greco-Turkish rivalry, and the
associated Cyprus question. The latter, for over a quarter of a century now,
continues to frustrate all attempts at inter-communal reconciliation and,
eventually, reunification. The Arab-Israeli issue has also featured prominently
at the international agenda, due to the intractability of its political and
historical complexity, the depth of its emotional intensity, and the recent
revival of hope for a negotiated peaceful settlement.
During the Cold War, Spencer writes, the prevailing view was
that the Mediterranean represented ‘a region of importance because of its
proximity, potential instability and hence exploitation by the erstwhile Soviet
Union, but of less importance as an “out of area” region in NATO terms’.[186]
The Cold War had led to a reductive assessment of Mediterranean security
problems, focusing on the means and ends of countering the threat of the Soviet
presence on Euro-American lines of communication, oil and trade routes. But
from the late 1980s onwards, a shift in emphasis became manifest from global
assessments of security issues to regional ones. Lesser has argued that
Southern Europe was peripheral during the bipolar era, but in the new strategic
environment problems and interests have shifted towards the South.[187]
The aftermath of the Cold War gave the impression, albeit briefly, that certain
protracted conflicts might be resolved. But the easing of East-West tension was
not followed by a similar trend in Mediterranean politics. Rather, the removal
of bipolar ‘safety net’ and with it the view that wanted the Mediterranean to
serve as a sub-theatre of superpower antagonism introduced an idiosyncratic
fragility at both regional and sub-regional levels.
Mediterranean society and culture is relatively unstructured
and non-hierarchical. The European civilisation owes much to the Mediterranean and the Islamic world, and both have found
themselves locked in centuries of lasting dynamic tension and cooperation. To
start with, one has to go back to the era of the ancient Greek civilisation,
and the days of the Roman imperium.
In the period after, the Mediterranean witnessed an explosion of the Arab
population that conquered the Greco-Roman civilisations, leaving a remarkable
and lasting impact on a region that extended from Egypt to the so called
‘Fertile Crescent’. The peoples living in this area were given a new religion,
Islam, and a new language, Arabic. Neither of which, however, was able to
create a melting pot through assimilationist techniques of enforced
homogeneity, or for that matter to lead towards a complete fusion or
incorporation, although some commonly shared features did offer a bridge to
overcoming diversity.
The Egyptian, Phoenician, Greek, and Persian civilisations,
and later the Roman Empire, have all found their way to the Mediterranean. The
split between the Byzantine empire in the East and the Catholic/Germanic
kingdoms in the West, the rise of Islamic and Arabic rule in the Middle East,
North Africa and Spain, the impact of extra-territorial forces such as the
Crusaders, and the rise of regional powers like Venice and Genoa, have all
contributed to a rich Mediterranean history. Their combined impact has often
turned the Mediterranean into a potentially explosive area, wherein the
divisions and controversies among its peoples intermixed with their historical
ties and related destiny. As a result, the Mediterranean has always run the
risk of becoming a site of endemic and often protracted conflicts.
From such a macro-historical perspective, the fragmentation
of the Euro-Mediterranean space constitutes the major obstacle to sustain
North-South co-operation. Tempting as it may be to characterise the
Mediterranean as ‘a horizontal dividing line’ between the rich European North
and ‘an arc of crisis’ located in the South, this division fails to capture the
dialectic between distinct, yet intertwined, geographical spaces. A North-South
conflict theoretical framework underestimates the realities of both North-North
and South-South frictions and the sympathies that not only prevent the outbreak
of autochthonous conflicts but also underlie Western European efforts to
develop harmonious, yet not symmetrical, relations across the Mediterranean.[188]
A more studied analysis though, reveals that the Mediterranean provides an
efficient line of contact. In fact, it has always constituted a crossing point
for conflict and co-operation, antagonism and co-existence. Being a
heterogeneous synthesis of diverse civilisations - conceptually, along the
lines of a ‘heterarchy’ - as well as of unequal economic development, a
plurality of political regimes, divergent perceptions of security, and uneven
demographic growth, the Euro-Mediterranean system occupies a position between
order and disorder, for which a comprehensive framework of analysis is yet to
become discernible. True as the latter may be, the Mediterranean can be also
seen as a network of diversities and dividing lines between different
socio-economic systems, political cultures and regimes, languages and,
crucially, religions. One may also refer to the Mediterranean as a space, where
geography, history and politics intermesh with culture and religion with
enormous complexity, resulting in a composite system of partial regimes, each
reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging.
Religion is a very important factor in
the Euro-Mediterranean system, in which all three major monotheistic traditions
co-exist. Much like Christianity, Islam originates out of Hebrew monotheism and
branches of Judaism with common roots back to the patriarch Abraham. The
influence of European thinking on the Arab-Muslim world dates back to the 19th
century, while the Muslim civilisation marked its impact on European-Christian
culture for several centuries. But whereas the Hellenic-Judaic tradition, Couloumbis and Veremis
note, captured the imagination of the Europeans with relatively little
resistance, Islam failed to make any significant inroads in the West. ‘The
Ottomans left their religious heritage in Bosnia and Albania but the Arabs that
preceded them facilitated the transmission of Aristotelian thought into Europe
of the tenth century. The subsequent blooming of the Renaissance was assisted
by the Byzantine transfusion of classical Greek philosophy and Platonic thought
that questioned the established Aristotelian wisdom’.[189]
Not only did European culture have no
particular influence on Muslims for over a thousand years, but also benefited
from the early Islamic ‘enlightenment’.[190] Regardless
of the socio-cultural and economic entanglements rooted in Mediterranean
history, the modern European image of Islam sets its culture outside Europe;
also, due to the burdened colonial past of the Europeans, the image of external
‘otherness’ to Europe is mirrored in the Muslim societies of the Mediterranean.
Mediterranean
security considerations are full of misunderstandings about distorted
perceptions and images of (political) Islam, as well as about the threat of
terrorism used by extremist nationalist movements in the region. Other issues
stem from the appropriation of Islam for political ends and the lack of respect
for universal values and norms of human rights. These misunderstandings emanate
from mutual ignorance and intended confusion, since the military dimension of
security is lacking from Southern debate on security. One should also guard
against the simplification often suggested in the media that ‘Islamic
fundamentalism’ is a violent and merciless organisation orchestrated by
During the Gulf War the West was seriously concerned with the
possibility of a militant Islamist backlash against intervention. The risk of
terrorist attacks against the West was raised by Hussein’s call for a ‘holy
war’ a few days after he invaded
Nevertheless, concern of an Islamic ‘threat’ to the West
increased after the Gulf War, by creating a new enemy stereotype after the
demise of communism, preparing a climate for a ‘new cultural war’.[196]
Rising anxiety in international relations is, according to Blunden, contagious.[197]
The international system tends naturally to generate insecurity and suspicion,
and ‘once a pattern of hostility has been established each will tend to see the
other as the enemy and to assume the worst about him’.[198]
In fact, even before the Gulf crisis, a theory started to take shape that it
was not Communism that constituted the major threat for the West, but rather
Islamic fundamentalism.[199]
On many occasions, Western policy-makers have exploited a general public
ignorance about Orientalism to
advance self-serving foreign policy objectives. Since ‘Islam is both a religion
and a polity’,[200]
it is not surprising that several extremist groups have used it for radical
purposes. The traditional view of the so-called Orientalists in the West is that the Arabs/Muslims ‘show lack of
coordination and harmony in organisation and function, nor have they revealed
an ability for cooperation. Any collective action for mutual benefit or common
profit is alien to them’.[201]
Crucial to the creation of such stereotypes has been the role played by the
Western media in equating Islam with ‘fundamentalist Islam’ and, hence, with a
direct threat to the liberal-democratic West. As Said observes, ‘... the
negative images of Islam are very much more prevalent than any others and such
images correspond, not to what Islam “is” ... but to what prominent sectors of
a particular society take it to be: Those sectors have the power and the will
to propagate that particular image of Islam, and this image therefore becomes
more prevalent, more present, than all others’.[202]
In this context, Said continues, ‘there is a consensus on Islam as a kind of
scapegoat for everything we do not happen to like about the world’s new
political, social, and economic patterns’.[203]
Likewise, Esposito, a renounced non-Muslim scholar on Islam, has suggested that
the selective presentation of facts and biased analysis have contributed to a
negative perception of Islamic religion by mainstream Western society, reducing
Islam and Islamic revivalism to stereotypes of ‘Islam vs. the West’, ‘Islam vs.
modernity’, ‘Muslim rage’, extremism, fanaticism, and so on.[204]
Writing on the subject, Roberson argues that ‘the Islamic threat is essentially
a counterfeit issue imbued with stereotypical misperceptions and a casual
commitment to analysis ... in some cases, a conscious exercise in image
creation for tactical political purposes’.[205]
There has been a century-lasting conflict between Islam and
Western Christianity, each being perceived by the other as ‘suspect’. Since the
crusades, the Western world used to export its civilisation through its
imperial and colonial policies, often echoing the logic of divide et impera, to secure its vital economic and trade interests.
All other civilisations were measured by Western standards on the basis of
anthropocentric and individualistic worldviews reflected in the Greco-Roman and
Christian traditions. These pre-liberal images were strongly influenced by the
pre-eminent role attached to an essentially value-driven distinction between
the individual and the collective. It was only thanks to the legacy of the
Enlightenment that certain notions of ‘civility’ were linked to a more
normative political language. Such a legacy has, in large measure, survived the
present era, with the West attempting to monopolise global discourse on the
democratic functions of government and human rights. But much like those in the West, Muslims believe that their faith has a
divine purpose too, motivating them to set the world straight. They believe to
be the chosen people following the righteous path to ‘judgement day’. More than
religion and polity, Islam is also a culture with a different perception of the
relationship between church and state.[206]
Despite the fact that the roots of this discourse can be
traced to the revival of classic Greek ideas and the Renaissance, it was the
coming of modernity that clearly exposed the differences between the two
cultures.[207]
Most Arab societies were introduced to the logic of modernisation under the
heavy pressure of colonial
In Western polities, a separation of
state and religion (secularism) was necessary to safeguard the modernisation
project - and its assorted properties of industrialisation, urbanisation,
bureaucratisation, technology, growth in communications, etc. - but Islam is
still against any such separation.[210]
The revival of Islam per se, of political Islamism, and of Islamic radicalism are
products of the aforementioned antitheses. Today, fragmented and struggling
with modernity, Islam faces a variety of challenges including potentially
violent movements with international implications. As Lapidus poits out, ‘to cope with these movements we
cannot merely deplore, hate, or fear them. We must understand what they are
trying to say and the conditions that give rise to them. While the strengths
and dangers of these movements can easily be overestimated, and frequently are,
their seriousness and unsettling long-term potential cannot be ignored’.[218] The
threat of fundamentalism currently
manifested in the
It logically follows that that the creation and maintenance
of a climate of meaningful and open dialogue in the
The
cause of tension in Euro-Mediterranean relations can only be partially ascribed
to politico-military factors or the resurgence of radical Islam. The
multidimensional character of Mediterranean security necessitates a
comprehensive approach to security, taking into account socio-economic and
cultural factors, and thus moving away from simplistic and convenient diagnoses
that overemphasise the military aspects of security. As Bin asserts, ‘many of
the security-related concerns that have come to the fore in the region
post-Cold War are non-military issues that may interact with more traditional
security risks’.[221]
The new era has reactivated concern over the impact of the
North-South divide on Mediterranean politics and society, itself part of the
global debt problem.[222]
Such a divide is determined by unequal economic development, a plurality of
political regimes, divergent perceptions
of security threats, and changing patterns of demography.
Euro-Mediterranean affairs are affected by
Turning to issues of complex economic disparity, Joffé emphasises the importance of the North-South ontology
of the
From the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, the southern
In the 1980s, the slowdown of the earlier boom brought about
a contraction of the Arab markets. Many Arab states became heavily indebted and
were forced to undergo sharp economic adjustments. Moreover, with the decline
of oil prices during the latter part of the 1980s most of the Arab economies
came to a grinding halt. The worsening of socio-economic conditions in the
Mediterranean as compared to other, less developed regions has become clear by
the 1990s. A report published by the World Bank in October 1995 stated that,
since the mid-1980s, the southern Mediterranean countries suffered the largest
decline of real per capita income than any other developing region
(approximately 2 percent annually), and a 0.2 percent annual decline in
productivity.[233] As
a response to these trends, the developing countries of the region accused the
Europeans (and the wider West) of setting up and supporting a global economic
system that works against their interests. From a historical perspective, such
criticisms date back to colonial occupation and its powerful effects on the
economic development of the Mediterranean south. Joffé explains: ‘The effects are most strikingly seen in the
Maghreb, where the region’s integration into the French colonial sphere meant
that economic structures were increasingly dedicated to serving the
metropolitan market’.[234]
On the whole, economic co-operation in the Mediterranean is limited as much by
the fragmentation of the southern economies (especially since protracted
conflicts constitute an obstacle to South-South economic relations), as by the
absence of a coherent framework to manage North-South relations in a mutually
advantageous manner.
Two undisputed features in the Euro-Mediterranean soft
security agenda are demography and migration. The countries of North Africa -
Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya - have at present a population
of 120 million, but over the next 25 years it is estimated that their
population will cross the threshold of 200 million. The population of northern
Mediterranean countries, which in 1950 accounted for two-thirds of the total
Mediterranean population, will fall to one-third by 2025, whereas on the
southern shore of the basin, the growth rate is increasing rapidly. Yet, the
crux of the problem lies in the age-differences between the populations of the
two shores. If there are no major demographic changes, the European countries
will experience an increased ageing of their populations in the next 30 or so
years, while in the southern rim the section of the population under 15 years
of age will continue to rise.[235]
Among the major consequences of these fast-growing demographic trends will be a
colossal demand for employment. This problem is compounded by the fact that
labour supply in southern Mediterranean countries is lagging far behind the
expected increase in the labour force seeking work. Just to absorb the young
people entering the labour market, these countries would have to create more
than 2.5 million jobs annually, that is, three times the present rate of job
creation. Never before in the history of the Mediterranean have there been as
many youngsters as today on its southern shores due to a robust and still in
full swing demographic transition.[236]
Should this market fails to absorb them, then it is easy to imagine the
frustration this will generate, not to mention the accompanying levels of
social protest and migratory pressures.[237]
As long as the conditions for the development of North African economies are
not in place, the only available option to a large section of their population
will be to migrate to the more prosperous European countries, thus posing an
additional challenge to regional stability.
Needed as cheap labour following World War II, the
Arab-Muslim migrants in Western Europe have recently become a security issue.[238]
Today, one easily identifies considerable migratory flows form ethnic communities
that resist integration and/or assimilation to respective European host
cultures, as some 6 million immigrants from the Maghreb alone reside in EU
countries, mainly France, Italy, Spain, Greece, and far more in the new
Mediterranean members of the EU, Malta and Cyprus. As this continues to occur
in a period of heightening demographic fragility, immigration will continue to
be seen as a major threat, leading to socially pathogenous phenomena such as
intolerance, racism and xenophobia among a section of the host population. At a
time when Europe is preoccupied with the perceived socio-economic and political
consequences of foreign residents, one should not forget the valuable
contribution of immigrants to Germany’s post-war ‘economic miracle’,[239]
regarded at the time as a resource, rather than a threat. Today, however, the
capacity of the European labour market to absorb growing migratory flows
appears to be far more limited. Contributing to the above has been the
ever-growing flows of refugees and immigrants from East European countries and
the Balkans post-1989, not to mention additional currents of immigration from
other troubled parts of the globe such as Black Africa,
Determining an appropriate policy response to the movement of
immigrants and asylum seekers across national boundaries is one of the key
challenges confronting both individual European governments and the EU
collectively. Recent trends have resulted in restrictive legislation on
immigrants and refugees which, in Aliboni’s terms, comes in sharp contrast to
the rationalist, democratic nature of modern European societies.[240]
Collinson has also illustrated the profound influence of the migration question
on the political and security agenda of the
Disparities in wealth within the
For
more than fifty years now, powers and forces that were either external or
peripheral to the region have defined Mediterranean politics mainly in bipolar
terms.[245]
Since the end of World War II, European policies in the Middle East have been
torn between Europe’s geographic contiguity, historical familiarity, and
privileged trade links with the Middle East, and the ideological-strategic
association with the US.[246]
The end of the European era in the eastern Mediterranean begun in 1956 with the
Suez debacle, sealing the fate of
Europe’s marginal role in Middle East politics.[247]
With such episodes, the Europeans surrendered the Mediterranean basin to the
competing American and Soviet spheres of influence. Thereafter, and throughout
the 1970s, the swiftness with which the superpowers initially supported their
respective Mediterranean allies further exposed the lack of a substantive
European influence. But even in the 1980s, when Europe begun to assert its role
as an international (economic) actor, it did not embark on a competitive tussle
with the superpowers over the Mediterranean, a situation that tacitly suited
everyone. Peters explains: ‘By mirroring the stance taken by the Arabs, [the
Community] effectively removed itself as a potential mediator between the two
sides’.[248] As
for Europe’s ‘civilian power’ image, it failed to project a common Mediterranean
approach. By looking inward to strengthen its internal arrangements by
reforming its institutions,[249]
the Community managed to play down security alliances in the region.
Although soon after the end of the Cold War the US and Europe
had strikingly common global interests, such a convergence began to fade by the
mid-1990s. For instance, the US-EU dispute over the extraterritorial
application of US laws (unilateral US sanctions against Libya, Iran and Cuba)
is a good case in point.[250]
In relation to the Mediterranean, Aliboni asserts that ‘the changing
Mediterranean environment is de facto
encapsulated by two different international contexts with different priorities,
responsibilities and efficacies: on the one hand, the Mashreq, where the US is
strongly committed both politically and militarily, with the EU playing only a
secondary role in the economic field; on the other, the Maghreb, where the EU
is the dominant, if not sole, actor’.[251]
But as Holmes argues, this arrangement is far from perfect, as it does not accurately
reflect the interests and capabilities of both international actors.[252]
Although transatlantic co-operation is central to Mediterranean stability, this
does not necessarily apply in the case of the Middle East, where Europe and the
US do not seem to be pursuing common strategies, as they do in the European
theatre. As Khalilzad notes, the policies pursued by the transatlantic partners
towards this unstable region are slipping close to rivalry, a situation that
could not only hurt the US-European alliance itself, but could also provide an
opening for the rise of hostile regional powers like Iran.[253]
On this issue, Marr warns that, if these differences are not handled carefully
by the transatlantic partners, they could impair NATO’s ability ‘to take concerted
out-of-area action when necessary ... making diplomatic efforts increasingly
contentious and ineffective’.[254]
Lesser defines three dimensions in relation to US interests
in the Mediterranean: a response to change and crisis in the region; an
extension of the American commitment to European security; and a determination
of US policy towards the lessening of Middle East tension.[255]
But the US lacks an integrated view of the problems confronting the
Mediterranean space,[256]
although its post-Cold war objectives in Europe have displayed a degree of
continuity: to secure European support for US actions outside Western Europe,
and to avoid increased financial and/or military obligations. Not only fiscal
pressures in the US have made the latter objective more important than before
and have reinforced US interest in EU initiatives for greater burden-sharing in
global security management. But it would be an illusion to believe that a safe
alternative currently exists to sustained US military capability to protect vital
US (oil) interests in the Middle East.
