Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System

Dimitris K. Xenakis

The transformation in world politics since the end of the Cold War and the removal of the bipolar overlay has led to a state of unpredictable change and, as often suggested, disorder. An increased perception of instability has resulted from the collapse of the Cold War deterrence regime--itself based on the promise of mutually assured destruction--which provided balance in the international system. The new international order is being shaped by regional dynamics that had operated all along under the surface of superpower confrontation.

Defining and recognizing conditions of stability in both the international and regional systems during the bipolar era was comparatively easy. During the past ten years, however, as international monitors have reported wars on a daily basis or, to borrow from the BBC, every fifteen minutes, the turbulence of the world demonstrates great difficulties arising from the debris of its Cold War past. In the new era, seismic changes transform regional and international politics, and the prospects for order, governance, and change have become transcendent issues. ¹ Today's world needs stronger and more efficient regional institutions. The problems the international community confronts in coping with global insecurity are easily identified in the ongoing tragedy under way in the Balkans, demonstrating that available [End Page 75] tools are thus far inadequate to deal with the threats of an ever more complex area. ²

Embedded in an international system of regions, the genesis of a considerable global power vacuum offers the European Union the opportunity to secure its territorial integrity from unnecessary instability, while making an impact on the international scene by preserving peace and prosperity in its southern and eastern peripheries. The post-1989 explosion of political liberty in Central and Eastern Europe has paradoxically inflicted upon this transformative European order signs of regional anarchy of the most traditional type. Issues of integration, disintegration, internationalization, balance of power, and the struggle for power have all contributed to the formation of a new pan-European architecture. The replacement of the Cold War overlay by multidimensional security challenges has also lent great fluidity and instability to the Euro-Mediterranean system. The latter was not well equipped in terms of policies, competencies, and institutions to transcend international change. Although the European countries of the Mediterranean have reached a high level of political stability, their Mediterranean neighbors are subject to a variety of acute clashes and challenges that severely affect regional cooperation. This is especially so if one considers the myriad possible negative combinations of sources of tension in the Mediterranean, a region of cultural and religious diversity, prone to clashes founded on longstanding nationalistic and ethnic tensions. It is evident that the recent proliferation of crises and the widening of the structural, institutional, and developmental gap between the northern and southern Mediterranean rims are causing dramatic instability in the European international politico-economic system and have a substantial impact on Europe's international identity.

At the dawn of a new millennium, the EU has considerably better prospects for forestalling large-scale instabilities than Europe had during all preceding periods in its history. Acknowledging the importance of developing regional and world trading blocs, the EU finds itself in a position to consolidate its international stance as the world's strongest economic union of states, not least because of the enduring predominance of economic [End Page 76] issues in world affairs. As the union has become the center of gravity for all the countries in its periphery, one may legitimately expect that its leadership will face up to its growing international responsibilities, including the application of good governance in the management of the Euro-Mediterranean system. In this framework, the question of whether the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)--a three-basket arrangement aimed at fostering cooperation between the EU and twelve Mediterranean countries--will be given the capacity through mechanisms and institutions to structure successfully the nascent Euro-Mediterranean order has become central, especially since 1995, when the EU began more seriously investing in its Mediterranean policy. The problems of the system, the previous fragmented policies of the strategic actors, and the outcome of the evolving Barcelona Process (BP) so far, all point to the urgent need for a reliable cooperative security regime to organize regional politics.

System Properties

The Euro-Mediterranean complex encompasses at least two international "regimes" (Western Europe and the Middle East) and three subregional groupings: Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta); the Mashreq (Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority); and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). Seen through the analytical lens of international regionalism, however, existing Mediterranean constellations need a complex reconceptualization of both their regional and subregional dynamics. ³ There is no doubt that, operationally at least, it is more important to pay attention to specific problems in these areas. There is some utility, however, in thinking about the Euro-Mediterranean system as a whole. This system could be seen as a dense network of diversities and dividing lines among different political and socioeconomic subsystems, cultures, regimes, languages, forms of expression, and religions. [End Page 77]