Currently, the EU faces significant difficulties in assuming
a substantive security role in the Mediterranean, not least due to the evident
US reluctance to share its regional initiatives, as in the Middle East Peace
Process,[257]
with European frustration growing not only by the lack of progress in the
Arab-Israeli talks, but also by Washington’s near-monopoly position on
diplomatic action.[258]
US emphasis on Israel’s strategic interests jeopardises EU efforts towards the
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Köchler writes: ‘Europe is
playing virtually no political role
in Palestine, being merely “tolerated” in acting as paymaster for social and
economic development projects in the occupied and “autonomous” Palestinian
territories’.[259] In
Gordon’s view, two scenarios seem possible. As long as the Arab–Israeli Peace
Process is moving forward, the US is probably right that Europe’s formal
involvement in direct peace talks would not be helpful, all the more so if such
a role aims at promoting policies different from those initiated by the US. But
if the Peace Process stalls completely, it will be difficult for the US not to
justify a more active European role in the politics of this troubled region.[260]
Regarding Europe’s strategic interests in the Middle East,
any political interference by the US - itself a party to regional conflicts -
is at least counterproductive. But leaving the Mediterranean to European hands
alone is too unrealistic an option, given the stakes involved.[261]
As Hollis put it: ‘Europe certainly lacks a distinct and unified military
capability and in this respect cannot challenge the United State’s role’.[262]
Although the EU has furthered the scope and level of ‘ever closer union’, it
still depends on US leadership, since it has so far proved delinquent in
addressing effectively security and defence issues in the Mediterranean. At the
same time, Holmes comments, the US ‘will not escape the impact of negative
consequences should that time bomb blow up’.[263] In any case, Snyder argues, a US exit
from the Mediterranean would make practically impossible the craft of a
credible regional security structure.[264]
Therefore, Europe and its Atlantic partner should co-ordinate their
Mediterranean policies and agendas. EU partners should encourage littoral
countries to adopt democratic policies and develop a strategy to address the
deep roots of existing conflicts, whilst NATO must assume a role in creating
military confidence by revising initiatives like the anti-ballistic missile project
and modernisation plans that generate fear and mistrust in the Arab countries.[265]
But a common US-European approach towards the Mediterranean depends not only on
the willingness and capabilities of the EU to assume greater responsibilities,
but also on the preparedness of the US to share global governance and join in a
genuine partnership.[266]
North-South and South-South
European Dimensions
Gillespie
suggests that the North/South European dimension must be considered in any
analysis of EU Mediterranean policy, for it provides a potential fault-line
along which European disunity could develop.[267]
Post-1989 Euro-Mediterranean developments are followed closely by the EU’s
southern members, something that cannot be said about their northern partners.
Intra-European controversy is not about having a Mediterranean policy or not,
but about methods, priorities and interests.[268]
The EU’s economic interests in the southern Mediterranean are comparatively
unimportant in relation to other geographical areas. In particular, the EU’s prospective enlargement has produced so far a
set of dynamic policies toward its eastern periphery, in contradistinction to a rather vague
Mediterranean orientation. As Kaminski notes, a further
Mediterranean enlargement is not an option to solve the regional ‘security
vacuum’ and will therefore concentrate mainly on Eastern European candidates.[269]
A related issue that currently challenges the formation of
the new European order is that there is no homogeneous European political space
linked to the maintenance of international security. The EU lacks a common
perspective in tackling Mediterranean issues. Historically, European powers
have expressed interest in different parts of the
Different perceptions of interest persist about the EU’s
relations with the
European ambitions for a stable and prosperous
The effectiveness of EU security policy depends on striking a
balance between the competing visions its members have about European security.
Still, differences
in the formulation of separate foreign policy initiatives reveal that southern
EU members and applicant countries have not yet found a reliable modus operandi for strengthening the
EU’s Mediterranean dimension. But the geographical diversity of preferences
among EU states does not necessarily mean that no cohesive position can emerge.[280]
For instance, Tanner asserts, ‘the fate of the Mediterranean Pact will heavily
depend on the EU members’ capability to take a common stance with regard to the
Having examined the properties of systemic complexity in the
On
27 November 1995, at a Conference organised by the Spanish Presidency of the EU
in Barcelona, the European Commission, the Foreign Ministers of the 15 EU
member states and 12 Mediterranean partner-countries (Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Palestinian Authority,
Cyprus, and Malta) signed a complex
agreement designed to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the region.
All southern EU states were particularly active, but at the supranational level
it was the Commission that influenced the agenda, whereas the contribution of
the EP was limited due to its restrictive decision-making powers.[282]
It is worth noting that the EU’s position at the Barcelona Conference was in
marked contrast to the other states of the region that lacked a collective common
position.[283] The
political aims of the EMP were not extensively discussed at
From a pragmatic view, the founding Euro-Mediterranean
Conference managed to bring Israeli and Syrian representatives at the same
table, something inconceivable for any previous Mediterranean initiative. As
Khouri put it: ‘The participation of the two Arab countries gives the meeting a
degree of legitimacy that the MENA did not enjoy’.[289]
A contributing factor was the euphoria from the considerable progress achieved
in Oslo during the Middle East multilateral negotiations.[290]
In an atmosphere of ‘high hopes and low motives’,[291]
the Barcelona Conference became the ‘launching pad’[292]
for a regional process aiming at the preservation of peace and stability, the
setting up of a shared zone of prosperity through the creation of a free trade
area, and the promotion of structured dialogue among distinct culturally
defined and politically organised units.
The Barcelona Declaration does not represent a historical
turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations, as its main objective was not
regional integration, at least as understood in the context of the EU system.
Yet, the document adopted in Barcelona introduced a new spirit of equal and
comprehensive co-operation in three areas:
i) political and security; ii) economic and financial; iii) and
socio-cultural. These fields were structured into three respective ‘baskets’ -
along the lines of the1975 Helsinki Final Act - each containing specific
proposals that could lead to a genuine regional process. The Declaration also
contained a follow-up procedure. Drawing from the final document, the
participating states were ‘resolved to establish a multilateral and lasting
framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for he
characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the
participants’.[293]
The Political Basket
According
to Jűnemann, although
the political basket specifies measures for enhancing regional peace and
stability, ‘it avoids concrete commitments in political and security
co-operation’ due to the incoherence of interests between the EU and its
Mediterranean partners.[294]
Yet, the partners stressed their conviction that Mediterranean peace, stability
and security are common assets that should be promoted and strengthened ‘by all
means at their disposal’. They also agreed to respect human rights, fundamental
freedoms, diversity, pluralism and the rule of law, and recognised ‘the right
of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural,
economic and judicial system’. To that end, they agreed to conduct a political
dialogue at regular intervals based on observance of the essential principles
of international law, while reaffirming various common objectives in matters of
internal and external stability.[295]
In a declaration of principles, the partners undertook a number of shared commitments that, given Mediterranean complexity, seem far-reaching. The participants considered within the first basket practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the excessive accumulation of conventional arms in the region. They have also agreed to refrain from developing military capabilities beyond their legitimate defence requirements in order to build mutual confidence. However, some south EU countries tried to make sure that the Barcelona Declaration would not venture into the deep Mediterranean waters of ‘hard’ security. Linked to the latter objective is the necessity to promote and sustain good-neighbourly relations.
The basket also contained a mandate for a region-specific
security arrangement to consider confidence and security-building measures as
means for the creation of an ‘Area of Peace and Stability’, including the
long-term objective of adopting a Euro-Mediterranean Charter. During the
Barcelona Conference, both France and Malta have tabled proposals for a
Euro-Mediterranean Charter. The French proposal draws from the Stability Pact
as originated in the Balladur Plan and adopted as a Joint Action under the
CFSP. The French proposal also sees the Euro-Mediterranean Charter as an
exercise in preventive diplomacy providing a framework for a political and
security-related dialogue. The proposal does not represent an arrangement
dealing with current conflicts in the region, but rather as the basis for a
future regional security architecture. Designed to provide a platform for
promoting voluntary and politically binding commitments, the French proposal
did not foresee the creation of new mechanisms and institutions, but aimed at
building on the experience of existing organisations. On its part, the Maltese
proposal highlighted the need to create a pan-Mediterranean security system to
promote regional political dialogue, including the creation of mechanisms with
operational capability to crisis-management and conflict-prevention. As Tanner
observes, both proposals reflect the need to give a clearer framework of action
to the ambitious objectives that were set up within the first basket of the
Barcelona Declaration.[296]
The political and security dialogue launched in Barcelona is
one of the EMP’s most promising elements, representing an entirely new
experiment in Euro-Mediterranean relations. As Aliboni asserts, the first
basket is an innovative and light mechanism, in that it is not linked to
specific objectives, but is instead directed to the broad task of political
consultation.[297] But
the envisaged security partnership envisaged is no easy task, for it has to
reconcile long-term goals with the contingencies of everyday politics in a
fragmented and volatile region.[298]
Another reason is that the EMP does not presently offer the necessary
institutions to deal with regional complexity. Important problems remain like the ‘EU-centric character’ of the
EMP, which has not been endowed with its own Secretariat. Rather, it is the
Commission that acts as the de facto
Secretariat. Besides, the Senior Officials’ Committee is chaired by the EU
Presidency. As Edwards and Philippart note, the non-institutionalisation of the
dialogue among the Senior Officials, ‘... has been surrounded by an air of
deliberative vagueness, largely because of sensitivities created by the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process’.[299]
Such arrangements exacerbate the southern partners’ sense of estrangement from
the EMP by confirming that it is less attuned to their security needs than to
those of the EU.[300]
The
The Economic Basket
The
economic and financial basket of the Barcelona Declaration was the most
detailed basket of the
The free trade area is not an end in itself, but rather a
means intended to diminish socio-economic disparities, promote regional
co-operation, accelerate sustainable development, and facilitate the
integration of southern Mediterranean economies into the global economy. In an
attempt to reduce the socio-economic gap between the two Mediterranean shores,
Commission proposals included the improvement of social services, especially in
urban areas, the harmonious development of rural areas, the development of
fisheries, and environmental protection. In the same context, the Commission
will take steps to the development of human resources. One of the key issues
here is technical assistance to reduce illegal immigration. The Commission also
intends to offer its expertise to combat the new forms of insecurity, most
notably drug trafficking, terrorism, and international crime. As regards
regional integration, the Commission planed to supply appropriate technical
assistance for the creation of co-operative structures and to finance the
development of infrastructures essential for increased intra-regional trade,
especially in transportation, communications, and energy.
The economic rationale behind MEFTA is relatively easy to
state: the EU, a large unit of some 400 million inhabitants, can only progress
and prosper within a stable Euro-Mediterranean space - MEFTA will consist of
approximately 700 million people - with which prosperity can be shared.
It was also agreed that the EU would negotiate with most
Mediterranean partners new Association Agreements with the view to
establishing, albeit bilaterally, an industrial free trade area within a
time-specific framework. The rationale is to improve the synergy of economic
competition across the Euro-Mediterranean space. This is why Jűnemann
claims that multilateralism in the Barcelona Declaration was merely added to
the traditional ‘bilateral concept’ of Euro-Mediterranean relations.[306]
As Minasi put it, ‘... the new system is not really multilateral, rather it is bi-multilateral,
whereas it is negotiated between a multilateral entity – the EU - and single
partner countries, encouraging fragmentation. Considering that trade among
partner countries is a mere 5% of their total external trade, the unusual fact
is going to happen that there will be a free trade area based on bilateral
rather than multilateral exchanges, and where intense North-South exchanges are
not matched by relevant South-South trade’.[307]
According to the Declaration, trade in agriculture will be
liberalised only ‘as far as the various agricultural policies allow’, which
means that real free trade may have to wait until the EU reforms its
cash-draining CAP system of domestic subsidies. As Tsoukalis highlights, ‘free
access to industrial exports does not mean a great deal if there is little to
export, as it is the case for most of the Mediterranean partners’.[308]
This is also why Wolf has argued that the EU’s approach to Euro-Mediterranean
economic integration is ‘Janus-faced’, for it combines ‘liberalism within and
mercantilism without’.[309]
The new Association Agreements have two key components: the
gradual introduction of free trade in the remarkably short period of 15 years,
as a vehicle towards greater competitiveness; and the parallel financial and
technical support to economic reform, as vehicles towards institutional and
policy reform. The 12 Mediterranean countries would not be left alone to deal
with the consequences of transition. Flexible patterns of economic support are
available from the EU, in what is often referred to as ‘the tool box approach’.
By the latter is meant that it is not compulsory to use all policy instruments,
but only those that are thought to be more adapted to a country’s needs.[310]
The year 2010 was decided for the completion of such individual free trade
agreements. Each Association Agreement is a specific case and thus individual
timetables leading to free trade should not, for the purpose of being accepted
in WTO (an absolute requirement for the EU), exceed 12 years. Accordingly,
complete free trade will only be achieved when the last transitional period of
the last agreement entered into force will be terminated. By that time,
however, trade barriers among the 12 southern Mediterranean partners would make
no sense and a strong incentive would have been established amongst them for
direct free trade arrangements.
Due to the considerable economic strains of meeting the MEFTA
objective,[311] the
southern Mediterranean economies would have to undergo a lengthy transition
period. Any partner entering this process will have to deal with the necessary
fiscal reforms (less revenue from tariff duties and more from value
added-related taxes), with the need for a strong economic environment conducive
to private investment (a functioning financial sector, an adequate legislative
environment for business, a proper judicial system as well as patent laws), and
with the need for an efficient class of entrepreneurs and businesses (given the
quality requirements and the competitiveness of the European market).[312]
Also, in most cases, they will have to create a leaner and more efficient state
to deal promptly with the social requirements of any modern polity. This means
that some inefficient sectors might have to be restructured or even phased out.
Similarly, the agricultural sector might have to undergo some serious
restructuring, especially when it comes to meeting the EU’s quality standards
like product quality, packaging norms, etc.
The regulatory package of MEFTA implies that the partners
have to make a pragmatic judgement whether the benefits in the short and medium
term outweigh the drawbacks, and whether their future option is to remain free
from collective market regulation or, conversely, to participate in the making
of a regional trading space.[313]
In a 1997 EuroMeSCo report it was predicted that the medium- and long-term
effects of creating the MEFTA would be positive, as they will trigger economic
growth and active integration into the international trade system, thus
boosting the job market. In the short-term, however, measures will have to be
taken in order to lower the social cost of the transition period. The general
conclusion is that, without palliative measures, the creation of MEFTA will
have adverse short-term effects on the states’ budgets, as well as on the
social situation, because of the immediacy of adjustment costs.[314]
Although the MEFTA objective has been conceived without fully considering its
consequences, and although it restricts free trade only to some products, it
can encourage growth on both shores of the Mediterranean, provided that the EU
is adequately involved in the funding of structural change in the South, and
that partner countries agree to improve domestic policies and to integrate
their economies reciprocally.[315]
Khader notes that the economic basket makes the EMP’s success imperative,
otherwise the 12 Mediterranean partners will be left either in economic
isolation and impoverishment, or will have to struggle in a disorganised way
with savage economic restructuring.[316]
Overall EU support for economic transition currently
represents an active pipeline of over ECU 650 million, to which should be added
the loans secured by the EIB. On an average commitment basis, EU financing in
the Mediterranean area is worth ECU 1700 million per year from the EU’s budget
and the EIB’s resources. The MEDA programme is the principal financial
instrument of the EU for the implementation of the EMP.[317]
It accounts for ECU 3424.5 million out of a total ECU 4685 million for the
period 1995-1999. Webb defined the funding priorities for the MEDA programme as
follows: i) support to economic
transition: the aim is to prepare for the implementation of free trade
through increasing competitiveness, with a view to achieving sustainable
economic growth, in particular through the development of the private sector;
ii) strengthening the socio-economic
balance: the aim is to alleviate the short-term costs of economic
transition through appropriate measures in the field of social policy; and iii)
regional co-operation: the aim is to
complement pre-existing bilateral activities through measures to increase
exchanges at the regional level.[318]
The economic agenda, and particularly the MEFTA objective,
poses serious challenges to the south Mediterranean partners, for it will
expose them to EU-standards of competition without providing any additional
significant market. As Aliboni put it, ‘one may wonder why they accepted it’.[319]
The answer is threefold. First, forces of both globalisation and liberalisation
of the world economy today confront any country in the world in an organised
and orderly manner. In the age of ‘casino capitalism’, sound macro-economic
policies and industrial competitiveness are factors that determine most the
overall performance, economic or otherwise, of any country.[320]
These are issues that the Mediterranean countries would have to come to terms
with irrespective of the EMP. Second, if any Mediterranean partner wishes to
reinforce its economic strength, mobilise national savings, and attract foreign
investment and technological know-how (and, as rarely is the case, know-why),
then it must prepare itself for tough competition with other parts of the globe
that also aim at a better share of the European market. To compete, the
Mediterranean states must implement more far-reaching liberalisation,
privatisation, and deregulation.[321]
Third, if any littoral state accepts that some form of institutional economic
and policy reform is necessary, then better do it with its major economic
partner, the EU, securing financial and technical support, rather than in a
disorganised and uncontrolled manner burdened by additional external
constraints such as pressures on exchange rates or the balance of payments,
rising debt service, etc.
The Socio-Cultural Basket
Anne-Charlotte
Bournoville, the Commission’s official in charge of culture, audio-visual and
information within the EMP, when asked to describe the nature of the
socio-cultural partnership, commented that ‘... although the Mediterranean’s
foremost product over thousands of years has been culture, cultural
co-operation at Euro-Mediterranean level was a ground-breaker for the Barcelona
Conference. Therefore, the fact that culture was included among the areas of
co-operation is a mini-revolution in itself. In practice, this means that in 1995
people were not used to working together at the Euro-Mediterranean level and
there was little experience at the Community level of dealing with issues of
this nature’.[322]
The aim of the Social, Cultural and Human basket is
wide-ranging and ambitious, granting Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and
civil society representatives a significant role in EMP affairs. As Colas
argued: ‘the incorporation of civil society into the Barcelona process is a
clear case of international regime formation, which seeks to respond to changes
of intergovernmental elitism’.[323]
Linkages and networks between civil societies in the Mediterranean may lay the
foundation for mutual knowledge, understanding and confidence, which are vital
in the construction of the Euro-Mediterranean space. Co-operation among
northern and southern Mediterranean civil societies should not take the form of
‘assistance’ or the imposition of the Western model. Rather, a real partnership
should incorporate the component civil societies in political decision-making
and also take into account their particularities and values. A crucial point
here is that the transformation of the Euro-Mediterranean order may well depend
on the strengthening of civil societies, but this has to be done in
co-operation with the states concerned. Otherwise, as Benaboud warns,
‘confrontation between civil society and the state will fail to build viable
social and political projects’.[324]
The Barcelona Declaration underlined that ‘the reinforcement
of democracy and respect for human rights’, are indeed the essential elements
of the entire project. But co-operation in these areas is also the most
sensitive dimension of the EMP, not least because the debate on democracy and
human rights in the Mediterranean (among other principles of good governance)
is linked to the debate on identity and civilisational interaction. Certain
sectors of North African and Middle Eastern public opinion suspect that the
West wants to impose its civilisation and hegemony under the guise of universal
democratic principles, whilst in the North, in parallel to the rise of racism
and xenophobia, the preconceived idea that there is an intrinsic
incompatibility between Islam and democracy has developed at both grassroots
and elite levels.[325]
As Fahmy points out, ‘potential differences may emerge in the various
conceptions regarding basic principles as democracy and human rights, and the
only way that such differences will be resolved is through a cultural dialogue
to reconcile the contending interpretations surrounding these concepts’.[326]
The EMP involves bringing the peoples of Europe and the Mediterranean closer,
promoting shared understandings, eliminating discomforting stereotypes and, in
brief, projecting positive images. Such a ‘pro-active’ approach encounters the
well-known islamophobic Clash of
Civilizations. The means for bringing the EMP partners closer together rest
on an inter-cultural hermeneutic dialogue in a wide range of areas such as
cultural heritage, media, dialogue among religions, etc.