From an international relations perspective, the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91 signaled a rearrangement of the world order, reducing the East-West confrontation to a minimum, while reemphasizing, in however complex terms, the Orient-Occident and North-South gaps. This event also appeared to have offered useful ammunition to those supporting the idea that the dominant conflict of the post-Cold War era is between occidental and oriental values. ⁴ But even before the Persian Gulf crisis, a theory started to take shape: that it was not communism that constituted the major threat for the West but, rather, Islamic fundamentalism. ⁵

Any discussion about this region should reemphasize the importance of the North-South dichotomy in the Mediterranean, linked to the rich-poor gap. ⁶ Today the Mediterranean offers a dramatic illustration of complex inequality. For example, the total gross domestic product of EU states in the northern Mediterranean is eleven times greater than that of the countries of the South. ⁷ Cyprus is a good case in point, with a population of 700,000 and a per capita income of nearly ten thousand dollars, while Egypt, with 58 million people, is below eight hundred dollars per capita. Unequal economic development, the plurality of political regimes, the divergent perceptions of security threats, and strong demographic growth are the major exacerbating factors affecting the Mediterranean North-South divide.

In recent decades we have witnessed the outbreak of numerous armed conflicts, both within and between nations, and the appearance of shaky regional political dynamics. These phenomena have as their origin the particular characteristics of the regional system itself, a system in which the existence of diverse types of conflict signals the eventual appearance of others. In addition, although the European countries of the Mediterranean have reached a high level of political stability and participate in common institutional structures--the existence of which prevents the appearance and the [End Page 78] escalation of both internal and external disputes--the rest of the littoral countries share few common institutions. The establishment of adequate institutional machinery in the region is essential for its stability, given the endemic nature of actual and potential tensions. As long as the Mediterranean continues to serve as a border between a wealthy, developed, and stable Europe, on the one hand, and a fragmented South, on the other, the EU could realistically hope to keep the fire under control without trying to extinguish it. The EU, however, has first to resist the temptation of becoming a participant rather than an intermediary in potential conflict situations in this unique body of water. ⁸

The Euro-Mediterranean system combines both power politics and interdependence, in that bilateral relations are concluded on realist principles whereas at a multilateral and/or regional level it has become clear that interdependence is increasing. The tendency for the littoral states to act unilaterally in an effort to solve their emerging security anxieties is self-defeating and needs to be replaced by a more balanced and comprehensive security regime founded on substantive regional cooperation for both the management and resolution of potential conflicts. This recommendation is based on the idea of enhancing national security through the prolepsis of immediate violence crisis and also through a long-term process of transparency and peace building--preventing conflicts before they arise is much more effective and cheaper than responding militarily if and when they arise. ⁹ This applies especially if one takes into account the possibility of Mediterranean challenges becoming direct European threats. It could be argued that the most crucial security challenge facing Europe and more particularly the EU in the Mediterranean today rests on the need to establish a set of complementary and overlapping security structures and mechanisms in the Mediterranean hotbeds of tension. It remains, however, unclear whether these can effectively impact the choice made by the participating states [End Page 79] when it comes to issues where national interests are, or appear to be, at stake.

The Euro-Mediterranean systemic complexities are such that they are becoming more and more difficult to confront, let alone resolve, on an individual basis by states acting in isolation from others. The active engagement of multiple actors in the politics of the region may well exacerbate the possibilities for reaching substantive interstate agreement on a number of highly sensitive issues, such as immigration, economic aspects of security, external protection of citizens, respect for human rights, and the resolution of protracted conflicts. The engagement/isolation divide points in the direction of a unitary trap where certain problems cannot be ignored but also cannot be solved separately by each partner acting alone. Both strategic orientation and coordinated action are essential if the fragile stability of the region is to be secured. But mutual trust and stability will continue to depend on a combination of other factors that, in addition to the promotion of North-South codevelopment, must encompass greater mutual understanding in all relevant fields.

Images of the Previous Regime

During the Cold War era, the Mediterranean served as a regional security chessboard for the strategic policies of the two dominant military blocks--the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. This introduced fragility in the regional security balance, which persists even after the collapse of the Eastern pole in the European international system. The Mediterranean represented a crucial area in strategic terms, encompassing many possible seats of conflict as well as a series of unresolved disputes with a strong historical background (for example the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus and the Arab-Israeli conflict).

Syria, Libya, and the Balkan countries were supported by the former Soviet Union, while U.S. support was directed toward Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, with both the United States and the former USSR competing to support Egypt and Algeria. It is worth remembering that in the bipolar distribution of power in the region, the European Community (EC) was supporting Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus. However, Euro-Mediterranean [End Page 80] relations have always been extremely politicized as a result of the geographical proximity, the nature and level of the interdependence of the countries, and the role that previous Mediterranean policies have come to play in the region. The EC had developed conventional relations with the littoral countries as early as 1962 (and even earlier in the case of the former North African French colonies), while it had also participated in the major political issues of the region. But the signs of an enhanced European interest in the region were first recorded in 1975, at the beginning of the Euro-Arab dialogue; then in the early and mid-1980s with the accession of Greece and the Iberian nations to the EC; and again after the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s. It could be argued that for historical, strategic, and economic reasons, the EC was anxious from early on to open both its membership and markets to the Mediterranean. Today, the EU is by far the biggest economic partner of the southern Mediterranean countries. ¹⁰ The EU's external relations with the Mediterranean states were realized in the form of bilateral agreements, which paradoxically are of similar, if not often identical, content. Such a fragmented approach resulted in two general types of association agreements: those concerning prospective members and closer economic associates (Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey) and those relating to the rest of the southern littoral states (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority). Those littoral countries not considered eligible for EU membership loom in the wider framework of the union's Mediterranean policy.

The Persian Gulf episode at the beginning of the 1990s served as a reminder of the Mediterranean region's potential to fall victim to a plethora of disputes over regional hegemony and an associated trend toward overarmament. It heightened awareness of the social, demographic, economic, and political challenges as well as traditional military security anxieties in the region. This is not to say that the Europeans, while often speaking of multidimensional challenges, actually perceive a distinct, direct threat from northern Africa. A military threat to Europe from the Mediterranean is rather unlikely, as the Mediterranean countries themselves attach more [End Page 81] importance to threats coming from the Arab world. ¹¹ Military threats from Europe are not a worry among the southern Mediterranean countries, where the term security is usually associated with internal problems. Still, some southern Mediterranean countries view the development of a European security and defense identity with suspicion. The EU has demonstrated relative difficulty in dealing with security issues in the Mediterranean as opposed to those in other regions, such as Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the EU has to anticipate possible hostility in the Mediterranean even without provoking it (a situation similar to the EU's relationship with Russia). ¹² In addition, the majority of the southern Mediterranean countries are skeptical of the EU's alleged unwillingness to undertake a decisive role in the Mediterranean, something they also perceive as one of the causes of the regional arms race. ¹³ This inertia leads to the continuation of patterns that have developed in regional politics through the years. Even when policy attempts try to take relations in a different direction, the old patterns tend to become convenient fallback positions when the new efforts are faced with setbacks. It is equally true, however, that the EU has faced significant difficulties in assuming a substantive security role in the Mediterranean as a result of the American factor and the reluctance of successive U.S. administrations to share their regional initiatives, e.g., the Middle East peace process.

Another associated problem in the post-1989 Euro-Mediterranean relationship is that developments in the region are followed with special attention by the EU's southern members and hardly even recognized in the north. The prospective enlargement of the EU had led to the employment of dynamic policies toward its eastern periphery, contrasting with its rather vague Mediterranean orientation. The reform process in Eastern Europe, currently under severe financial stress, should in the EU view be kept alive with the active support of the EU's budget. In contrast, many Mediterranean countries outside the EU worry that the massive transfer of resources to [End Page 82] Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus as part of the single-market initiative are further increasing the regional gap in terms of economic and developmental inequality. Turning the EU's external focus is a difficult task given that the two largest members (England and Germany) are adamant that economic assistance should aim at the reconstruction of the Eastern European economies and polities in order to reinforce their accession process. Still, others fear that the focus toward Eastern Europe could hinder the integration process of the Southern European members. They also have economic concerns about this policy's expected negative impact on foreign direct investment and on the EU's development aid to the South. These concerns became manifest in a joint statement produced by the Portuguese and Spanish prime ministers in Seville in 1990. One might see current EU policies toward the East affecting its Mediterranean policies, with the union seeing the latter as a counterpart to its new Ostpolitik.