The third basket highlights common roots (as part of a common
experience) as well as the richness of Mediterranean cultural diversity, doing
away with negative pre-conceptions. But building the cultural partnership is a
delicate process due to the difficulties in establishing a constructive
dialogue among different civilisations, especially if such dialogue has to
transcend images from the region’s colonial past, feelings of intolerance and
xenophobia, as well as a narrow view of national identity. An additional
obstacle may be that any cultural dialogue implies cultural exchanges and
mobility that are not always easy to achieve in the southern rim. In light of
the above, what is needed is a new hermeneutics of North-South perceptions
together with the inclusion of religious and cultural rights in the debate on
democracy and modernity. Although the socio-cultural dimension is often
projected as being of secondary importance to the politico-economic dimensions
of the EMP, the view taken here is that it is potentially the most
revolutionary outcome of the regional process. It is a recognition that trade,
investment, and economic assistance are part of a wider evolutionary process
that incorporates a substantive human dimension. In fact, after making
obligatory references to ‘dialogue and respect among cultures and religions’ as
‘a necessary precondition for bringing peoples closer’, the socio-cultural
basket goes on to identify the need for a programme of human exchanges between
the two Mediterranean shores, whilst including the utilisation and development
of human resources in the region. In addition, it touches upon the sensitive
issues of illegal immigration,[327]
organised crime and drugs trafficking, as well as on co-operation between local
government authorities, trade unions, and public and private companies.
Finally, the Declaration recognised the future challenges posed by the
demographic trends in southern Mediterranean and declared that these should be
counterbalanced by appropriate policy measures to advance social progress and
economic development.
The Follow Up Mechanism
The
Declaration finally included an appendix offering a follow-up procedure in
various sectors at various levels for implementation purposes. Progress towards
the aims of the Declaration, as well as the definition of new aims and
activities, is governed by the annual meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers.
The Barcelona Process also consists of ad
hoc Ministerial Conferences for different portfolios (industry, energy,
etc.) and thematic fields (the information society, local management of water,
etc.). Conferences are also arranged on an ad
hoc basis for senior officials and experts as well as representatives of
civil society and parliamentarians. A
Euro-Mediterranean Committee was thus established consisting of officials from
the EU Troika (the previous, current, and next Council Presidencies) and from
all southern Mediterranean states. The Committee should meet regularly and
report to the Foreign Ministers who are also to meet periodically to review progress
in the implementation of agreed principles and to reach consensus on actions
that would further promote the objectives of the EMP. Waites and Stavridis
note: ‘This was a substantial advance on earlier experiments in Mediterranean
cooperation which had little follow up and depended for progress on constant
ministerial action’.[328]
But as Edwards and Philippart point out, no ‘Barcelona Secretariat’ as such was
established. They explain: ‘The Barcelona Declaration designated “the
Commission departments”: to undertake the “appropriate” preparatory and
follow-up work for meetings resulting from the Barcelona Work Programme and
from the conclusions of the Euro-Med Committee - a somewhat odd designation
given the fairly general use of the term directorates-general and even,
perhaps, suggestive of a degree of fragmentation or segmentation within the
Commission’.[329]
The inclusion of a follow-up procedure provides assurance for
the ‘continuity’ of the process placing the EMP in a position to be considered
as a pragmatic mechanism for regional co-operation. But both structural and
institutional analyses of the EMP’s decision-making procedures come to an
important conclusion: the term ‘Partnership’ does not reflect the substance of
the actual Euro-Mediterranean relationship. Aliboni makes the point well: ‘It
is in fact not really a partnership (i.e. a relationship between equal
parties), but the aggregation of the non-EU Mediterranean partners to the
Union’s institutions of political co-operation in a satellite status’.[330]
Or, as Monar argues, the Partnership suffers more from a gap between its
apparent potential to act and its actual performance: ‘this discrepancy can be
explained in part by the particular institutional and procedural constrains of
the Union’s “dual” system of foreign affairs’.[331]
Within
the Work Programme of the Barcelona Declaration it was decided that Senior
Officials would meet periodically, starting within the first quarter of 1996,
to conduct a political and security dialogue, and to examine appropriate means
for implementing the Barcelona principles. Five meetings were held in 1996 in
the above context. Although the results were somewhat weak, in general,
progress was steady despite numerous political problems, especially in the
Middle East Peace Process. In particular, progress was achieved in three areas,
where the senior officials decided to set up: i) a list of PBMs such as the
network of foreign policy institutes (EuroMeSco)[332]
and the mechanism for co-operation in the event of natural and human disasters;[333]
ii) a regularly updated Action Plan to serve as a blueprint for the group’s
work, covering six sectors of activity: strengthening of democracy, preventive
diplomacy, security and confidence-building measures, disarmament, terrorism
and organized crime; and iii) a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and
Stability to serve as an institutional mechanism for dialogue and
crisis-prevention and to enhance co-operation in the political basket.[334]
However, as EuroMeSco itself recognised, for these tasks to be accomplished,
efficient decision-making mechanisms and procedures are needed.[335]
In its communication to the Council and the EP, the
Commission indicated the priorities of the Second Euro-Mediterranean
Ministerial Conference that was agreed to take place in 1997. After reviewing
the first 15 months of the EMP and the state of negotiations in the Association
Agreements with the 12 Mediterranean partners, the Commission suggested several
objectives for future co-operation.[336]
More specifically, it proposed a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and
Stability to endorse the achievements of the political and security dialogue,
while on the economic and financial front it considered measures to encourage
free trade a particular priority. On the question of social, cultural and human
affairs, the Commission reported that efforts had already begun in the spheres
of cultural heritage, promotion of human rights, education, and dialogue among
civil societies, and that these efforts should be further intensified along
with the introduction of measures to combat drugs-traffic and organised crime.
After
the Barcelona Declaration, the whole process moved forward by a series of new
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that updated and enhanced the
previous bilateral arrangements agreed under the terms of the GMP and the RMP.
In addition to the Customs Union with Turkey, Association Agreements were
signed with Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Morocco, and Tunisia,[337]
while close to completion were agreements with Egypt and Algeria. Licari argues
that ‘the agreements are likely to need a serious reappraisal by the forth or
fifth year of their life’; otherwise, ‘two-way trade will probably increase to
the EU’s advantage’.[338]
These agreements were not, however, genuine free trade area agreements, of the
kind enjoyed by Israel or Turkey. Nor did they come close the common economic
space arrangements enjoyed by the EFTA countries. But the idea of using the Barcelona Process as a springboard for
strengthening co-operation among southern Mediterranean partners has not been
particularly profitable, since such co-operation remained at a very limited
level. This has been associated with the worsening of the Arab-Israeli
relations and the consequent upheaval among the Arabs, following Netanyahu’s
election in June 1996. Joffé notes: ‘He, together with his Likud and
conservative allies, has systematically undermined the Oslo Process and has
been tacitly supported in his efforts by the pusillanimous attitude of the
United States’.[339]
Furthermore, to increase international pressure on Israel and the US, some Arab
states, reminiscent of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, have pushed during the Malta
Conference for a European-track of the Middle East Peace Process.
Although a certain commonality of interests exists between
Europe and the US, the Middle East Peace Process and the Barcelona Process can
be interpreted as competitive projects.[340]
The exclusion of the US from the EMP, thus giving the EU a predominant role in
the Barcelona Process, prompted Washington to consider the EU’s initiative as
irrelevant in the construction of regional peace in the Middle East. Instead,
US policy-makers placed their trust in the Middle East Peace Process - as
initiated in Madrid in 1991 and as modified by the Oslo Accords in 1993 - and
in the concomitant Middle East and North Africa economic summit process that
begun in Rabat in 1994.[341]
But keeping the US out of the EMP was of importance given the previous
experience of containing the US presence in Europe (e.g., Bosnia).[342]
On the other hand, this mutual exclusion among the transatlantic partners can
be regarded as a potentially significant problem obstructing the Barcelona
Process from bearing full fruit. This is clearly reflected in the negative
results of the 1997 Malta Review Ministerial Conference, illustrating the
existence of a causal relationship between progress in the Barcelona Process
and the Middle East Peace Process. It was the task of the Malta Conference,
coming as it were at a most critical phase in Middle East politics, to prove
capable of sustaining the political dynamic of the EMP irrespective of the
negative developments in the Middle East. But as Tanner records, such hopes
were dashed by the Arab-Israeli disagreement, to the extent that prevented the
Malta Summit from adopting a concluding document.[343]
Senior Officials agreed to meet in Brussels in early May 1997 to put together a
text whose content had little relevance to the reality of what had actually
occurred in Malta.
The main task of the Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial
Conference in Malta was to elaborate more specifically on the implementation of
the Partnership Programme and to set up short-term action plans for the
advancement of tangible co-operative ventures. Its results provided, in
Calleya’s words, a ‘reality check’ of what had been the main issues at stake in
the first two years of the Barcelona Process.[344]
Apart from the problems related to the Middle East Peace Process, the Malta
meeting revealed some difficulties in the economic dimension of the EMP. So
far, the economic basket has shown mixed results, some of which - ‘more by
accident than by design’ - allow for some degree of optimism. All in all
though, the proposed new agreements were hardly as generous or as optimistic as
the Barcelona Declaration had implied.[345]
The Turkish Foreign Minister ostensibly stayed away from the Malta Summit
because of the EU’s apparent inability to disburse the $500 million pledged to
Turkey under the Customs Union agreement, whilst Egypt’s Foreign Minister
publicly announced his frustration regarding the protracted negotiations with
Brussels on the Association Agreement.[346]
The Malta communiqué
reported serious disagreements over language referring to human rights and
referred only in passing to ‘the rule of law, democracy and human rights’ as
common objectives. During 1997, many EU governments took up ratification of the
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that the EU had initiated earlier
with Tunisia, Israel, and Morocco. During this process, parliamentarians and
others raised the question of human rights compliance, particularly with
reference to Israel, as specified in Article 2 of the Agreements. Several
governments indicated that they would seek to have the Commission set-up a
human rights monitoring mechanism as part of the implementation process. But no
EU member demanded human rights improvements from Israel, Tunisia or Morocco as
a condition for ratifying the Association Agreement. In 1997 the EU signed an
interim Association Agreement with the Palestinian Authority and was scheduled
to sign one with Jordan in November the same year. Negotiations continued with
Egypt and Algeria. As EU and Syrian officials were about to open negotiations,
the Council of Ministers continued to suppress a November 1995 report on human
rights in Syria that the EP had mandated as a condition for economic
assistance.
At the top of the agenda in Malta was the endorsement of a
Euro-Mediterranean Charter. But as Calleya asserts, ‘the Malta Declaration
indicates that very little headway has been registered in moving ahead with
implementing such an aspiration’.[347]
Equally important was the need for a renewed commitment to ensure a close
balance in all three baskets, although some partners felt that progress in the
political basket was overtaking progress in the remaining two. The Malta
Conclusions redressed this imbalance, albeit partially, by indirectly slowing
down progress on the first basket.[348]
The vagueness of the Conclusions was indicative of the lack of progress in the
creation of a region-wide security arrangement.[349]
Joffé argues that both the French and the Maltese proposals raised Arab
suspicions of European hegemony and, at the Malta Review Conference, both were
pushed aside by EU attempts to rescue the Middle East Peace Process.[350]
In general, the Malta Conference was unsuccessful in terms of both revitalising
the latter process and reviewing progress in the implementation of the
Barcelona provisions. At the rhetoric level, however, the first
Euro-Mediterranean Review Conference stressed that the EMP is an ‘irreversible
process’, albeit one not particularly well equipped to confront the challenges
of a turbulent and volatile region. The disappearance of the MENA Summits,
together with the multilateral component of the Middle East Peace Process,
elevated the BP as the only vehicle for economic development in southern
Mediterranean, whatever regional peace and security structure was to emerge.[351]
After
the Malta Conference, the atmosphere continued to deteriorate with an
unsuccessful attempt to hold a meeting on terrorism and a last minute
cancellation by Morocco of the Industrial Minister’s meeting under Syrian
pressure due to be held in Rabat in October.[352]
As the Palermo meeting approached, not only did the deadlock in the Oslo
Process persist but also deepened, increasing discussions of ‘contamination’ of
the BP from the US initiative and a boycott by most Arab countries. In the Ad
Hoc Ministerial Meeting of June 1998 in
They also confirmed their commitment to work on issues of
substance, including the concept of ‘global stability’ and the need to develop
‘common perceptions’ on matters that may endanger progress in the Barcelona
Process. Such an attitude was expected to contribute to the drafting and
adoption of a Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability as foreseen in
Barcelona Declaration. Senior Officials were again assigned the task of taking
this matter forward by means of special ad
hoc meetings. The aim was to make progress on this issue before the next
meeting in
In the experts’ meeting on the Euro-Mediterranean Economic
Area that was held in
Cultural relations and mutual understanding have been subject
to extensive scrutiny due to the absence of any visible progress in this field
since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration.[355]
Since then, however, there has been a strongly stated political commitment to
putting the socio-cultural dimension on an equal footing with the other two.[356]
Most importantly, the 1998 Rhodes Ministerial Conference on the socio-cultural
dimension confirmed the priorities of the cultural partnership. This strategy,
outlined also in Stockholm and Palermo, is based on three pillars: i) focussing
activities on a small number of thematic framework programmes (Heritage,
Audio-visual and Humanities); ii) increasing public involvement (particularly
by women and young people); and iii) encouraging the establishment of networks
of cultural operators at a regional level to foster exchanges of experience and
further develop joint endeavours.
The Barcelona Declaration was adopted after the signing of
the Oslo Accords. It was agreed that the EMP was not intended to intrude upon
other peace processes already engaged in the Mediterranean region, but that it
would contribute towards them. By the end of the 1990s, however, we live in a
very different political atmosphere in the
The Third Ministerial Euro-Mediterranean Conference in
Stuttgart demonstrated that, ‘three and half years after the inaugural
conference in Barcelona, the EMP has developed considerably and has given clear
proof of its viability in sometimes complex circumstances’.[359]
The main aim of the Conference was to provide additional impetus to the EMP
itself and more clearly confirm the goals set out in the Barcelona Declaration.
The participants recalled the priority accorded in the EMP for the protection
and promotion of human rights and agreed to concentrate activities in priority
areas, increase the involvement of actors outside central government, and make
the EMP more ‘action-oriented’ and ‘visible’. They also emphasised the
importance of intra-regional and sub-regional co-operation in all baskets,
endorsing the guidelines set out at the 1999 Valencia Conference on the methods
of future co-operative arrangements, and calling for a ‘systematic evaluation’
of the Barcelona Process and for a ‘concrete follow-up’.[360]
In its eight years of function it is fair to say that the
Barcelona Process has not yet fulfilled its rather high ambitions. The process
has experienced significant constrains since its inception in November 1995 for
two main reasons. First and foremost, due to the fact that the Barcelona
Process has not helped in the resolution of any major security problem in the
region. All three of its baskets of co-operation have suffered from problems
such as, the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass
destruction, low level of investment and infrastructure, illegal migration,
violation of human rights, and above all the regional ‘ticking bomb’ called
demography. Secondly, all the optimism that the Oslo Process produced in the
early 1990s has evaporated in a mutually reinforcing violent cycle of suicidal
terrorist attacks and excessive use of military force. It is lamentable that
since the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000, the EMP has failed
continuously to free itself from the Middle East Peace Process.
There is no
doubt that the EU exhibits difficulties in dealing with Middle East security in
contrast to dealing with other transformative regions. But the EU also faces
significant challenges as a result of the presence of the US and the continuing
reluctance of the latter to share its ‘co-operative hegemony’ in the Middle
East. The post-September 11th US sponsored counter-terrorism
campaign in the Arab world and the crisis over Iraq have also highlighted the
existence of profound divergences not only within the international community,
the transatlantic alliance and the EU, but also within the EMP partners themselves.
Moreover, the inadequacy of the EU’s intervention in the 2002 Middle East
crisis seriously affected the status of the EMP, not only regarding security
co-operation but also its multilateral nature. It is no secret that the EU has
to make considerable efforts to keep Israel in the process, whilst continuing
to co-operate with the Arab countries. Europeans have to contribute something
concretely positive to the Peace Process in accordance with the reasonable
demands of their Arab states, whilst dealing with Israel’s hostile attitude
towards any EU-led intervention.
Of importance in the years to come
will be the chosen institutional format to transcend the peculiarities of the
Euro-Mediterranean space. But the institutionalisation of the Barcelona Process
alone will not be sufficient to manage a rather complex security agenda. The
question is whether the EMP can meet its prescribed ends, without first
transforming itself into a system of patterned behaviour, with a particular
notion of rules of the game. In other words, the question is whether the
co-operative ethos embedded in the new regional institutional setting can go
beyond the level of contractual interstate obligations and closer to a genuine
or, at least, meaningful partnership.[361]
New rules and norms on how to handle change will have to be created, given that
behaviour, not just proclamations, will determine the outcome of the regional
order-building project. In this framework, the EU’s strategic choices will be
of great importance, together with the promotion of norms of good governance,
given the tensions arising from different conceptions of democracy and
modernisation. Equally crucial are the socio-cultural barriers in furthering
the prospects of an open inter-civilisational dialogue, keeping in mind the
recent re-embrace of religious fundamentalism. Whatever the legitimising ethos
of the prevailing views, a structured dialogue based on the principles of
transparency and symbiotic association is central to the cross-fertilisation
among distinct politically organised and culturally defined units. Such a
dialogue, could not only alleviate historically rooted prejudices, but can also
endow the EMP with a new sense of process.
After
September 11th and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, most analyses suggest that
the wider Mediterranean space constitutes a zone of strategic and
socio-economic instability, migration flows, violent religious and cultural
conflicts, varying forms of political and economic institutions, differing
perceptions of security and, above all, differing cultures and worldviews. Although, terrorism is endemic in the
Mediterranean region much earlier than September 11th, however, most
would agree that the new US sponsored doctrine focusing on asymmetrical threats
had its impact on Euro-Mediterranean affairs - ie, the re-enforcement of
policing in national security affairs, the increase of restrictions in free
movement, and the alienation between the Euro-Mediterranean populations. True
as it may be, the new antiterrorist doctrine has affected regional affairs by
increasing ‘internal pressures’ and reactions in some southern societies, and
by redirecting the focus on issues of military security at the cost of
investment in economic growth and regional stabilisation. These developments
have influenced negatively the workings of the Barcelona project. Such trends
were further reinforced by the unpopular US policy towards the Arab-Israeli
crisis.
There
is a dominant perception in the Arab world that the US sponsored antiterrorist
campaign in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and possibly in Syria or somewhere else in
the Middle East is the beginning of Hundington’s clashing era in
international relations. This perception stems from a chain of events that have
fuelled the Arab world with a deep sense of insecurity, especially the
post-September 11th US doctrine convinced the Arabs that the West
will not hesitate to strike out against them should its interests require so. Important here is that the emphasis
given to the development of European military capabilities has led many Arab
partners to the erroneous conclusion that the EU shares NATO’s strategic plan
for the Mediterranean, focusing on new asymmetrical threats and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The consequences of all the above
endanger the empowerment of radical segments in the Arab countries that view
Europe as a potential enemy, as the escalating crisis in the Middle East
mobilises radical Islamism.
Contemporary Euro-Mediterranean
affairs are clearly affected by a new regional strategic variable: the
formation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This new
crisis-management tool suggests a new development that enhances the role of the
Union in international and regional security affairs. ESDP is only one
dimension of a broader and more ambitious goal related to the future of the EU
itself. These developments reflect the desire of EU states to ‘deepen’ their
political integration, which is inconceivable without the strengthening of the
second EU pillar. The consolidation of the Union’s CFSP is the tool that will
make the EU heard in international affairs, not only as an economic giant, but
as a single and independent political entity able to face global challenges and
promote worldwide the fundamental principles of peace, security, co-operation,
democracy, rule of law, and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
These goals will be supported by the EU’s security arm, the ESDP, which in its
current state limits itself to dealing with crisis management, humanitarian and
rescue tasks, peace-keeping operations and tasks of combat forces (including
peacemaking); the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’. It is necessary to make clear
that ESDP is not an explicit first step towards the formation of a European
army.[362]
It can better be defined as a point of convergence among different European
aspirations, as well as a medium between the strategic preferences of the
transatlantic partners. The EU is a polity with no historical precedent. Hence
our expectations to elevate its current status to the level of a global actor
with enhanced military capabilities is difficult to be contextualised.[363]
Even though the transformation of the EU into a collective
security system is an inadequately addressed issue,the deeper integration of
foreign, security and defence policies in Europe is bound to influence
Euro-Mediterranean affairs, and particularly the Barcelona Process. But the
creation of an autonomous European defence capacity should not lead to a
‘fortress’ Europe. To the contrary, because the ESDP is better equipped to deal
with crisis-management operations, it can complement the Barcelona Process by
endowing Mediterranean security affairs with a pluralist and transparent
vision. Here, it is important for both projects to arrive at common definitions
to security anxieties related to asymmetrical threats such as terrorism, as
well as to pertaining asymmetries in issues of justice, tolerance,
information-flow, and trust-building. Accordingly, all strategic perceptions in
the Mediterranean region should be reconsidered and clarified, so that the open
character of both the EMP and the ESDP processes is safeguarded.
The successive crises in the Balkans during the 1990s increased the need for developing a reliable ESDP in order to support EU foreign policy objectives. ESDP was formally launched at the June 1999 Cologne European Council. Since then, it developed itself though a series of decisions taken at Helsinki (December 1999), Feira (June 2000), Nice (December 2000), Geteborg (June 2001), Laeken (December 2001), Seville (June 2002), Brussels (October 2002), Copenhagen (December 2002) and, more recently, Athens (April 2003). Each of these summits gave substance to the EU’s desire to enhance its capacity for autonomous action. Following the mobilization of the Hellenic Presidency during the Informal Conference of EU Defence Ministers (Rethymno 4-5 October 2002), the prospects of ESDP have been set on a more stable basis. The basic priority set out by the Hellenic Presidency is the finalisation of all outstanding issues that will allow for the utilisation of the EU’s operational capability in crisis management operations within 2003, through the balanced development of civilian and military aspects and the advancement of civil-military networks. It has to be stressed here that a basic parameter for the further development of ESDP is the co-operation agreement with NATO and the settlement of all pending issues in Euro-Atlantic relations.[364]
Most analysts, in the light of the negative experience with
Eurofor and Euromarfor, have underlined the need of complementary measures to
support the ESDP. Given the low level of information about the ESDP that is
provided in the Arab world, it was decided that the EU pays attention to the
misperceptions and fears of some Mediterranean partners regarding the
strengthening of its military capabilities. Thus the ESDP has its own
Mediterranean dimension, courtesy of the initiative taken by the Spanish
Presidency during the first half of 2002.[365]
Greece, through its ESDP Presidency, has already played a decisive role in this
effort. The Greek proposals over transparency, trust-building and the
institutionalisation of a security dialogue in the Mediterranean, will allow
the Mediterranean partners to gain better access in the construction of a
co-operative Euro-Mediterranean space, by reducing the asymmetry that currently
characterizes the regional system.[366]
Hence, another function of the 2003 Hellenic Presidency’s seminars on the
Mediterranean Dimension of the ESDP in Rhodes (1-2 Nov- 2002) and Corfu (9-10
May 2003) is to act as platforms for constructive discourse.[367]
It is crucial that this line of communication remains open to clarify EU
strategic intentions and alleviate possible misperceptions by the Arab
partners, thus promoting mutual understanding.
It is important to mention here the
EuroMeSCo’s working group III on ‘European Security and Defence Policy: Impact
on the EMP’ assessment of the southern Mediterranean perceptions. The first
year report revealed very useful data for the current state of art in regional
security affairs.[368]
The Arab partners generally doubt the international role of the EU, since the
favorable European attitude towards the right of existence for the Palestinian
Authority is counterbalanced by its ineffective action in
Besides the growing feeling that in
the Arab world there is a negative predisposition towards the ESDP, questions
about the properties of a Mediterranean security system further complicate
discussion about the objectives and the level of the EU’s strategic involvement
in the region. The EU’s official documents such as the Common Strategy for
the Mediterranean are general descriptions lacking prioritisation over the
EU’s pragmatic intentions.[369]
But in the process of consolidating a European defence identity with
operational capabilities, the conceptions, intentions, planning, political
goals, individual national interests of EU members and their attempts to
maintain a relative diplomatic freedom in the
ESDP represents a new regional
strategic variable, not a threat. Thus the Mediterranean partners of the EU
should not perceive it in hostile terms. Immigration is not on the ESDP agenda,
and the EU’s military force is certainly not intended to act as a police force
for the Mediterranean people. Southern partners should not therefore view the
deeper motives of the ESDP as the creation of a Schengen-type force to guard
the
Most
of the southern partners of the EU see positively the strengthening of regional
defence co-operation and their involvement in joint military exercises. It is
essential to promote the positive expectations for a more active EU in
Mediterranean security affairs, by encouraging its partners to participate in
joint strategic activities. The participation of southern EMP partners in future
ESDP exercises in the region is a confidence-building measure that needs to be
encouraged. The reinforcement of scientific co-operation in joint military
exercises like emergency rescue missions and the handling of natural disasters
is a good case in point. It is also suggested that co-ordination mechanisms for
bilateral security and defence co-operation should not be excluded from the
agenda, initially at the level of exchange of information in sub-regional
initiatives where security is a clear issue, such as the Mediterranean Forum.[371]
This could then be extended to the EMP. This will promote regional co-operation
in the fields of security and defence through immediate upgrade of the
intelligence level in ESDP matters.
Even
though Mediterranean partners seem to appreciate security and defence
co-operation at a selective bilateral level, the holding of frequent
conferences and seminars at MoD level to act as platforms for constructive
discourse is something desirable by all partners. This was clear at the seminar
on the Mediterranean dimension of the ESDP in
Limited,
as it may currently is, the potential for organising Mediterranean security
awaits utilisation. Because crises in the region are endemic, they know no
borders: they have a tendency to ignore passport procedures and spill-over very
rapidly. ESDP, the new EU crisis-management tool will be operationally ready
within 2003. There is no doubt that its Mediterranean dimension will have
positive cumulative effects in the regional security system. This prospect
opens a wide range of possibilities for crucial strategic issues to be brought
to the fore of Euro-Mediterranean affairs, such as questions of operational
readiness, doctrinal convergence, conflict prevention, intelligence sharing and
information-exchange practices, civilian emergency planning, and so on.
Jűnemann
defines the EMP as ‘the climax of a political process that started shortly
after the fall of the
‘It is quite obvious’, Jűnemann argues, ‘that the
As Fahmi notes, the EMP resolved the major question of
whether regional security would be addressed within a strictly Mediterranean
context, or within a wider framework encompassing European security concerns.[376]
Although the Barcelona Declaration did not linger over the meaning of security
and stability, it produced a clearly Euro-centric perspective of the ‘common
threat’.[377] The
EMP was a collective attempt to redefine European threat perceptions towards
the
From a purely economic perspective, the Barcelona document
does not represent a radical break with past European policies towards the
Mediterranean that consisted of comparatively limited economic and financial
aspects, but rather it is ‘a deepening of past efforts’,[380]
in that it incorporates in its economic agenda more clearly defined global
objectives.[381]
Overall, the entire project was a sign of the EU’s willingness to play an
increasingly active economic role in bringing all partners closer together and
to reduce political and social sources of conflict.[382]
But building the MEFTA pre-supposes that partners will be able to understand
each other and to share the same practices. Since
According to Marquina, no idea of security exists that gives
backbone to the EMP, and the documents themselves contain incoherence and
imprecision regarding the concepts of co-operative security, preventative
diplomacy, and ‘good neighbour’ relations.[383]
He claims that these principles remain under-explained in both conceptual and
operative aspects. However, there is a degree of coherence in the EU’s
intention, in that economic problems can only be tackled once issues of
political legitimacy are addressed. Ultimately, most players seem to agree that
regional co-operation will need to be implemented by the private sector,
business enterprises, and individuals.[384]Furthermore,
Aliboni argues that this initiative is the result of a remarkable and
successful effort by the EU to innovate and reinforce its Mediterranean policy,
noting that change has marked this
effort: ‘Change is reflected in the articulation of a new structured strategy
of regionalism, predicated on the establishment of a Free Trade Area as well as
in the search or a common area of peace and stability aimed at providing
security and supporting economic development’.[385]
But the MEFTA objective, which is to be achieved through a series of economic
reforms, hides security risks since accelerated market liberalisation in the
southern Mediterranean rim could produce greater waves of instability.[386]
The EMP has not yet utilised the necessary mechanisms to operationalise and, in
time, regularise political co-operation, something that may prove vital in case
of further economic recession in the southern rim. These mechanisms are cited
in the Barcelona document, establishing ‘information exchanges’ and ‘dialogue
mechanisms’, and in the Action Plan that was set out at the beginning of the
Barcelona Process. Joffé suggests that the EU, in seeking to create a
global and comprehensive approach, should provide the following set of mechanisms:
i) support for responsive and participatory political processes backed up by
the encouragement of economic transparency and accountability within a codified
and independent legal structure; ii) collective co-operative security alongside
viable economic restructuring; and iii) a financial commitment ‘to guarantee
the creation of the essential human and physical infrastructure that will make
the economic refashioning of the Mediterranean region into a win-win situation
for all’.[387]
According to Edwards and Philippart, the EMP offers a process whose analysis and interpretation encompasses different theoretical possibilities.[388] In general, the Barcelona Process clearly aims at correcting the structural deficiencies evident in past European policies towards the region, and can be seen, in Gillespie’s words, as ‘emblematic of a process’ being constituted from a dynamic set of international exchanges, but still falling short of a meaningful partnership.[389] Yet, the invention of the entire project should be seen as a vital step towards a partnership that may animate some confident expectations for the emergence of a common ‘Euro-Mediterranean consciousness’, thus laying the groundwork for the creation of an international regime.
From a systemic point of view, the EMP is an emerging
multidimensional regime that establishes links between political (security),
economic (MEFTA) and socio-cultural (human rights/civil society) arenas. The
core claim here is that states obey the rules embodied in international regimes
because of the functional benefits that the latter provide. For the moment,
however, the EMP represents a balance of separate national preferences, rather
than a genuinely common Euro-Mediterranean interest per se. Although the EMP sets up a system of flexible regional
arrangements, the substantial differentiation of the ratio with the EU’s budget
for the reconstruction of East European economies was the major reason for
attracting the interest of southern Mediterranean countries.[390]
Indeed, the EMP is propelled by a certain ‘economism’ whose financial rather
than trade implications are favourable to the non-EU partners. In return to the
above, the EU linked issues of economic liberalisation to a set of political
principles.
Keohane, in an influential study that straddled the lines of
realist and neoliberalist thinking,
suggested that regimes are ‘institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon
governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international
relations’.[391] This is of special importance considering that
Euro-Mediterranean politics combine both power politics considerations and
questions of increased complex interdependence. Keohane’s ‘lean’ definition, as
opposed to that offered by Krasner, has the advantage of relieving scholars
from the burden of justifying their decision to call a given injunction a
‘norm’ rather than a ‘rule’.[392] The above definition is helpful, since
norms are not explicit in the complex framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations
and since no substantive level of institutional autonomy exists. Although the
EMP provides for some general rules, it remains weak in relation to the
development of an identifiable set of norms. Ceteris paribus, the EMP can be seen as an international regime in statu nascendi, albeit one which
accords with Keohane’s ‘lean’ definition of the term. Without a better, or,
indeed, a less nebulous definition in the acquis
académique, such a claim remains valid.
A distinctive feature of international relations today is
that power is becoming more widely dispersed and low politics acquire more
salient for scholars and policy-makers. Developments in Euro-Mediterranean
politics and attempts at institutionalising the EMP are no exception. The
latter, only a handful of years since its inception remains in limbo between an ‘association of
states’ and an ‘international regime’. The question is whether it can sustain
itself for any length of time without becoming a system of patterned behaviour.
In other words, without generating a notion of rules of the game capable of
guiding and at a latter stage structuring international behaviour. From a
linear projection of Euro-Mediterranean governance, the Partnership could
evolve into a fully-fledged international regime with a life of its own. At
present, no such entity can be said to exist as a result of the Barcelona
Process, at least in terms of complying with the basic analytic construct of
international regimes. The rather discomforting empirical developments in the
process, suffice to make the point. On the other hand, the fascinating element
in the evolving Partnership is that, from a dynamic macro-political
perspective, it may find ways of instrumentalising the principles and norms
embedded in the Barcelona Declaration and transform them into concrete rules of
the game based on shared beliefs, standards of behaviour, and decision-making
procedures for implementing collective choice. This is crucial for
international regime-formation emphasises the importance of institutionalisation
and international culture in sustaining co-operative behaviour. The trend is to
regularise a form of international co-operation that, in Jervis’ words, ‘is
more than the following of short-term self-interest’.[393]
In other words, to move beyond ad hoc
agreements based on short-term power maximisation.
But it would be wrong to equate the end-result of the
Barcelona Process with the formation of an international regime per se. For the latter are not regarded,
in Krasner’s terms, as ends themselves. Rather, ‘[o]nce in place they do affect
related behaviour and outcomes. They are not merely epiphenomenal’.[394]
From this view, principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures have
an impact on outcomes and related behaviour, thus transcending ‘structural
orientations [that] conceptualise a world of rational self-seeking actors’.[395]
In short, regimes make a difference, moving beyond a state-centric realist
perspective that reflects calculations of self-interest. The relationship
between patterned behaviour and convergent expectations is a key to our
understanding of international regimes: those two aspects create an environment
of ‘conditionalised behaviour’ which in turn ‘generates recognised norms’ that
transcend national boundaries and nurture a broader social space.[396]
Contrary to structural arguments made by realists, regimes have an independent
impact on behaviour and are a crucial part of patterned human interaction. The
latter view is drawn from the Grotian tradition, where ‘regimes are a pervasive
and significant phenomenon in the international system’.[397]
In the case of the EMP, it could be argued that
regime-creation is directed at setting the limits of acceptable behaviour
within a nascent and flexibly arranged structure of governance. It is important
to note here that the EMP addressed the post-Cold War Mediterranean reality as
‘an overlap of different regions integrating different dimensions’.[398]
The flexibility of the EMP sets the limits of ‘consciousness-raising’ in issues
of Euro-Mediterranean governance and in particular the possibility of acquiring
operational capabilities. In this context, its weak institutional structure
makes it difficult for individual state actors to transcend the pursuit of
short-term interests. Regimes also deploy a system of interconnectedness among
different areas of co-operation that helps explain the nature and complexity of
interdependence among the actors involved.
Aficionados
of the literature on international regimes are conscious of the need to achieve
mutually rewarding outcomes in systems of institutionalised rule. Being a
highly fragmented system of policy interactions, any future attempts to
navigate the dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean regime need to be
differentiated according to the specific conditions of co-operation embedded in
its basket arrangements. Following this line of argument, the EMP encompasses a
multiplicity of norms of behaviour, especially when different procedures apply,
determining the degree of involvement of the relevant actors. Further, a
partial conceptualisation of the EMP’s baskets as separate pillars is not
particularly helpful when assessing its cross-sectional, essentially political
properties - i.e., what defines it as a system with significant regime aspects.
But regime theory may fail to take into account the relationship between the
politicisation of issues that regional co-operation may bring about and the
strategy employed by particular actors to exercise managerial and even more
substantive control over the process of regime-formation. These deeper concerns
have as much to do with implied benefits from collective action (or regime
maintenance) as with questions about what kind of co-operation the EMP is
allowed or prohibited from taking. Conceptualising the EMP through the lenses
of regime theory has the advantage of moving away from a formalistic approach
to multilateral co-operation, institutional linkages, and the importance of
domestic politics in regional affairs: it could set in train a process for the
internationalisation of issues and their inclusion under a flexible management
system.
As students of international relations put great emphasis on
international regimes as institutional devises for collective problem-solving,
it is questionable how far the Euro-Mediterranean system can realise its
‘co-operative objectives’ under its currently weak structure. That is to say,
without investing further in concrete partnership-building measures on issues
of substance such as the need to develop a Charter for Peace and Stability in
the region.[399] The
envisaged Charter will be an exercise in pre-emptive diplomacy and, above all,
will represent a form of institutionalised alliance. It can provide the levels
of transparency that an ongoing dialogue requires, along with the necessary machinery
to manage potentially unresolved crises.
All the above beg the following question: why is it that
states are bound by certain norms, principles, rules, and decision-making
procedures? International regime theory offers a plausible answer: whether
international co-operation is an a priori
objective of states, or stems from a certain idealism about the management
of pressing international affairs, states pursue their interests more
effectively by being members of a larger association.
As stated in the introduction of this study,
the empirical evidence so far has focused on the institutional and policy
issues that set the agenda as well as the competing interests and attitudes
toward the two international processes. The emphasis was on the interplay
between three sets of factors - cognitive, structural and political - so as to
gain a better understanding of the systemic complexity and system-change
characterising
Comparing the HP and the BP reveals several similarities and
differences between the two projects that are relevant for theorising
regime-formation and order-building. The macroscopic approach adopted here
helps to frame both theoretical and empirical puzzles by generating plausible
hypotheses that are worth examining. But comparative politics is very much a
problem-driven field of inquiry.[400]
What motivates this study are puzzles of practical significance in
Euro-Mediterranean politics: Why form a Euro-Mediterranean regime? What role
can regimes play to facilitate prosperity and equity in a such a complex and
diverse region? What strategies and mechanisms can be employed to achieve
compliance in the
A
good point for departure in demonstrating the deviations and approximations
that would allow analogical mapping to be appropriate and effective between the
two international processes is to compare their origins and respective
normative orders. The post-war period, much like the present post-Cold War era,
was a time of transition. New
technologies, Soviet power, and the appearance of nuclear weapons demanded
creative responses. The CSCE was created in an attempt to multilateralise the
bipolar US-Soviet confrontation into an East-West dialogue. Against this
background, the EC’s earlier Mediterranean policy was patterned on the triptych
trade concessions, financial co-operation, and project aid. But these actions
proved insufficient to sustain regional economic progress. The same can be said
of all pre-1989 EC efforts to promote political dialogue and horizontal
co-ordination in the region. Such efforts lacked a formal and comprehensive
dialogue component due to their predominant bilateralism. With the signing of
the Barcelona Declaration, however, all Euro-Mediterranean agreements acquired
a multilateral framework within which to operate. Creating a community of
interests and a dialogue on mainly economic but also political and
socio-cultural issues are the major challenges for the
Whereas the CSCE emerged from a bargaining process
with a view to managing competing normative orders of détente in a ‘divided’ order, the EMP, currently evolving
within a fragmented order itself, represents the culmination of previous
European efforts to a reliable and co-ordinated response to the various
challenges confronting the
The general assessment of this study is that there are
many correspondences, to borrow a
term from comparative social science,[402]
between the two phenomena, especially post-1989. It was then that the CSCE
changed its focus to accommodate the re-integration of
Both the Barcelona Declaration and the HFA are not
international treaties or conventions, but politically binding agreements that
constituted the EMP and the CSCE respectively.[405]
Treaties and conventions are the two most formal instruments in the range of
mechanisms available to international law.[406]
Less formal and more frequently used arrangements are ‘agreements’, ‘final
acts’, ‘declarations’ among other forms of international instruments.[407]
‘Acts’ may take the form of ‘general acts’ referring to instruments which are
part of a set of arrangements, or ‘final acts’ that normally combine a set of
declaratory principles and rules governing the workings of an international
conference. To offer an example, the Helsinki Consultations prepared during the
preparatory talks were incorporated into the HFA. Any ‘final act’ is what
Barston calls a form of procės-verbal
where signature does not serve as an indication of states being bound by the
obligations stemming from such acts, as is the case of international treaties.