While the northern EU members have accepted a degree of symmetry in the making of the union's foreign and security policy, different perceptions of interest persist about the relations with its Mediterranean partners. ¹⁴ France, Spain, and Italy, particularly, bring Mediterranean issues to the fore of the EU's agenda, and they traditionally maintain a plethora of economic and political ties with the region. France has displayed a distinctive and rather inchoate strategy toward parts of the Mediterranean. This makes it hard for the EU to accept French leadership in its Mediterranean policy making, as does the fact that Spain and, to a limited extent, Italy have also expressed their own distinct preferences on the EU's Mediterranean policy. ¹⁵ A further Mediterranean issue is that while these three larger Southern European member-states play an essential role in the setting of the EU's Mediterranean agenda, the smaller countries (Greece, Portugal, and possibly Cyprus and Malta) confront more directly the potential tidal waves of Mediterranean stability. These differences illustrate that the European partners have not yet found a reliable modus operandi for utilizing their common [End Page 83] membership so as to promote their interests by strengthening the Mediterranean dimension of the EU.

European ambitions for a stabilized and prosperous Mediterranean in the early 1990s have been promoted mainly outside the framework of the EU's Mediterranean policy. In the eyes of the EU member states, the region is being destabilized due to economic crises and resulting radicalization of social conflicts. The EU member states are worried about losing control over their energy supplies and about increased illegal migration from the region. These anxieties were reflected in demands for increased financial and political support from those member countries that were most disturbed by upheaval south of the Mediterranean. Reassuring to this Southern European concentration of interest was the substantial increase of EU financial assistance for the North African and Middle Eastern region (including Iran) from France, Spain, and Italy. ¹⁶ (The latter put forward a number of multilateral schemes, generally incapable of dealing with the complex array of security challenges in the region.) ¹⁷ This proved to be a very ineffective process, however, sometimes even causing friction among the policies and the Mediterranean aspirations of southern EU members and applicant states. ¹⁸ These initiatives, when applied to parts of the Mediterranean rather than to the whole of the regional system, have created more tensions among the southern EU members than any positive results in terms of cooperation. Although those initiatives that formed part of the EU's former global approach to the Mediterranean fostered, to a certain extent, economic and political cooperation in the region, they all failed to establish a security regime to accommodate and even transcend international change.

The New Euro-Mediterranean Regime

The EU has recently tried to pass from the stasis of its previous policies to a new strategy aiming to correct the imbalance created by its monolithic bilateral [End Page 84] trade relations within a more coherent policy framework that would secure the subtle, and often shaky, stability of the region. In June 1994 the European Council, meeting in Corfu, gave the initial impetus, and in communications of October 1994 and March 1995 the European Commission tabled proposals for a Euro-Mediterranean partnership. At its Essen and Cannes meetings in December 1994 and June 1995, respectively, the European Council endorsed those proposals. In November 1995 foreign ministers from the fifteen EU states sat down with their opposite numbers from twelve Mediterranean nations with a grand agenda. Epitomizing the essence of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration is the emphasis put on respect for democracy and human rights, political dialogue, economic liberalization, and financial and technical assistance for the Mediterranean partners in their adjustment processes. The declaration recalls the numerous international norms and values of interstate relations and global disarmament agreements. It also included--albeit in the circumlocutions of diplomacy--cooperation on combating terrorism and drug trafficking as well as on issues of illegal immigration and arms control, particularly of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The 1995 document infused a greater political and security bias to Euro-Mediterranean relations while encompassing an ambitious economic plan for the creation of an industrially inspired free-trade area by the year 2010. However, free access to industrial exports does not mean a great deal if there is little to export, which is the present case for most of the Mediterranean partners. ¹⁹ Moreover, the Mediterranean Free Trade Area objective, which is to be achieved through a series of economic reforms, also hides security risks, since accelerated market liberalization along the southern Mediterranean rim could produce greater waves of instability in this sensitive region. The EMP does not yet involve any ingenious mechanisms to sustain regional political cooperation, something that might be vital in the possible case of further economic recession and political instability in the southern Mediterranean rim.