The latter require separate signature and ratification.[408]
‘Declarations’ have been increasingly used by states, reflecting the formation
of diverse political groupings, and the perceived need for co-ordinated action
and, where applicable, collective governance. While certain declarations may be
regarded as treaty instruments in view of their law-making function or specific
undertakings, others may not. Barston is explicit when he argues that
‘declarations published after a heads of government conference may partly
contain agreements to do or not to do something and partly statements of common
policy, causing considerable difficulty in determining whether they may be
regarded as treaty instruments’.[409]
During the Cold War,
declarations in which the two superpowers promised to observe certain general
ethics or norms often made relations worse. Such declarations fostered
different and often conflicting interpretations of rules and lacked detailed
provisions for implementation. Each state interpreted the language to its own
advantage, leading to mutual recriminations and blame when neither lived up to
the other’s expectations. Cold War declarations in which leader proclaimed
their desire for peace and co-operation had little impact on the other side,
which asked for ‘deeds, not words’.[410]
Statements announcing specific co-operative actions had a greater impact on
trust-building as opposed to general declarations of intent. Moreover,
informal instruments like declarations and final acts are often used for
reasons of administrative ease, speed, political and/or economic secrecy and,
above all, flexibility, although inevitable problems arise in connection with
their interpretation and binding nature, especially in transitional periods.
Similarly, the informality characterising the EU’s approach towards its
Mediterranean partners is a means of managing the idiosyncratic complexity of
Mediterranean politics without creating a robust regime with good chances of
altering the behaviour of actors. Stein argues that informality allows regimes
to grab a toehold in a contentious climate: ‘It is precisely the informality of
most (security) regimes ... their capacity to build on tacit consensus, to
exploit common aversions which are mutually shared, which gives them special
potential in an environment that is coldly inhospitable to more formal
arrangements’.[411]
As stated in the introduction of this study, the Barcelona
Declaration shares a structural resemblance with the normative foundation of
the HFA, whose human rights provisions acted as agents of change through
issue-linkage. Seen as a primitive version of conditionality, and by affirming
that the ‘human dimension’ is essential for the development of friendly
relations among states, the
The basket-based
architectural design of both projects, their process-driven nature, and the low
levels of institutionalisation during their early stages are linked to the
principle of conditionality. In the case of the EMP, conditionality takes the
form of a ‘trade off’ between financial/technical assistance from the EU (as
opposed to its previous less rewarding policies) and an ethics of
liberalisation based on socio-economic restructuring and, where possible,
reconstruction. Whereas the human dimension of the HP was seen by the West as a
useful diplomatic weapon for gradually eroding communism by introducing a
system of mechanisms and international controls over human rights issues, the
aim of the BP is to establish concrete avenues of communication among distinct
culturally defined and politically organised states and societies. From a
process-phased analytic prism, this is an important qualification pointing to a
differentiation of the motives and expectations that navigate the
macro-strategic choices of the actors involved. The current Mediterranean
policy of the EU is not based on a crude Westernisation approach aiming at the
erosion, if not the collapse, of existing South Mediterranean regimes although,
the distribution of expected benefits is not as equitable as Europeans would
have us believe. In short, the essence of the emerging
After the Cold War, the international system is slowly but
surely being shaped by the uncertainties of the new world order. The fact that
most conflicts today are within and not between states reflects the general
success of international norms and organisations in maintaining peace in the
international system. In this context, one of the most important ingredients
for the success of the CSCE regime was that it managed to guarantee the
viability of détente, despite
the fundamental cleavages of the Cold War. What ultimately matters, Rotfeld
notes, ‘is not so much the removal of conflicting interests, which is almost
irrational to expect, but the creation of a framework within which these
conflicting interests could be peacefully reconciled’.[414]
Euro-Mediterranean regime-formation, evident in the functionalist strategy of
the EU, does not aim to create a homogenous regional order, but rather to
develop a multilateral framework for negotiating mutually acceptable outcomes.
Mitrany’s argument that politics should
not dominate function in the management of collective problems influenced early
theorists of international regimes.[415] This
implies that regimes are partial orders suited to specific administrative
domains that are embedded in a broader international order. Each issue-area can
have different, if analogous, governance structures (regimes) as a result of
the endogenous interaction of the interests and power at stake. Regimes are
organized on the basis of the activities to be regulated not the
characteristics of the actors or the region they inhabit.[416] A
lot of effort has been devoted in the relevant literature in explaining and
understanding East-West security regimes, with particular emphasis on the CSCE
process. In general, security regimes reduce conflict between actors by
decreasing the uncertainty and distrust characteristic of the ‘security
dilemma’, wherein what one does to increase its security may be seen as a
threat to each other. Rittberger’s analysis has been influential in this field.
He writes:‘... international regimes are but one, yet increasingly important,
manifestation of a process in which self-help strategies, or unregulated
conflict management, are being replaced by mechanisms of self-control, or
regulated anarchy. The formation and the spread of international regimes
contribute to the continuation of the process of civilization on a higher
international level. This newly emerging complex structure of the international
system may best captured by the image of a regulated anarchy’.[417]
As Gale argues, international regime
analysis can serve critical purposes.[418] Such an
analysis is not only a tool for understanding co-operation and
the role of norms in the pursuit of co-operation there is a need to go beyond
merely ‘routinized’ or ‘patterned’ behaviour,[419]
but also an instrument that helps explaining patterns of regional
order-building. Conceptualising Euro-Mediterranean politics from the prism of
international regime theory has the advantage of moving away from a formalistic
approach to co-operation to a more dynamic conception of the role of
institutions in shaping regional order. The principal claim of regime analysis
is that ‘states may generate institutions in identifiable issue areas that
affect their behaviour and foster cooperation, even if short-term interests
would dictate deviation’.[420]
Regime analysis tackles two important aspects that hinder co-operation in the
Euro-Mediterranean order: the uncertainty about the future of the region in
relation to actors’ preferences and the possibility that such actors may behave
in an opportunistic manner. Keohane outlines the role of international regimes
from a functionalist perspective as follows: ‘the principle and rules of a
regime reduce the range of expected behavior, uncertainty declines, and as
information becomes more widely available, the asymmetry of its distribution is
likely to lessen. Regimes provide standards of behavior against which
performance can be measured. Arrangements within regimes [can] monitor actors’
behavior [and] provides procedures and rules through which ... sanctions can be
coordinated’.[421]
The BP has produced so far a loose association of
partial regimes that encompass a multiplicity of norms and procedures. However,
it is precisely the high level of flexibility characterising the
Euro-Mediterranean regime and its weak institutional(ised) structures that make
it difficult for the partners to transcend the pursuit of short-term interests
and objectives.
Grosso
modo, if states and other international actors are to
co-operate there are many different strategies for achieving collective goods.
According to Kindleberger, one such method is to ‘bind the members of the
international community to rules of contact, to which they agree, and which
will restrain each member from free riding, and allocate burdens equitably, as
a matter of international legal commitment’.[422]
But ‘nonhegemonic cooperation [as proposed by the EMP] is difficult, since it
must take place among independent states that are motivated more by their own
conceptions of self-interest than by devotion to the common good’.[423]
The above syllogism drives us directly to the issue of compliance and the
question of why actors abide by the norms embedded in international regimes. Contemporary scholarship offers two
largely competing answers: regime theorists emphasise material factors and
instrumental motives, while neglecting the social and interaction contexts of
compliance, while constructivists stress the role of social structures in
compliance decisions, while failing to develop a robust and multi-faceted
theory of agency.[424] In both cases, however, Young’s axiom seems
to hold true, in that ‘compliance to specific regulations invariably poses
problems of choice for those who are subject to specific behavioural
prescriptions. This is so whether a given actor chooses to comply or not to
comply, either on the basis of conscious calculations or of subconscious
forces’.[425]
International relations research on compliance in regulatory regimes in the
1990s suggests that high levels of compliance have been achieved with generally
little attention to enforcement; that those compliance problems that do exist
are best addressed as management rather than enforcement problems; and that the
management approach is the key to the evolution of future regulatory
co-operation in the international system.[426]
Others claim that, while these findings are grosso
modo correct, policy inferences are
dangerously contaminated by endogeneity
and selection problems.
To the extent that institutions ‘reflect a set of dominant
ideas translated through legal mechanisms into formal governmental
organizations’,[428]
the literature on ideas as an impetus for foreign policy echoes the work of
neoliberal institutionalists. Until recently, the definition of international
relations as the study of egoistic competition in an unregulated environment
set the terms of academic discourse. Thus, the neorealist-neoliberal debate has
been primarily concerned with the barriers to international co-operation, the
relative importance of wealth versus
security, and the degree to which international institutions can ameliorate the
harsher aspects of anarchy.[429]
As Jervis points out, for neorealism (and institutionalism too), the actors’
values, preferences, beliefs, and definition of ‘self’ are all exogenous to the
model and must be provided before analysis can begin.[430]
Neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance
of two main obstacles to international co-operation: problems of cheating and
enforcement, and problems of relative gains. By contrast, Fearon argues that
problems of international co-operation have a common strategic structure in
which a third, distinct obstacle plays a crucial role.[431]
Almost regardless of the issue area, states must first resolve the bargaining
problem of agreeing on terms before they can actually implement an agreement.
For sure, there has always been a lively dissenting view to these dominant
perspectives within both the regime and bargaining literatures. Haas’s early
work on international organisation,[432]
and a smaller group of regime-compliance scholars such as Adler and Ruggie[433]
have been concerned with the dynamics that produce regime-compliance: allusions
to learning, internalisation, and persuasion. Indeed, the so-called
‘cognitivists’ have consistently argued that the agents’ strategies and,
perhaps, underlying preferences are in flux, and thus open to learning. Put
differently, compliance occurs through interest/identity redefinition.
In this context, and within the comparative focus of this
study, Adler claims that the CSCE consensus rule fostered a sense of
responsibility among all its members for maintaining security in post-Cold War
Europe. He explains: ‘It makes states look beyond their own interests and share
the broader responsibility for overall security. The right to block any
decision is a powerful form of leverage. The “institutional culture” teaches to
use it in a responsible way. Sometimes it may be tempting to use the “veto” to
demonstrate dissatisfaction or even despair with a bilateral problem or other
matter of concern not directly related to the issue at hand. But a common,
although unwritten understanding exists that a single state may block
decision-making only when vital interests related to the issues justify it’.[434]
The Kremlin had no intention of
implementing principles in the HFA that called for democracy, respect for
sovereignty, and human rights; yet Gorbachev ended up doing just that, at the
cost of losing control in
The
end of the Cold War unleashed widespread speculation on what the future of
international politics would bring about: instability or unprecedented global
co-operation; sovereign equality or great power domination; world democratic
revolution or old-fashioned despotism; a ‘new world order’ or a return to previous
eras of hypernationalism. International and regional orders are in transition
after fifty ‘cold years’ and so are most international institutions and
organisations formed during that era. Capturing the main international systemic
dynamics in the early 1990s, Barber asserts that the world is ‘falling
precipitantly apart and coming
reluctantly together at the very same moment’.[440]
The recent sea change in international politics has given rise to new thinking
about ‘a new world order’, ‘the end of history’, ‘blood and nationalistic
belongings’, ‘the clash of civilisations’, ‘coming chaos’, and ‘world
disorders’. Added to the above prophecies is the fact that we are approaching
the third millennium, something that has occasioned the gloomiest of
prognostications. But as this troubled century draws to a close, there are
reasons for being optimistic when looking at the future of international
relations.
As too many forces of change function at the international
level, world politics should not be taken as a historically frozen realm of
power-hungry, but rather as a dynamic process incorporating within it new forms
of international governance.[441]
Moreover, the risks of a major war are at their lowest point, whilst
complementary institutional structures have been created, formal and informal,
to deal with various types of controversies, ranging from the economic to the
strategic. Competition between international actors has become less dangerous
and the multilateral regulation of problems less difficult to achieve. This
requires new and constructive action in the fields of international regimes and
organisations. Drawing from Vasquez, force and war as decision-making
mechanisms are increasingly being replaced by new ways of reaching decisions.[442]
A clear trend has thus emerged to replace unilateral relations and power
politics behaviour with a multilateral institutionalised context.
In recent years we have seen the emergence of a form of
regional multilateralism that binds together regions around the world into the
global system. As a result, sub-national and regional actors are increasingly
recognising that their futures are intermeshed and are taking steps to
co-ordinate their relationships. Today, the multilateral management of
international problems occupies a central position in political,
socio-economic, environmental, and security issues. Yet, there is considerable
debate and in some quarters disillusionment about the form, content, and
prospects for multilateralism as an institutional form. The post-1989 growing integration
of the world economy has also sparked new interest in multilateralism. States,
non-governmental organisations and other transnational actors are responding to
new and old problems on the global agenda. In the economic sphere, the
existence of organisations such as the IMF, GATT (and now WTO), the World Bank,
and an array of transnational networks suggest that the shift toward market
liberalisation will be attended by important forms of multilateral regulation,
management, and political lobbying. Multilateralism, then, is a particular
(Western) way of bringing together international actors to support global
co-operation, incorporating principles of non-discrimination and diffused
reciprocity.[443]
As Axelrod put it, ‘the requirements for the emergence
of cooperation have relevance to many of central issues of international
politics’.[444]
Undoubtedly, the lessons of the
A good lesson from the Helsinki experiment is that the
emergence of a comprehensive regime, covering all major areas of international
relations - including even concrete normative commitments embraced by
procedural rules - proved to be neither utopian nor unattainable. Analysis of
the CSCE’s long journey has shown that international rules are crucial. The two
superpowers established rules on crisis-management and crisis-prevention so as
to reduce the danger of a major confrontation. In fact, these rules may have played a more important role in
maintaining peace than did the MAD deterrence regime.[448] A related issue concerns the
process-fluctuation of the two projects. It is necessary to recall that in the
1970s and 1980s any fluctuation of the East-West relations had its impact on
the progress of the HP. Its slow pace in the first two meetings in
The
Another useful insight drawn from the evolution of the C/OSCE
is the importance of preserving its process-characteristics to preserve
flexibility, dynamism and continuity. This latter property of the system has
become even more sophisticated by the provisions of the 1990 Paris Charter. But
the HP proved as much a result of changing realities as an instrument of
further changes. As previously mentioned, the HP successfully took additional
steps in its transition from ‘Conference’ to ‘Organisation’. It logically
follows that if the BP is to become a (more) meaningful approach to regional
order-building, then a process of institutionalisation along the OSCE lines
should be considered as the safest way to substantive regional co-operation. In
this context, institutionalisation refers to ‘the development of practices and
rules in the context of using them and has earned a variety of labels,
including structuration and routinization, which refer to the development of
codes of meaning, ways of reasoning, and accounts in the context of acting on
them’.[452] Of
course, OSCE structures cannot simply be reassigned to fit the current
Euro-Mediterranean order-building process and lead to conditions that would
satisfy both the aims of the
If history were efficient, then political practice used in
the
The experience offered by the C/OSCE model goes even further,
pointing in the direction that a ‘cognitive region’, along the lines of a
security-community, or even more congruent organisational forms of collective
governance, may develop on the basis of gradual institutionalisation and the
sustenance of certain types of norms.
But a security community is an arbitrary system, which is real and effective
for certain areas of crisis but illusory and impossible for others. In the
All said, the HP experience is an insightful case to
compare with the BP, as the first has completed its evolution from a
process-structured system to one of political consultation, and then to a
permanent institutional setting with operational capabilities. Such normative
commitments have been explicitly undertaken in the real world of international
diplomacy, where sovereignty-conscious states navigate their foreign policies
in the pursuit of national gains. In practice, whether or not the CSCE
norm-setting and norm-implementing experience can apply in the
By using the Helsinki experience either as a prototype, or as
a representational base, or even as a ‘standard’ for the Barcelona project,
this study has tested ideas from one unit of analysis to the other, and
particularly from the transformation of the HP into a more congruent
organisational structure to patterns of institutionalisation among
Euro-Mediterranean partners. In the latter case, the emphasis has been on the
limits and possibilities for empowering the EMP with the necessary knowledge to structure and manage a
heterarchical order. The institutional structure of the OSCE, equipped with
instruments for carrying out specific political and functional tasks, offers
the EMP an operationally meaningful example. But one should not also forget
that the success of order-building is predicated on the extent to which it can
accommodate change without violence.
Even if there are shortcomings in its functioning, the C/OSCE has been a
success story, albeit of a relatively low-profile as compared to more advanced
experiments in regional organisation. According to Gyarmati: ‘An instrument of
preventive diplomacy very rarely hits the headlines. It does not in itself make
headlines’.[457] The
mechanisms, instruments and organs for co-operative conflict-resolution that
have been successfully used in the HP may help to the realisation of the BP’s
security objectives. These mechanisms have proven to be real workhorses of the
international community in its efforts to control conflicts within states,
lubricate change among states, and maintain order in post-1989
Limited as it may be, the potential for systematising
regional conflict-prevention and conflict-management in the
The adoption of C/OSCE-like mechanisms and monitoring
structures by the EMP would be a welcome development, for such instruments
carry out specific tasks that help transform the EMP’s constitutive principles
into political achievement. A difficulty here is that the EMP has not yet
operationalised or even regularised political co-operation, despite the
adoption of the Action Plan that was set out at the beginning of the BP.
Aliboni writes: ‘While the Action Plan would be a list of measures
and policies that the Partners would pick up and negotiate over time according
to priorities and modes they would remain free to gradually agree upon, the
Charter would be an institutional framework with a normative ambition and a
stronger mechanism of political dialogue’.[459] Speaking
of tangible endeavours, Calleya suggests that ‘the 27 partner countries must
introduce a basic type of confidence-building measure, a network that will
enable them to manage and contain the large number of security challenges that
risk upsetting stability across the Euro-Med area’.[460]
The complexity stemming from the nature of protracted conflicts and threat
(mis)perceptions constrain the implementation of the agreed PBMs. Therefore,
the establishment of conflict-prevention mechanisms should provide PBMs with
minimal capacity to intervene on real or potential conflict situations.
According to EuroMeSCo, such mechanisms must have a non-military nature and,
whenever related in some way to military factors, they must have a ‘slowly- or
non-evolutive character’.[461]
The
normative question raised in this study is whether international regimes really
matter in complex, fragile and fragmented orders. Although international
scholarship has conceived of regimes in several ways, the most common amongst
them combines elements of realism and liberalism. Realism stresses the
centrality of states in international politics, describing them as autonomous
units that constantly seek to maximise their own interests within an anarchic
context. Liberalism, on the other hand, by not dismissing the importance of
states in the international system, emphasises the increasing role of
institutions in international governance. It follows that regimes do not play a
role in issues where states can realise their own interests directly through
unilateral applications of leverage. Rather, regimes come into existence to
overcome collective goods dilemmas by means of co-ordinating the actors’
behaviour. Although the latter continue to seek their own interests, they also
create common frameworks and institutions to structure and co-ordinate
collective action. This is where regimes offer an indispensable service, by
making international co-operation possible even within diverse and fragmented
orders such as the Euro-Mediterranean heterarchy. As Keohane put it: ‘To be
effective in the twenty-first century, modern democracy requires international
institutions’.[462]
The latter are used by the states to foresee and predict the responses of other
states. Patterns of mutual expectations and reciprocal behaviour represent the
very fabric of an order sustained by the rule-governed interactions, offering a
framework for further agreement, encouraging transactions, and reducing
cheating among states.
Institutionalists believe that ‘in a world politics
constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to experience
effective hierarchical governance, international institutions operating on the
basis of reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace’.[463]
Although claiming too much for the effectiveness of institutionalised
governance in the
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[2] J. P. Olsen and B. G. Peters, ‘Learning from Experience’, ARENA Reprints, No 96/5, 1996, p. 28.
[3] B. Rothstein, ‘Political Institutions: An Overview’, in R. E. Goodin and H. D. Klingemann (eds.) A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996.
[4] D. Collier, ‘The Comparative Method’, in A. Finifter (ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 112.
[5] L. R. Novick, ‘Analogic transfer: Processes and individual
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[6] Ibit, p. 125
[7] S. Vosniadou and A. Ortony (eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning, Cambridge University Press,
[8] O. R. Young (ed.), Global
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[9] As Stein argues, ‘[c]omplexity is almost a theological concept; many people talk about it, but nobody knows what “it” really is. For example, organizations and systems are often called complex, not because they are seen as dynamic and adaptive, but because they defy easy notions as to how they are organized or function’. D. L. Stein (ed.), Lectures in the Sciences of Complexity, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City CA., 1989, p. xiii.
[10]
P. Taylor, International Co-operation
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[11] M. Landau, ‘On the uses of metaphors in Political Analysis’, Social Research, Vol. 28, 1961, pp. 334-335.
[12] E. E. Agnoletti, ‘The Difficult Construction of a Coherent Policy’, Politica Internazionale, Vol. 5 No 1, 1986, p. 5.
[13]
[14] V. Y. Ghebali, ‘Toward a Mediterranean Helsinki-Type Process’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 4 No 1, 1993, p. 92.
[15] D. Fenech, ‘A Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Whose Security?’,
paper presented at the Conference on Prospects
after Barcelona, organised by MEDAC,
[16]
During the Paris Ministerial Summit Meeting of the ‘Euro-Arab Dialogue’,
Italian Foreign Minister de Michelis stated that the time had come to extend
the spirit of
[17]
G. Munuera and H. Wrede, ‘Prospects for Security and Cooperation in the
[18] See B. G. Peters, Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods, Macmillan, London 1998, p. 56; Cf. A. Przeworski and H. Tenue, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, Wiley-Interscience, New York, 1970.
[19]
P. Harris, Foundations of Political Science, Second Edition, Huchinson and Co,
[20]
H. Teune, ‘Comparing Countries: Lessons Learned’, in E. Oyen (ed.), Comparative Methodology: Theory and Practice
in International Social Research, Sage,
[21] G. Sartori, ‘Comparing and Miscomparing’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 3, 1991, pp. 243-257.
[22] Peters, op. cit., 1998, p. 86.
[23] J. Kinnas and A. J. R. Groom, ‘Association’, in A. J. R. Groom and P. Taylor (eds.), Frameworks for International Cooperation, Pinter, London, 1990, pp. 70-77.
[24] Peters, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
[25] A. Kohli, P. Evans, P.
J. Katzenstein, A. Przeworski, S. Hoeber, J. C. Scott, and T. Skocpol, ‘The
Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium’, World Politics, Vol. 48 No 1, 1996, pp. 1-49..
[26] Détente, in modern diplomatic parlance designates a phase in which tensions between opposing powers have relaxed but without a definitive settlement or any assurance that relations will not worsen again.
[27]
Y. Laulan, ‘East-West Economic Relations’, NATO
Review, Vol. 21 No 2, 1973, pp. 15-16. Cf. P. Hanson, ‘Economic aspects of
[28] Quoted in L. Halle, The Cold War as History, Harper Perennial,
[29]
H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Touchstone
Books,
[30]
V. Mastny, The
[31] In fact, it did not establish any new set of human rights or fundamental freedoms; it mainly reaffirmed provisions already laid down in UN conventions, elevating them to an important an aspect of security.
[32] See G. Moritz, ‘From Sputnik to NDEA: The Changing Role of Science During the Cold War’, unpublished manuscript, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~gmoritz/papers/j3.html, 1999.
[33]
See M. J. Medhurst, et al. (eds.), Cold war rhetoric: strategy, metaphor, and
ideology, Greenwood Press,
[34]
J. L. Gaddis,
[35]
See G. Orwell, In Front of Your Nose
1945-1950, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., Penguin Books,
[36]
For an excellent collection of documents on the ‘Red Scare’ see A. Fried,
(ed.), McCarthyism: The Great American
Red Scare: A Documentary History, Oxford University Press,
[37] R. Jervis, R. N. Lebow and J. G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985.
[38]
See further in E. J. Rhodes (ed.), Power
and MADness: the logic of nuclear coercion, Columbia University Press,
[39] B.
Weisberger, Cold War, Cold Peace: the
[40] Agnew and Corbidge, op. cit., p. 65.
[41]
D. Calleo, ‘NATO and some lessons of history’, in J. Golden et. al. (eds.), NATO at forty: Change, Continuity and Prospects, Westview,
[42]
A. G. V. Hyde-Price, ‘The system level: The changing topology of
[43]
A. De Porte,
[44] See H. Wallace, ‘The Europe that came in from the cold’, International Affairs, Vol. 67 No 4, October 1991, pp. 647-663..
[45] M. Cox, ‘The cold war system’, Critique, Vol. 17, pp. 17-82.
[46]
Molotov’s proposal was perceived from the West as an endeavour to block
ratification of the Paris Agreements, by which
[47] Rotfeld, op. cit., 1984, p. 16.
[48] Fundamental to German Chancellor Brandt’s Ostpolitik was to ‘keep alive the concept of the continued existence of one German people and one German nation’.
[49] R. Legrod, ‘The Problem of European Security’, Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb. 1974, p. 26.
[50]
V. Mastny, ‘The Helsinki process and a new framework of European Security’, in
J. Story, (ed.), The New
[51]
See M. Bowker and P. Williams, ‘Helsinki and West European Security’, International Affairs, Vol. 61 No 4,
Autumn 1985, p. 607; and S. Flanagan, ‘The CSCE and the development of
détente’, in D. Leebaert (ed.), European
Security Prospects for the 1980s.
[52]
A. Bloed, From
[53]
These countries were
[54] R. Legrold, ‘The Problem of European
Security’, Problems of Communism,
Jan/Feb 1974, p. 26.
[55] S. Lehne, The
[56] On this point see F. Cameron, ‘The European Union and the OSCE: Future Roles and Challenges’, Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6, No 2, 1995, pp. 21-31, especially the introduction.
[57] Maresca, op. cit., p.133.
[58] Ibid,
p.133.
[59] Maresca, op. cit., p. 5.
[60] R. Spencer (ed.),
[61]
W. Höynck, ‘From Adversaries to Partners: CSCE Experience in Building Confidence’, Speech at the
[62] Accordingly, the governments of all 35 CSCE states undertook to notify their partners, not less than 21 days in advance, of their ground force manoeuvres with or without air and naval components, which exceeded a total of 25,000 personnel. The provisions also provided for notification of sub-threshold manoeuvres and military movements, and for the invitation of observers to manoeuvres of any size.
[63] However, the effort to achieve balance within these parameters foundered. After more than ten years the MBFR negotiations ended without any formal result. They did, however, prepare the ground for new and successful negotiations on CFE.
[64]
G. Edwards, ‘The Madrid follow-up to the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in
[65] M. Van Der Stoel, ‘The Heart of the Matter: The Human Dimension of
the OSCE’, Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6,
No. 3, 1995, http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/h_monit/hel95_3/stoel.htm, (
[66] Masty, op. cit., 1993, p. 422.
[67] For a detailed analysis of the third basket see G. Edwards, ‘Human Rights and Basket III Issues: areas of change and continuity’, International Affairs, Vol. 61 No 4, Autumn 1985, pp. 631-642.
[68] Not only in the classical Deutschian notion, but also along the lines suggested by Adler. See respectively, K. W. Deutsch et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957; and E. Adler ‘Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations’, Millennium, Vol. 26 No 2, 1997.
[69]
Later, the Soviet invasion in
[70]
R. Davy, ‘No Progress at
[71] Lehne,
op. cit., p. 16.
[72] Ibid,
p.16-17.
[73]
K. Birnbaum, ‘Alignments in
[74] The Western proposals included, inter alia, non-discrimination against
applicants for foreign travel, reduced fees for visas and passports, provisions
on family reunifications, etc. See also
A. Bloed and P. Van Dijk (ed.), Essays on
Human Rights in the Helsinki Process,
[75] Lehne, op. cit., p. 22.
[76]
The Madrid FUM made provision for five more specialised meetings on a variety
of subjects: a meeting on the peaceful settlement of disputes in Athens in
1984; a seminar on Mediterranean co-operation in Venice in 1984; a human rights
meeting in Ottawa in 1985; a cultural forum in Budapest in 1985; and a meeting
on human dimension in Bern in 1986. As for the Valletta Conference,
Mediterranean countries outside
[77] K. Birnbaum and I. Peters, ‘The CSCE: a reassessment of its role in the 1980s’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 16 No 4, Oct., 1990, p. 615.
[78]
A. Bloed, The Conference on Security and
Co-operation in
[79] Lehne, op.
cit., p. 24.
[80] Mastny, op. cit., 1993, p. 426.
[81] Lehne, op.
cit., p. 23.
[82]
Concluding Document from the
[83] This mechanism contained four elements: exchange of information, bilateral meetings, notification of all CSCE states, and raising issues at certain CSCE meetings.
[84]
For the purpose of its implementation and further improvement of its
provisions, the Vienna document endorsed the decision to convene an information
forum in London in April 1989; a Conference on economic co-operation in Bonn in
March 1990; a meeting of experts on the peaceful settlement of disputes in
Valetta in January 1991; and a symposium on the cultural heritage of the CSCE
in Cracow in May 1991. A. Bloed, The Conference on Security and Co-operation
in
[85]
The CFE Treaty was finally signed in
[86] These included the creation of a ‘Council for European Co-operation’, a ‘European Security Commission’, and a trilateral initiative with far-reaching institutional ideas for the development of the HP.
[87]
See A. D. Rotfield, ‘New Security structures in
[88]
The PrepCom did not limit itself to its specific tasks in
[89] In 1991 the CSCE organised the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, which added provisions to the growing body of guidelines for policies on national minorities issues In fact the Report of the Geneva Meeting includes what has become known as ‘the shopping list’, a sizeable catalogue of potentially constructive measures for addressing such issues.
[90] Höynck, op. cit., p. 5.
[91]
See respectively, W. Wallace, The
Transformation of Western Europe, Chatham House Papers, RIIA Pinter,
[92]
M. Mandelbaum, (ed.), The New Russian
Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution,
[93]
F. Carr and P. Starie, ‘Structure and Change in International Order’, in F.
Carr, (ed.),
[94] J. Mayall and H. Miall, ‘Conclusion: Towards a Redefinition of European Order’, in Miall (ed.), op. cit., p. 262.
[95] R. F. Lehman II, ‘Global and Part-Regional Trends in Arms Control and Confidence Building: Implications for the Mediterranean Region, North Africa and the Middle East’, in F. Tanner (ed.), Arms Control, Confidence-Building and Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East, MEDAC, Malta 1994.
[96] See further in A. Politi, ‘European Security: The New Transnational Risks’, Chaillot Papers, No 29, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, October 1997.
[97]
P. Hassner, ‘Change and Security in
[98] Ibid, p. 4.
[99]
F. Heisbourg, Challenges to European
Security and How to Meet Them, Speech to the European Movement’s Conference
on European Foreign and Security Policies,
[100] W. Park and G. Wyn Rees (ed.), Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe, Longman, London and New York 1998; O. Waever, ‘Insecurity, security, and asecurity in the West European non-war community’, in Adler E. and M. Barnett (ed.), Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 69-118.
[101] A. Kortunov, ‘Regional and International Institutions in Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping’, in G. W. Lapidus and S. Tsalik (eds.), Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1994.
[102] See P. Van Ham, ‘
[103] R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, ‘Introduction: The End of the Cold War in Europe’, in R. O. Keohane, J. J. Nye and S. Hoffman, (eds.), After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Harvard University press, Harvard, 1993, p. 2.
[104]
V. Rittberger (ed.), International
Regimes in East-West Politics, Pinter,
[105]
European Commission, ‘The Future of North-South Relations. Towards Sustainable
Economic and Social Development’, CAHIERS,
Forward Studies Unit,
[106]
See C. Zaldivar, ‘The conditions for peace’, in N. Gnesotto (ed.), War and Peace: European Conflict Prevention,
Chaillot Papers, No 11, Institute for
Security Studies,
[107]
A. Moravcsik (ed.), Centralization or
Fragmentation?
[108]
A. D. Rotfeld, ‘
[109] See further here in, H. Klebes, ‘The Quest for Democratic Security’, Peaceworks, No 26, United States Institute of Peace, 1998.
[110] I. Gambles, ‘Conclusion: prospects for the expansion of the European security-community’, in I. Gambles (ed.), A Lasting Peace in Central Europe?, Challot Papers, No 20, Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Paris, October 1995.
[111] R. Weitz, ‘Pursuing Military Security in Eastern Europe’, in Keohane, Nye and Hoffman, (eds.), op. cit., pp. 346-347.
[112]
U. De Vito, Vade Mecum: An Introduction
to the “Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
[113] I. Peters, ‘The “Old” and the “New” CSCE Institutional Quality and Political Meaning’, in. Peters (ed.), op. cit., 1996, p. 86
[114]
A. Bloed, The Conference on Security and
Co-operation in
[115]
Charter of
[116] The idea of creating a Parliamentary Assembly had already appeared in the London Declaration adopted by NATO Heads of State and Government in July 1990. See R. Estrella, ‘The CSCE and the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly’, NATO Review, Vol. 39 No 5, Oct 1991.
[117] It is necessary that 13 participants demand such a meeting. However, if a decision is to be taken as a result of such a meeting, it still requires the agreement of all participants.
[118] J. Dienstbier, ‘The Future of European Security. Prague Conference confirms agreement on basic ideas’, NATO Review, Vol. 39 No 3, June 1991, p. 2
[119]
C. Anstis, ‘CSCE Mark II: Back to
[120]
[121]
A practical achievement in
[122] Anstis, op.
cit., p. 22.
[123] See criticism in P. Simic, ‘The West and the Yugoslav Crisis’, Review of International Affairs, Vol. XLI No. 970, 1991.
[124] W. Höynck, ‘The OSCE’s Contribution to new Stability’, Speech at the Seminar on Post Cold War Europe - Organizations in Search of new Roles, Helsinki, 10 May 1995, p. 5.
[125]
V. Y. Ghebali, ‘The July CSCE
[126] Peace-enforcement activities are, according to Article 53 of the UN Charter, a prerogative of the UN Security Council. CSCE states explicitly excluded the principle option contained in the UN Charter of implementing enforcement measures on behalf of the UN. See further I. Peters, ‘CSCE and Peacekeeping: An Institution and its Instrument as “Victims” of Conflicting State Interests’, in D. Haglund, H. G. Ehrhart (eds.), The “New Peacekeeping” and European Security: German and Canadian Interests and Issues,.Nomos Baden-Baden, 1995, pp. 107-126
[127]
T. Sneek (ed.), ‘Complementarity and Cooperation: The OSCE as part of a
European Security Model for the 21st Century’, Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 7 No 4, 1996,
http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/h_monit/hel96_4/sneek.htm, (
[128]
M. Van Der Stoel, ‘The role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities in CSCE conflict prevention’, CSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities contribution to the Seminar on The
CSCE as a security tool in
[129] Ghebali, op. cit., 1992, p. 5.
[130] V. Y. Ghebali, ‘The CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation: The Opening Gambits’, NATO Review, Vol. 41 No 3, June 1993, p. 23.
[131] The establishment of the FSC put an end to a situation where the CSCE was relegated to the negotiation of CSBMs because it could not be involved in disarmament negotiations. The FSC laid the groundwork for a new approach to military aspects of security in post-communist European politics, while ‘it created an original instrument given its functions, its programme (Immediate Action), as well as the areas of application of that programme’. Ibid, p. 27.
[132]
Six specific topics for negotiation were defined: ‘The harmonization of
obligations contracted by CSCE states under the various international
agreements covering conventional forces in Europe; the development of CSBMs set
out in the Vienna Document 1992; the adoption of new stabilizing and
confidence-building measures including constraints, addressing force generation
capabilities of active and non-active forces; the development of a world-wide
system for the exchange, on an annual basis of military information (covering
weapons, supplies and production); cooperation in the fields of
non-proliferation and international arms transfers and, the adoption of
regional arms reduction and arms limitation measures’. Concluding Document from
[133] Ghebali, op. cit., 1993, p. 28.
[134] In
the Budapest Document, the transition from the CSCE to the OSCE has been
conceived more in formal than in actual terms. On this see V. Y. Ghebali,
‘After the Budapest Conference: The Organization for Security and Cooperation
in
[135] W. Höynck, ‘From Adversaries to Partners: CSCE Experience in Building Confidence’, Speech at the Tel Aviv University M. Kuriel Center for International Studies, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, 5 March 1995.
[136]
[137] W. Höynck, ‘CSCE works to develop its conflict prevention potential’, NATO Review, Vol. 42 No 2, April 1994, p. 17.
[138] W. Höynck, ‘The Current Situation of Regional Security Co-operation and its Future, from European Viewpoint’, Speech at the Ninth Meeting of the International Security Forum, Tokyo, 12 February 1996.
[139] Ibid, p. 26.
[140] Currently, this has been integrated into NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PfP) programme. See M. O’Hanlon, ‘Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces’, Survival, Vol. 39 No 2, 1997, p. 12.
[141] Ghebali, op. cit., 1995, p. 27.
[142]
Given the
[143]
From the very beginning of the
[144]
[145] M. Hanson, ‘Democratisation and Norm Creation in Europe’, European Security After the Cold War, Part I, Adelphi Papers, No 284, Brassey’s for IISS, pp. 28-41.
[146] K. J. Huber, ‘The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East’, RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol. 2 No 31, 1993, pp. 23-30.
[147]
S. Croft, Strategies of Arms Control. A
History and Typology,
[148]
The Dayton Agreement gave two basic tasks to the OSCE: to organise and carry
out negotiations on CBMs and arms control in
[149] K. J. Huber, ‘The CSCE’s New Role in the East’, RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol. 3 No 31, 1994, pp. 30-36.