The three baskets of issues agreed on in Barcelona in 1995 aimed at accommodating ad integro both emerging and established regional patterns. [End Page 85] They also encompassed a set of policy components whose roots lie in the concepts of both the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the Conference (later the Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C/OSCE). ²⁰ The inclusion of a follow-up mechanism constitutes the dynamic element that--historically speaking--provides ensurance for the continuity of the European initiative, placing the EMP in a position to be considered as a pragmatic mechanism, a major forum for international cooperation, and a procedure that applies to various sectors at both ministerial and senior official levels. A Euro-Mediterranean committee of the EMP was established, consisting of officials from the EU troika (the current, previous, and next council presidencies) and from all twelve southern Mediterranean countries. It was decided that the committee should meet regularly and report to the foreign ministers. It was also decided that the foreign ministers of all partner countries will meet periodically to review progress in implementing the principles of the Barcelona Declaration and to agree on actions that would promote its objectives. This was a substantial advance compared to earlier European policies and initiatives, which contained no precise follow-up provisions and were dependant on constant ministerial action. The EMP also has the advantage of elevating the status of the EU's Mediterranean policy to a genuinely common European policy, rather than one confined to its Southern European countries and their largely uncoordinated initiatives in the region.

Grosso modo, the EMP was the result of a successful effort by the EU to reinnovate and reinforce its Mediterranean policy. The EMP did address the post-Cold War Mediterranean reality: an overlap of different regions integrating different dimensions, including the sociocultural one--something that apparently was missing from previous Mediterranean initiatives. ²¹ The evolving BP has been described as a political gesture aiming at correcting the problems that were created from the inadequacy of the EU's previous narrow-minded policies toward the region. ²² Another rationale was to lock [End Page 86] the EU and the twelve Mediterranean countries into a process with a common framework through cooperation in political, economic, and sociocultural dimensions. To be sure, as Attina has asserted, the EMP is a case of "diffusion effect," reflecting the EU's model for cooperation. ²³ Although there is evidence to suggest that the BP is moving in the right direction, it is doing so at a relatively moderate pace. The BP should be seen, in Gillespie's words, as "emblematic of a process" being constituted from a dynamic set of international exchanges, but still one that leaves much to do before it becomes a meaningful partnership between the two Mediterranean shores. ²⁴

From a systemic point of view, the EMP is a multidimensional regional and international regime that established the linkages between political, economic, and sociocultural security arenas. ²⁵ The partnership has a rather innovative system of arrangements in terms of flexibility for both the EU and its Mediterranean partners. One should not forget that the substantial competition in the financial budget of the EU with the reconstruction of Eastern European economies and polities was the major reason for attracting the interest of the southern Mediterranean countries in the first place. ²⁶ Indeed, the partnership is propelled by a certain economism whose financial implications are particularly favorable to the non-EU partner states. The EU linked the issue of economic liberalization to the set of political principles ratified in Barcelona in November 1995. The entire EMP was a collective European attempt to redefine its threat perceptions about the Mediterranean. The European consensus on traditionally sensitive issues such as human rights, democracy, self-determination, and religious tolerance, together with the initiation of economic and financial cooperation among the Mediterranean states, constitutes the space of regional/international relations where the expectations of the actors converge. The agreement should [End Page 87] also be seen both as a vital step toward a real partnership and a step forward from previous EC/EU-Mediterranean relations. The EMP represents a balance of European and non-European interests, while not yet reflecting a genuinely common Euro-Mediterranean interest per se.