[150]
P. Neville-Jones, ‘
[151] By 1996 the OSCE’s constant shortage of finance and resources was becoming even more of a liability. This was embarrassingly evident in the Bosnia Mission.
[152]
This has been the case with the HCNM, the ODIHR, and the Missions. The need for
greater co-ordination between the HCNM and the Missions was highlighted by the
HCNM himself in his report to the Vienna Review Meeting. See M. V. D. Stoel,
‘Report to the OSCE Review Meeting’,
[153] Sneek, op. cit., p.11.
[154] E. Adler, ‘Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE’s security community-building model’, in Adler and Barnett (eds.), op. cit., p. 148.
[155] I. Peters, op. cit., 1996, p. 120.
[156]
See more analytically in G. Munuera, ‘Preventing Armed Conflict in
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R. Zaagman (ed.), ‘To change our perceptions: The economy, ecology and European
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[158] R. Zaagman, ‘Focus on the Future: A Contribution to Discussions on a new OSCE’, Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6 No 3, 1995, http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/h_monit/hel95_3/zaagman.htm, (23 march 1999).
[159] Höynck, op. cit., 1994.
[160] Ferraris, op. cit. p. 59.
[161] K. Birbaum, ‘Lessons of the Past,
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[162] J. Baker, ‘CSCE: Building Together
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[163] Andrén and Birnbaum, op. cit., p. 90.
[164]
K. Joon Hong, The CSCE Security Regime
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[165] W. Korey, Human Rights and the
[166] V. Mastny, The
[167] V. Y. Ghebali, La Diplomatie de la Détente: La CSCE, D’Helsinki d’Vienne (1973-1989),
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[168] V.
Mastny, ‘The Helsinki process and a new framework of European Security’, in J.
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[169] D. N. Chryssochoou, M. Tsinisizelis, S. Stavridis and K. Ifantis, Theory and reform in the European Union, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1999.
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[171]
E. B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power:
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M. Van Der Stoel, ‘Political Order, Human Rights, and Development’,
Introduction of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to the
seminar on Conflict and Development:
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[173] Höynck, op. cit., 1995.
[174] S. Lehne, The
[175] A. Heraclides, Security and
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[176] G. Kummel, ‘From Yesterday to Tomorrow - CSCE/OSCE at Twenty: Achievements of the Past and Challenges of the Future’, OSCE ODIHR Bulletin, Winter 1995/1996, p. 13.
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L. Acimovic, ‘OSCE in the Post-Cold War International Relations in
[178]
V. Y. Ghebali, ‘The CSCE in the Post Cold War
[179] Adler, op. cit., p. 148.
[180]
See O. Weaver, et. al., Identity, Migration and the New Security
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[181] Peters, op. cit., 1996, p. 121.
[182]
[183]
There is a reluctance to include the Balkans as a Mediterranean sub-regional
space, which is instead seen as comprising a separate region in itself. S.
Calleya, Navigating Regional Dynamics in
the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area,
[184] A. Ounais, ‘Security Trends in the Mediterranean: A Perspective
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I. O. Lesser, ‘Growth and Change in
[188] N. Waites and S. Stavridis, ‘The EU and Mediterranean Member States’, in S. Stavridis, T. Couloumbis, T. Veremis, N. Waites (eds.), The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s, London, Macmillan, 1999, p. 29.
[189]
T. Couloumbis and T. Veremis, ‘Introduction: The
[190]
H. Köchler, ‘ Muslim-Christian Ties in
[191] P. Cuco, The Eastern Mediterranean, Report submitted on behalf of the
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[192] H. Essid, ‘Les termes de l’équivoque’, Le
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In ‘The End of History?’
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M. J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies:
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M. Blunden, ‘Insecurity in
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B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: The
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[199] N. Ayubi, ‘Farms, factories and.... walls: which way for European/Middle Eastern Relations’, in N. Ayubi (ed.), Distant Neighbors: The Political Economy of Relations between Europe and the Middle East/North Africa, Ithaka Press, Reading 1995, p. 7.
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E. Said, Orientalism, Vintage,
[202] E. Said, Covering Islam. How
the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World,
Routledge and Kegan Paul,
[203] Ibit, p. 31
[204] J. L. Espozito, Islam and Politics, 4th edition, N.Y.
Syracuse University Press,
[205]
B. A. Roberson, ‘Islam and
[206] I. M. Lapidus, ‘Beyond the Unipolar Moment a Sober Survey of the Islamic World’, Orbis, Vol. 40 No3, Summer 1996, p. 393.
[207]
The term modernisation refers to the process in which the structures of the
traditional societies are dismantled and replaced by new structures on
economic, social, political, and cultural levels. See more analytically in C.
E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization:
A Study in Comparative History, Harper and Row Publishers,
[208]
G. A. G. Soltan, ‘
[209]
Such features include unitarianism, a rule-ethic, individualism, scripturalism,
puritanism, an egalitarian aversion to mediation and hierarchy, and a small
load of magic. See
[210]
P. G. Vatikiotis, Islam and the State
(in Greek), Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy,
[211]
S. P. Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner
(eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, The John Hopkins University Press
and the National Endowment for Democracy,
[212] R. Aliboni, ‘Factors Affecting Mediterranean Security’, in Tanner (ed.), op. cit.
[213] S. P. Huntingdon, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, in L. Diamond and M. F.
Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of
Democracy, The John Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for
Democracy,
[214]
J. Diamond, J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, Lynne Rienner,
[215] Ibid., p. 198.
[216]
D. G. Curdy, ‘Security and Peace in the
[217] Pool, op. cit., p. 215.
[218] I. M. Lapidus, op. cit., p. 404.
[219] Quoted in H. A. Jawad, ‘Islam and the West: How Fundamental is the Threat?’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 140 No 4, August 1995, p. 37.
[220] H. Köchler, ‘Philosophical Foundations of Civilizational Dialogue: The Hermeneutics of Cultural Self-comprehension versus the Paradigm of Civilizational Conflict’, Occasional Papers Series, No 3, International Progress Organization, 1998.
[221]
A. Bin, ‘Strengthening cooperation in the
[222]
World Bank, Dept Tables 1994,
[223]
P. R. Ireland, ‘
[224]
M. Grenon and M. Batisse (eds.), Futures
for the
[225] J. C. Renaud, ‘Security and Energy in the Post-Crisis Period’, in NATO Review, No 1, Vol. 39, Feb. 1991, p.22.
[226]
G. Joffé, et al., ‘The
[227]
For a detailed analysis of all these factors see M. Benyaklef, ‘Socio-economic
Disparities in the
[228]
Couloumbis and Veremis, op. cit.,
1999, p. 3. For other useful analysis of statistics on the North-South gap see
R. Aliboni, et al., ‘Co-operation and
Stability in the
[229]
A. de Vasconcelos, ‘The New Europe and the
[230]
For any given per capita income, poverty was lower in the
[231]
B. Khader, ‘Europe-Arab Economic Relations: Balance of a Quarter Century
1973-1997’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers
Internacionals, No 37, 1997.
http://www.cidob.es/castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/khader. html (
[232]
This has been particularly true not only for the major oil-producing countries,
but also for minor producers like
[233]
World Bank Report, ‘Claiming the Future Choosing Prosperity in the Middle East
and
[234] Joffé, op.
cit., 1996.
[235]
For a detailed analysis of figures and trends in Mediterranean demographics
see, R. King and M. Donati, ‘The “Divided”
[236] S. E. Ibrahim, ‘The Demographic Factors in the Security of the Mediterranean: From The Battle Of Tours To The Battle Of Algiers’, Fondation Mediterraneenne d’Etudes Strategiques, Seminar de la Tour Blanche, Toulon, 21-24 June 1995.
[237]
Inter-Parliamentary
[238] S. Collinson, ‘Migration and Security in the Mediterranean: A Complex Relationship’, paper presented in the Conference on Non military aspects of Security in Southern Europe: Migration, employment and labour market, organised by the Institute of International Economic Relations and Regional Network on Southern European Societies, Santorini 19-21 September 1997.
[239] See S. Spencer (ed.), Immigration as an Economic Asset: The German Experience, IPPR/Trentham Books, Staffordshire, 1994.
[240] Aliboni, op. cit., 1994.
[241]
S. Collinson, Shore to Shore. The
Politics of Migration in Euro-Maghreb Relations, Royal Institute of
International Affairs,
[242]
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘The Marginalization of
[243] N. Fahmy, ‘After Madrid and
[244]
R. Aliboni, ‘European Security Across the
[245] Signs of the Cold War became evident in the
[246]
G. Salame, ‘Torn between the
[247] In
the late 1970s and early 1980s, a disunity of regional alignments in the wider
Mediterranean region through a series of events including the change of regime
in
[248]
Joel Peters, ‘
[249] A process that culminated in the signing of the Single European Act in February 1986 which represented the first formal revision of the original treaties.
[250] H. Köchler, ‘US-European Relations After the End of the East-West Conflict: Implications for Euro-Mediterranean Co-operation’, Occasional Papers Series, No 1, International Progress Organization, 1997.
[251]
R. Aliboni, ‘Collective Political Co-operation in the
[252] J. W. Holmes, ‘US Interests and policy Options’, in Holmes (ed.), op. cit., p. 224.
[253]
Z. Khalilzad, ‘Challenges in the Greater
[254]
P. Marr, ‘The United States,
[255] See more analytically I. O. Lesser, ‘Southern Europe and the Maghreb: US Interests and Policy Perspectives’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1 No 2, Autumn 1996, pp. 231-242.
[256] E. Laipson, ‘Thinking about the Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 1, No 1, Winter 1990, pp. 50-65, see especially pp. 63-65.
[257] G. Joffé, ‘Southern Attitudes Towards an Integrated Mediterranean Region’, op. cit., 1997, p. 18.
[258]
For more details see Euromed Special
Features, ‘The Middle East Peace Process and the Role of the European
Union’, Issue No 7,
[259] Köchler, op.
cit., 1997.
[260]
P. H. Gordon, ‘The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing
[261]
C. Gaspar, ‘
[262]
R. Hollis, ‘
[263] Holmes, op. cit., 1995, p. 225.
[264] J. C. Snyder, ‘Proliferation Threats to Security in NATO’s Southern Region’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 4 No 1, Winter 1993, p. 110.
[265] M. Aguirre, ‘NATO needs a new approach to the Mediterranean’, Summit Briefing Paper, No 97.4, Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security, July 1997.
[266]
D. C. Gompert and S. F. Larrabee (eds.),
[267] R. Gillespie, ‘Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona
Process’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers
Internacionals, No 37, 1997.
http://www.cidob.es/castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/gillespie.html (
[268] A. Jűnemann, ‘Europe’s interrelations with North Africa in the new framework of Euro-Mediterranean partnership - A provisional assessment of the Barcelona concept’’, The European Union in a Changing World, Third ECSA-World Conference, 19-20 Sept. 1996, Brussels, Selection of papers published by the European Commission, Luxembourg 1998, p. 378.
[269]
A. Kaminski, ‘The Geostrategic Implications of Enlargement’, paper delivered at
the Second Meeting of the Working Group on the Eastern Enlargement of the
European Union, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute,
[270] Among the important parameters that differentiate various actors on
the European theatre are the character of objective security risks, the way of
assessing the substance of vital national interests, the available means of
defusing possible threats, a country’s role and place in the emerging security
architecture, its options of alignment and, more generally, its security
interaction with other actors. See V. Baranovsky, ‘An Understanding of Europe’s
Overlapping Political Realities’ Revista
CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, No 38-39, 1997.
http://www.cidob.es/Ingles/Publicaciones/Afers/38-39baranovsky.html (
[271]
This term draws on C. Hill, ‘European Foreign Policy Power bloc, Civilian model
- or Flop?’, in R. Rummel (ed.), The
Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe’s New Assertiveness,
[272]
H. Miall, ‘Wider
[273]
R. Aliboni, ‘Southern European Security: Perceptions and Problems’, in R.
Aliboni (ed.), Southern European Security
in the 1990s, Pinter,
[274] D. Constas, ‘Southern European countries in the European Community’, in Holmes (ed.), op. cit., pp. 127-150.
[275] T. Veremis, ‘International Relations in Southern Europe’, in J. Loughlin (ed.), Southern European Studies Guide, Bauker-Saur, London 1993, pp. 207-210.
[276] For comprehensive analyses of Spain’s increasing role in the Mediterranean see R. Gillespie, Spain and the Mediterranean: Developing a European Policy towards the South, Macmillan, London, 1999; and, ‘Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, Summer 1997, pp. 33-48; R. Gillespie, ‘Spain and the Mediterranean: Southern Sensitivity, European Aspirations’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1 No 2, Autumn 1996, pp. 193-211; and C. Echeverria Jesus, ‘Spain and the Mediterranean’, in Stavridis et. al. (eds.), op. cit., 1999, pp. 98-113. Respectively for Italy see J. W. Holmes, ‘Italy: In the Mediterranean, but of it?’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1 No 2, Autumn 1996, pp. 176-192; E. Greco and L. Guazzone, ‘Continuity and Change in Italy’s security policy’, in Aliboni (ed.), op. cit., especially pp. 71-83; and, R. Aliboni, ‘Italy and the Mediterranean in the 1990s’, in Stavridis, et. al. (eds.), op. cit., 1999, pp. 73-97.
[277] J. Marks, ‘High Hopes and Low Motives: the New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1 No 1, Summer 1996, p. 11.
[278] D. Allen, ‘Conclusions’, in C. Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, Routledge, London 1996, p. 301.
[279]
R. Pace, ‘Peace, Stability, Security and Prosperity in the Mediterranean
Region’, in A. Bin (ed.) Co-operation and
Security in the
[280]
These differences stem from the geographical position of the southern EU
members and their different historical pasts: while
T. Veremis, ‘European Political Cooperation and the pursuit of security: towards a southern position?’, in Aliboni (ed.), op. cit., p. 33.
[281]
F. Tanner, ‘An Emerging Security Agenda for the
[282] A. Jűnemann, ‘Europe’s interrelations with North Africa in the new framework of Euro-Mediterranean partnership - A provisional assessment of the Barcelona concept’’, The European Union in a Changing World, Third ECSA-World Conference, 19-20 Sept. 1996, Brussels, Selection of papers published by the European Commission, Luxembourg 1998, p. 365.
[283] R. Whitman, ‘The EU and the Mediterranean: Looking towards the Millenium’, CMS Occasional Papers, No 18, Center for Mediterranean Studies, University of Bristol, February 1998, p. 10.
[284] R. Gillespie, ‘Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona
Process’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers
Internacionals, No 37, 1997.
http://www.cidob.es/castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/gillespie.html (
[285]
[286] H. Köchler, ‘US-European Relations After the End of the East-West Conflict: Implications for Euro-Mediterranean Co-operation’, Occasional Papers Series, No 1, International Progress Organization, 1997.
[287] Quoted in L. Khan, ‘
[288] Launching the Middle East Peace Process in
[289] Quoted in Khan, op. cit.
[290]
See J. Peters, Pathways to Peace: The
Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks, RIIA,
[291]
Marks, op. cit.
[292] Barbé, op.
cit, pp. 25-42.
[293]
Commission of the European Communities,
[294] Jűnemann, op. cit., p. 369.
[295] Commission of the European Communities,
[296]
F. Tanner, ‘An Emerging Security Agenda for the
[297]
R. Aliboni, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Interpretation from
[298] N. Kliot, ‘Politics and Society in the Mediterranean Basin’, in R. King, L. Proudfoot and B. Smith (eds.), The Mediterranean: Environment and Society, Arnold, London 1997, pp. 108-125.
[299] Edwards and Philippart, op. cit., p. 15.
[300]
R. Aliboni, ‘Re-Setting the Euro-Mediterranean Security Agenda’, The International Spectator, Vol. XXXIII
No 4, Oct.-Dec., 1998.
[301] Joffé notes that, ‘this may occur despite the recommendations for ‘good governance’, not because of them, and that it may be economic change that brings it about’. G. Joffé, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona’, Briefing Papers, No 44, Middle East Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, May 1998.
[302] EuroMeSCo, Working Group on Confidence-Building, Arms Control and Conflict Prevention, EuroMeSCo network, April 1997. In order to establish functions of conflict prevention, it is also argued in the report, the EMP should combine short and long-term action such as systemic as well as structural and diplomatic preventive actions with a highly pragmatic approach in intra-conflict and post-conflict situations. The report argues that this may become acceptable if a strong mechanism of information and communication without intervention is firmly established in the meantime and the scope of information were not subjected to significant limitations.
[303]
F. Tanner, ‘An Emerging Security Agenda for the
[304]
C. Echeverria Jesus, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Political Relations: Confidence - and
Security-Building Measures’, ELIAMEP
Occasional Papers, No OP97.07, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign
Policy,
[305]
There is a certain resemblance between the nature of the commitment for the
MEFTA and the completion of the Single European Market. In both cases, the
dates agreed were target dates rather than legally binding dates. This permits
certain levels of flexibility for the necessary adjustment processes.
Interview, DG 1B, European Commission,
[306] Jűnemann, op. cit., p. 370.
[307] N. Minasi, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area and its Impact on the Economies Involved’, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No 16, Special Issue on the Euro-Med, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, October 1998.
[308] L. Tsoukalis, ‘The EU in search of a Mediterranean policy’, European Expression: A Quarterly Edition on European Issues (in Greek), No 28, January-March 1998, p. 37.
[309] M. Wolf, ‘Cooperation or Conflict? The European Union in a liberal global economy’, International Affairs, Vol. 71 No 3, 1995, p. 333
[310] Euromed Internet Forum, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area’, Euromed Special Feature, Issue No 2, November 1998.
[311]
An early study by the EU suggested that during the transition EU competition
could bankrupt some 2000 companies in
[312] Euromed Internet Forum, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area’, Euromed Special Feature, Issue No 2, November 1998.
[313] E. L. Hudgins, ‘Regional and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Complementary Means to Open Markets’, Cato Journal, Vol. 15 No 2-3, Fall/Winter, 1995/96.
[314] EuroMeSCo, Working Group on Confidence-Building, Arms Control and Conflict Prevention, EuroMeSCo network, April 1997.
[315] Minasi, op.
cit.
[316] B. Khader, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP): The Unaccomplished Tasks’, The IPTS Report, Special Euro-Mediterranean Issue No 25, IPTS/European Science and Technology Observatories Network, June 1998.
[317] For more on the MEDA Programme see H. Schneider and H. Zomer, ‘European Union and the Mediterranean (MEDA)’, APRODEV Information Document, August 1997.
[318] Interview with M. Webb, op. cit.
[319] Aliboni, op. cit., 1996.
[320]
The term is borrowed from S. Strange, Casino
Capitalism, Manchester University Press,
[321] B. Hoekman, ‘The World Trade Organization, the European Union, and the Arab World: Trade Policy Priorities and Pitfalls’, Private Sector Development Division, Europe and Central Asia, and Middle East and North Africa Technical Department, World Bank, Sep. 1995.
[322] Euromed Internet Forum, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Partnership’, Euromed Special Feature, Issue No 3, December 1998.
[323] A. Colas, ‘The Limits of Mediterranean Partnership: Civil Society and the Barcelona Conference of 1995’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 8, No 4, Fall 1997, p. 75.
[324] F. Benaboud, ‘Civil Society in the Euro-Mediterranean Region’, Journal of the Society for International Development, Vol. 41, No 1, 1997.
[325] A. De Vasconcelos, R. Aliboni and A. Monem Said Aly, EuroMeSCo Report 1997/1998.
[326] N. Fahmy, ‘After Madrid and
[327]
To reduce migratory pressures, the partners stressed that it is the southern
Mediterranean countries that have overall responsibility for the re-admission
of illegal immigrants to
[328] Waites and Stavridis, op. cit., p. 33.
[329] Edwards and Philippart, op. cit., p. 10.
[330] Aliboni explains that the EU gives its Mediterranean partners nothing more than a limited co-management of its Mediterranean policy. In practice however, what they can do is either ‘corroborate’ or ‘oppose’ EU decisions, as their initiative is limited, because it is strongly conditioned by EU mechanisms for reaching consensus or otherwise making decisions in the framework of its CFSP. Informal EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials Seminar, Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue, Bonn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 March 1999, EuroMeSCo News, No. 5, April 1999.
[331] J. Monar, ‘Institutional Constrains of the European Union’s Mediterranean Policy’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3 No 2, Autumn 1998, pp. 39-60.
[332] The EuroMeSCo network of Euro-Mediterranean foreign policy institutes was established in June 1996 at Sesimbra under the co-ordination of the Lisbon IEEI. It functions as a laboratory for ideas and methods in tackling issues which may be deemed sensitive but are nonetheless essential for the EMP to work.
[333] The creation of a network of defence institutes and the organization of a seminar on the deployment of armed forces for humanitarian work were also issues that were raised, but were suspended to future discussions.
[334] The Charter for Peace and Stability is intended to establish a set of principles and instruments that would enable partners to make and implement common decisions. In other words, it would create an institutional framework with a normative ambition: that partners should aim at adopting a more coherent agenda as opposed to that put forward by the Action Plan.
[335] Informal EuroMeSco-Senior Officials Seminar, Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue, Bonn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 March 1999, EuroMeSco News, No. 5, April 1999.
[336]
COM(97) 68, ‘Commission communication on the progress of the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership and preparations for the second ministerial conference’,
[337]
See A. Jbili and K. Enders, ‘The Association Agreement Between
[338] J. Licari, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Economic and Financial Aspects’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3 No 3, Winter 1998, p. 19.
[339] Joffé, op.
cit., 1998.
[340] H. Lindholm-Schulz and M. Schulz, ‘The Middle East - exception or embryonic regionalism?’, Politeia, Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, p. 106.
[341]
In so far as they did accord it a role, the EU was to bankroll the bilateral
part of the Middle East Peace Process, particularly the essential support
required by the new Palestinian economy as it emerged in the
[342] F. Attinà, ‘Regional Cooperation in Global Perspective. The case of the ‘mediterranean’ regions’, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No 4, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, December 1996.
[343] F. Tanner, ‘The Malta Meeting revisited: The Middle East is catching up with the Barcelona Process’, editorial of Director on the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Barcelona Process, held in Malta on 15/16 April 1997.
[344] St. C. Calleya, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No 2, autumn 1997, pp. 1-22.
[345] Joffé, op.
cit., 1998.
[346] Tanner, ‘The Malta Meeting revisited’, op. cit.
[347] St. C. Calleya, ‘Providing new dynamism to the Euro-med process’, Euro-Mediterranean Magazine, Volume 3, Issue III, EuroMed Internet Forum.
[348]
Maltese Prime Ministers’ Closing Statement, Second Euro-Mediterranean
Ministerial
[349]
For example, ‘The Participants take note of the work of Senior Officials on a
Charter for peace and stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and instruct
them to continue the preparatory work, taking due account of the exchanged
documents, in order to submit an agreed text at a future Ministerial Meeting
when political circumstances allow’.
[350] Joffé, op.
cit., 1998.
[351] Ibid.
[352]
R. Edis, ‘Does the
[353]
Experts’ Meeting on the Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area
[354] The importance of an appropriate regime concerning rules of origin was recognised.
[355] EuroMeSCo, Working Group on Confidence-Building, Arms Control and Conflict Prevention, EuroMeSCo network, April 1997.
[356]
Since the Barcelona Conference, there have been four meetings on the
socio-cultural dimension: two Ministerial Conferences, in
[357]
Euromed Internet Forum, ‘The
[358] See Informal EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials Seminar, Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue,
[359]
Chairman’s Formal Conclusions, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign
Ministers - Barcelona III,
[360]
Euromed Internet Forum, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Conference On Regional Cooperation’
Euro-Med Special Features, No 5,
[361] See further on this in D. K. Xenakis and D. N. Chryssochoou, The emerging Euro-Mediterranean system, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2001.
[362]
In the military aspects of ESDP, the
[363]
D.N. Chryssochoou, M. J. Tsinisizelis, K.Ifantis and
[364] The problems of creating smooth and efficient ESDP-NATO relations are not in the focus of this article. However, these problems include among others, the harmonisation of the national defence policies and strategies; the problem of harmonising different group memberships because some EU members are in NATO and others are out of NATO; the problem of financial resources of the ESDP; the problem of defining the weight of different groups of countries in the decision-making process, etc.
[365]
[366] D. Ê. Xenakis, ‘The Future of Euro-Mediterranean Defense Co-operation: The Way Ahead’, experts round table paper, international seminar of the Hellenic Presidency, The Mediterranean Dimension of the ESDP and the Hellenic Presidency, Defence Analysis Institute, Ministry of Defence, Rhodes, 2 November 2002.
[367] The main aim was to exchange views on ESDP matters and soft-security measures with the Mediterranean partners in order to further develop the capacity to identify and adopt a common Euro-Mediterranean ground on security and defence issues.
[368] First Year Report of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) Working Group ÉÉÉ, ‘European Defence: Perceptions vs. Realities’, EuroMeSCo Papers, No 16, 2002, especially pp. 11-12.
[369] The Common Strategy for the Mediterranean was adopted by the European Council in Feira and constitutes a means for exercising EU foreign policy in the Mediterranean region, as well as a mechanism for implementation of the CFSP objectives, according to the relevant provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty.
[370] EuroMeSCo, ‘European Defence: Perceptions vs. Realities’, op.cit., p. 14.
[371] While conceived as a sub-regional 'proximity' circle within the wider Euro-Mediterranean space, the Mediterranean Forum can have a very active and specific role in promoting a multilateral co-operation agenda in the Mediterranean in what concerns particularly security and defence issues. Its membership makes it easier to tackle co-operation on such issues, which would be a harder task, due to current circumstances, at the EMP level to address. Istituto Affari Internazionali, Summary of Deliberations, workshop on ‘Measures for Conflict Prevention in the MedForum Countries’ Framework’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome 21-22 June 2002.
[372] A. Jűnemann, ‘Europe’s interrelations with North Africa in the new framework of Euro-Mediterranean partnership - A provisional assessment of the Barcelona concept’’, The European Union in a Changing World, Third ECSA-World Conference, 19-20 Sept. 1996, Brussels, Selection of papers published by the European Commission, Luxembourg 1998, p. 365.
[373] J. P. Derisbourg, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership After Barcelona’, paper presented in Conference organised by MEDAC, Prospects after Barcelona, Malta, March 1996.
[374] Jűnemann, op. cit., p. 383.
[375] Ibid, p. 373.
[376] N. Fahmy, ‘After Madrid and Barcelona: Prospects for Mediterranean Security’, paper presented in Conference organised by MEDAC, Prospects after Barcelona, MEDAC, Malta, March 1996.
[377] R. King and M. Donati, ‘The ‘Divided’ Mediterranean: Re-defining European Relationships’, in R. Hudson and A. M. Williams (ed.), Divided Europe: Society and Territory, Sage, London 1999, p. 156.
[378] Malcolm Rifkind, ‘British Initiative in Investment Barriers’, British Foreign Secretary brief in the Barcelona Conference, 28 November 1995, British Foreign Office 1995.
[379] E. Kienle, ‘Destabilisation through Partnership? Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the Barcelona Declaration’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3 No 2, Autumn 1998, p. 4.
[380] S. M. Nsouli, A. Bisat, and O. Kanaan, ‘The European Union’s New Mediterranean Strategy’, Finance and Development, Vol. 33, No 3, September 1996, p. 14-17.
[381] For a more detailed analysis of the economic benefits and costs of the EMP see S. M. Nsouli, A. Bisat, and O. Kanaan, ‘The European Union’s New Mediterranean Strategy’, Finance and Development, Vol. 33, No 3, September 1996, p. 14-17.
[382] Commission of the European Communities, ‘Progress Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Preparations for the Second Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers’, Communication From The Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(97) 68 final, Brussels, 19.02.1997.
[383] A. Marquina, ‘Security and Political Stability in the Mediterranean’, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, No 37, 1997 http://www.cidob.es/castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/marquina.html, (23 March 1999).
[384] G. Luciani, ‘Where to Start with Multilaterism - An Agenda for Cooperation between Europe, the Middle East and North Africa’, Working Papers, Research Group on European Affairs, University of Munich August 1996.
[385]
R. Aliboni, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Interpretation from Italy’,
paper presented in Conference organised by MEDAC, Prospects after Barcelona, Malta, March 1996.
[386] See Kienle, op. cit., pp. 1-20.
[387] G. Joffé, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Today’, Informal EuroMeSCo-Senior Officials Seminar, Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue, Bonn, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 March 1999, EuroMeSCo News, No. 5, April 1999.
[388] Edwards and Philippart, op. cit., p. 18.
[389] R. Gillespie, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 No 1, Summer 1997, pp. 4-5
[390] Barbé, op.
cit., p. 32
[391] R. O. Keohane, ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics’, in Keohane (ed.), op. cit., 1989, p. 4.
[392] Hasenclever et
al., p. 7.
[393] Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, in Krasner (ed.), op. cit.
[394] S. D. Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables’, in Krasner (ed.), op. cit., p. 5.
[395] Ibid, p. 6.
[396] Ibid, p. 9.
[397] Ibid, p. 10.
[398] Bin, op. cit., 1997.
[399] Concluding Statement of the UK Presidency by the Foreign Secretary Mr Robin Cook, Ad-Hoc Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting, Palermo, 3-4 June 1998.
[400] Kohli argues that the problem orientation distinguishes comparative politics from other social science fields that tend to be driven primarily by theoretical and/or methodological ends. See A. Kohli, et.al. op.cit, 1996, p. 46.
[401] G. Edwards and E. Philippart, ‘The EU Mediterranean Policy: Virtue Unrewarded or...?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11 No 1, 1997, p. 186.
[402] See A. Collins and M. Burstein, ‘Afterword: A framework for a theory of comparison and mapping’, in Vosniadou and Ortony (eds.), op. cit., 1989, pp. 546-565.
[403] V. Y. Ghebali, ‘Toward a Mediterranean Helsinki-Type Process’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 4 No 1, 1993, p. 95.
[404] H. D. Lange, ‘The CSCE and Security in Europe’, Helsinki Monitor, No 3, 1992, p. 29.
[405] See C. Lipson, ‘Why are Some International Agreements Informal?’ International Organization, Vol. 45, Autumn 1991, pp. 495-538, and A. Aust, ‘Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 35, 1986, pp. 787-812.
[406] International ‘treaties’ can be defined as agreements, which establish binding obligations between the parties, and whose terms and provisions are governed by international law, whilst ‘conventions’ are multilateral instruments of a law-making or regulatory type, usually negotiated under the auspices of regional and/or international organisations. See further in D. P. O’Connell, International Law, 2nd edition, Stevens and Sons, London, 1970, pp. 195-295.
[407] Agreements are distinct from treaties and conventions in that the latter are generally of a more comprehensive kind and have permanent subject matter, whilst, agreements normally take the form of a single instrument and tend to be bilateral rather than multilateral.
[408] R. P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, Longman, London and New York, 1988, p. 212.
[409] Ibid, p. 211.
[410] D. W. Larson, ‘Words and Deeds: The Role of Declarations in US–Soviet Relations’, in M, Krepon, J. S. Drezin and M. Newbill (eds.), Declaratory Diplomacy: Rhetorical Initiatives and Confidence Building, Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 27, April 1999.
[411] J. G. Stein, ‘Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict’, International Journal, Vol. 40, Autumn, 1985, p. 624.
[412] G. W. Downs, D. M. Rocke, and P. N. Barsoom, ‘Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism’, International Organization, Vol. 52 No 2, Spring 1998, p. 397.
[413] R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton N. J., 1984, p. 91.
[414] A. D. Rotfield, From Helsinki to Helsinki and Beyond:
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[415] See L. M. Ashworth and D. Long, (eds.), New Perspectives on International Functionalism, Macmillan, London, 1999.
[416] D. Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization, RIIA, London 1943, pp. 18-19.
[417] V. Rittberger (ed.), International Regimes in East-West Politics, Pinter, London and New York, 1990, p. 2.
[418] F. Gale, ‘“Cave! Hic dragones”: a neo-Gramscian deconstruction and reconstruction of international regime theory’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 5 No 2, Summer, 1998, pp. 252-284.
[419] V. Rittberger and M. Zűrn, ‘Towards regulated anarchy in East-West relations: causes and consequences of East-West regimes’, in Rittberger (ed.), op. cit., pp. 9-63.
[420] M. Levy, O. Young and M. Zűrn, ‘The Study of International Regimes’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1 No 3, 1995, p. 271.
[421] Keohane, op. cit., 1984, pp. 97-98.
[422] C. P. Kindleberger, ‘Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, 1981, p. 252.
[423] Keohane, op. cit., 1984, p. 244.
[424] See J. T. Checkel, ‘Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions’, ARENA Reprints, No 99/24, 1999.
[425] O. R. Young, Compliance and
Public Authority, The
[426] See inter alia A. Chayes and A. Handler Chayes, ‘On compliance’, International Organization, Vol. 47, No 2, Spring 1993, pp. 175-205; R. B. Mitchell, ‘Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance’, International Organization, Vol. 48, No 3, Summer 1994, pp. 425-458; and O. R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989.
[427] G. D. Downs, D. M. Rocke and P. N. Barsoom, ‘Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?’, International Organization, Vol. 50, No 3, Summer 1996, pp. 379-406.
[428] J. Goldstein, ‘Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy’, International Organization, Vol. 42 No 1 Winter 1988, p. 182.
[429]
See D.
[430] R. Jervis, ‘Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation’, World Politics, Vol. 40, April 1988, p. 319.
[431] J. D. Fearon, ‘Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation’, International Organization, Vol. 52 No 2, Spring 1998, pp. 269-305.
[432] E. B. Haas, When Knowledge is
Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations,
[433] Ruggie J.
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on International Institutionalization,
[434] E. Adler, ‘Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE’s security community-building model’, Adler and Barnett (eds.), op. cit., 1998, pp. 119-160
[435] R. O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Westview Press, Boulder, Co., 1989, p. 226.
[436] See A. Dawisha, ‘Arab Regimes: Legitimacy and Foreign Policy’, in Dawisha and Zartman (eds.), op. cit., Croom Helm, London, New York and Sidney, 1988, pp. 260-275.
[437] I. Harik, ‘The Origins of the Arab System’, in G. Salamé (ed.), The Foundations of the Arab State (Croom Helm, London, New York and Sidney, 1988, pp. 19-46.
[438] Chayes and Handler Chayes, op. cit., 1993, ff. 201-204;
[439] H. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes,
[440] See B. Barber, ‘Jihad versus McWorld’, The Atlantic Monthly, March 1992, pp. 53-63 (author’s emphasis).
[441] See R. O. Keohane, J. J. Nye and S. Hoffman, (eds.), After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1993.
[442]
See J. Vasquez, ‘Peace and the
[443] Current theoretical and policy debate over multilateralism addresses conceptual and methodological issues; for example, when, under what circumstances, and in what domains is multilateralism a desirable and feasible form of conduct and co-operation? What difference does multilateral action make in terms of possible outcomes of co-operation? Are there strategic, institutional, ethical, normative or other criteria by which multilateral action can be judged useful and feasible? A possibility for multilateral management of regional and international problems transcends traditional intellectual, disciplinary, and area studies divides. The world economy, human rights, the environment, population, security concerns, non-proliferation, cultural affairs all constitute possible issues for further investigation. See further in R. O. Cox (ed.), The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order, MacMillan/UN University Press, Tokyo, 1997.
[444]
R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation,
Basic,
[445] C. W. Kegley Jr., ‘The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, June 1993, p. 141.
[446] R. O. Keohane, ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War’, in D. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1993, especially pp. 269-300.
[447] Adler, op. cit., 1998, p. 149.
[448]
J. Vasquez, ‘The Deterrence Myth: Nuclear Weapons and the Prevention of Nuclear
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[449]
W. Höynck, ‘From Adversaries to Partners: CSCE Experience in Building Confidence’, Speech at the
[450] M. Nimitz, ‘Mediterranean Security After the Cold War’, Mediterranean Quarterly, http://users.erols.com/mqmq/nimetz.htm.
[451] D. Fenech, ‘The Relevance of European Security Structures to the
[452] See J. P. Olsen, ‘European Challenges to the Nation State’, in B. Steunenberg and F. V. Vught, (eds.), Political Institutions and Public Policy, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1997, pp. 159-160.
[453] However, as March and Olsen have argued, history is path dependent in the sense that the character of current institutions depends not only on current conditions but also on the historical path of institutional development. J. G. March J. P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, ARENA Reprints, No 98/5, 1998.
[454] Adler, op. cit., 1998, p. 149.
[455]
Interview with Michael Webb, DGIB, European Commission,
[456] A. Ounais, ‘Security Trends in the Mediterranean: A Perspective from North Africa’, in Fred Tanner (ed.), Arms Control, Confidence-Building and Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East, MEDAC, Malta 1994.
[457]
I. Gyarmati, ‘On Current Issues of the OSCE’, in P. Tálas and S. Gorka
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[458] C. Spencer, ‘Building Confidence in the
[459] R. Aliboni, ‘European Union
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[460] S. C. Calleya, ‘Providing new dynamism to the Euro-med process’, Euro-Mediterranean Magazine, Volume 3, Issue III, EuroMed Internet Forum 1998.
[461] EuroMeSCo, Working Group on Confidence-Building, Arms Control and Conflict Prevention, EuroMeSCo, April 1997.
[462] R. O. Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?’, Foreign Policy, Spring 1998.
[463] R. O. Keohane and L. L. Martin, ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’, International Security, Vol. 20 No 1, 1995, p. 50.
[464] J. J. Mearsheimer, ‘The false promise of international institutions’, International Security, Vol. 19 No 3, 1994, p. 7.
* The author wishes to thank Dr. Geoffrey Edwards (Univ. of Cambridge), Dr. Mick Dumper (Univ. of Exeter), Professor Fulvio Attinà (Univ. of Catania), Prof. Justin Greenwood (Robert Gordon Univ.), Prof. Richard Gillespie (Univ. of Liverpool), Prof. Emil Kirchner (Univ. of Essex), Prof. Michael Tsinisizelis (Univ. of Athens), Prof. Theodore Couloumbis (Univ. of Athens), Prof. Thanos Veremis (Univ. of Athens), Prof. Constatntine Stephanou, (Panteion Univ.), Dr. Dimitris Chryssochoou (DAI), Dr. Charalambos Chardanidis (IIER), Dr. Kostas Ifantis (Univ. of Athens), Ambassadors Dionysios Lelos and Sotirios Varouxakis (both at Greek MFA) and two anonymous referees, as well as, audiences in Athens, Barcelona, Cambridge, Catania, Corfu, Exeter, Halki, Kent, London, Rethymno, Rhodes and Spetses for constructive comments on earlier drafts. The usual proviso on responsibility applies here too.