In practice, after 1995 the Barcelona Declaration process was moved toward a series of new Euro-Mediterranean association agreements that updated and enhanced the previous industrial agreements between the EU and the southern Mediterranean countries. Still, the idea of using the BP as a springboard for strengthening cooperation among the twelve Mediterranean states has not been productive. Trade among the southern Mediterranean partners still remains limited; this has been associated with the worsening of Arab-Israeli relations since late in 1995 and the consequent upheaval among the southern partner countries. The results of the second ministerial meeting held on Malta in April 1997 provided a reality check of what were the main issues at stake in the first two years of the BP. ²⁷ The EMP's detachment from the (U.S.-dominated) Middle East peace process represented an effort by the Europeans to avoid the obstacles posed by the complex relations of the eastern Mediterranean. But the exclusion of the United States from the EMP--something that gave the EU a predominant role in the BP--brought in turn reluctance on the part of the United States to share its Middle East initiative. Keeping the United States out of the BP was of great importance to the Euro-African Mediterranean region, especially if seen in connection to the experience of retaining the U.S. presence in Europe--in Bosnia, for example. But this mutual exclusion between the EU and the United States should be regarded a major problem obstructing Barcelona from bearing full fruit. This is seen in the negative results noted in the 1997 second Euro-Mediterranean conference in Malta, underlined by the existence of a causal relationship between progress in the Middle East peace process and progress in the BP. ²⁸ It was hoped from the beginning that these two separate processes would be complementary but not linked to one another. [End Page 88]

Conclusion

Although previous initiatives that formed part of the EU's approach to the Mediterranean fostered to a certain extent economic and political cooperation in the region, they all failed to establish an efficient security regime able to accommodate international change. The 1995 EMP set the direction of future Euro-Mediterranean order by establishing a common approach, according to which economic relations are not pursued in isolation but rather as part of a complex web. Its overall flexibility allows the participating actors to seek cooperative security frameworks or interactions in different policy areas without jeopardizing the regional project as a whole. But whether it will actually play a dynamic role in the affairs of the region remains to be seen.

In the post-1989 era, the research focus on security regimes is not so much on their relevance to security per se but rather on the nature of the functions that must be performed by the types of regimes that have been implemented to secure stability, that is, the quality of management exhibited by the common institutions. What model of large-scale institution building should the EMP proceed with? The endorsement of adequate mechanisms similar to those used in the Helsinki Process should be regarded as a prototype for the regularization of political behavior in the Euro-Mediterranean area. In this context, and in order to achieve a relaxation of North-South tensions and to emphasize the importance of human rights, the BP should aim at creating a reason-based, institutionalized, and mutually reinforcing environment between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. The C/OSCE offers a model of successful international regime formation and maintenance for the promotion of stability in the Euro-Mediterranean area, including innovative mechanisms such as the confidence- and security-building measures. Yet the experience offered by the OSCE points in the direction that a cognitive region, along the lines suggested by Emanuel Adler, or even a more congruent setting of collective/mutual governance will develop on the basis of gradual institutionalization sustained by certain norms (ethics of conduct). ²⁹ Such a process of community [End Page 89] building in the context of the nascent Euro-Mediterranean must be accompanied by some degree of formalization of decision-making procedures. But how to arrive at a security regime similar to the pre-1989 European order is neither the crucial question nor is it a panacea to all Mediterranean anxieties in the post-Cold War era.

The question of whether institutions and, by extension, systems (or models) of institutionalized governance matter in complex regional settings remains an open one. ³⁰ However, "in a world politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to experience hierarchical governance, international institutions operating on the basis of reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace." ³¹ Thus, the institutionalization of the EMP is expected to provide the long-needed international setting to manage issues of both order and change.

Dimitris K. Xenakis is a doctoral candidate in politics, University of Exeter.

Notes

1. J. N. Rosenau, "Governance, Order and Change in World Politics," in Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. J. N. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1.

2. N. Gnesotto, "Lessons of Yugoslavia," Chaillot Papers, no. 14 (1994).

3. Stephen C. Calleya, "Post-Cold War Regional Dynamics in the Mediterranean Area," Mediterranean Quarterly 7, no 3, (summer 1996): 42-54; and more extensively, idem, Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth, 1997), 89-140.

4. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, no. 3 (spring 1993): 22-49.

5. N. Ayubi, "Farms, Factories and . . . Walls: Which Way for European/Middle Eastern Relations?" in Distant Neighbors: The Political Economy of Relations between Europe and the Middle East/North Africa, ed. N. Ayubi (Reading, Mass.: Ithaka Press 1995), 7.

6. G. Joffe et al., "The Mediterranean: Risks and Challenges," International Spectator 28, no. 3 (1993): 36.

7. See also R. Aliboni et al., "Co-operation and Stability in the Mediterranean: An Agenda for Partnership," International Spectator 29, no. 3 (1994): 5-20.

8. Theodore Couloumbis and Thanos Veremis, "Introduction: The Mediterranean Perspective," in The Foreign Policy of the European Union's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s, ed. S. Stavridis et al. (London: Macmillan, 1999), 18.

9. The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy and Research, "How Can Europe Prevent Conflicts?" PMI Discussion Papers, no. 14 (1997).

10. See the Eurostat key figures in "European Union Trade with the Mediterranean Countries," Frontier-Free Europe, no. 4 (1996): 2.

11. F. Faria and A. Vasconcelos, "Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity and Reality," Chaillot Papers, no. 25 (1996): 4.

12. E. Mortimer, "Europe and the Mediterranean: The Security Dimension," in Europe and the Mediterranean, ed. P. Ludlow (London: Brassey's, 1994), 106.

13. G. Joffe, "Southern Attitudes towards an Integrated Mediterranean Region," Mediterranean Politics 2, no. 1 (summer 1997): 18.

14. R. Gillespie, "Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process," Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals, no. 37 (1997).

15. See for more analysis, "Special Issue on Western Approaches to the Mediterranean," Mediterranean Politics 1, no. 1 (autumn 1996): 157-211.

16. J. Marks, "High Hopes and Low Motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative," Mediterranean Politics 1, no. 1 (summer 1996): 11.

17. For trans-Mediterranean initiatives, see C. Tsardanides, "The Southern EU Member States' Policy towards the Mediterranean: Regional or Global Co-operation?" Journal of Area Studies 9, no. 3 (September 1996): 53-69.

18. See the overall analysis provided in Foreign Policy of the European Union's Mediterranean States.

19. L. Tsoukalis, "The EU in Search of a Mediterranean Policy," Evropaiki Ekfrassi (Greek) 28 (January-March 1998): 37.

20. D. K. Xenakis, "The Barcelona Process: Some Lessons from Helsinki," Jean Monet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, no. 17 (October 1998).

21. A. Bin, "Mediterranean Diplomacy: Evolution and Prospects," Jean Monet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, no. 5 (January 1997).

22. G. Edwards and E. Philippart, "The EU Mediterranean Policy: Virtue Unrewarded or . . .?" Cambridge Review of International Affairs 11, no. 1 (autumn 1997): 185-207.

23. F. Attina, "Regional Cooperation in Global Perspective: The Case of the 'Mediterranean' Regions," Jean Monet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, no. 4 (December 1996).

24. R. Gillespie, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," Mediterranean Politics 2, no. 1 (summer 1997): 1-5.

25. Dimitris K. Xenakis, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership versus Regional Complexity: The Anticipation of a "Lean" International Regime, RUSEL Working Papers (Exeter, U.K.: Research Unit for the Study of Economic Liberalization, University of Exeter, 1999).

26. E. Barbe, "The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process," Mediterranean Politics 1, no. 1 (summer 1996): 32.

27. Stephen C. Calleya, "The Euro-Mediterranean Process after Malta: What Prospects?" Mediterranean Politics 2, no. 2 (autumn 1997): 1-22.

28. F. Tanner, "The Malta Meeting Revisited: The Middle East Is Catching Up with the Barcelona Process," paper published by the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Msida, Malta, April 1997.

29. E. Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE Security Community-Building Model," in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 119-60.

30. J. J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 7.

31. R. O. Keohane and L. L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 50.